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Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KO@TENAI

!
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE.
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

ase No.: No. CV-OB-7069
i

LAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE

vs.
THE HARTFORD F1RE INSURANCE
COMPANY. a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

A. Consequential Damages are Foreseeable Under the Policy

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract unduly delaying payment of the claim and
for refusing to pay sums which were properly due pursuant to the contract of insurance. I The

damages for breach of contract are those which arise naturally from

t1~e

breach and are

reasonably foreseeable. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d

672,677 (2002). The question of foreseeability constitutes a question of fact. Appel v.

LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 137, 15 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2000), citing Davis v. McDougall, 94 Idaho
61,480 P.2d 907 (1971).

I

Amended Complaint at 7.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
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The insurance policy specifically contemplates the payment 6r lost profits because it is a
i
policy that pays lost profits when the insured business is not in operation. 2 Furthermore, the
policy provides that it will pay the money it takes to get the businessre-opened so the insured
can again generate the profit that it was before the catastrophe. 3 It pays for the damage to the
contents of the store, which includes inventory and the fixtures and equipment needed to sell that
inventory.4 It is foreseeable that failing to payor unreasonably deJaying payment under the
policy would cause the damages that Lakeland seeks in this lawsuit.

B. Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company is distinguishable and
frivolously cited.
Reliance on this case is frivolous. This is an unpublished federal ,case interpreting New York
law in 2003 and the interpretation is not a correct statement of current New York law on the
subject. In Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. ofNew York, 10 N.Y.3d 187, 194,
886 N.E.2d 127,856 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.2008), the insurance poJicywas almost identical to the
policy in this case. The insured in that case suffered a fire and submitted a claim. The insurance
company did not timely pay under the policy and the insured went out of business. The
insurance company argued that the policy had an exclusion for "consequential damages" and the
Court responded that the damages suffered were recoverable because those damages were
foreseeable.
Thus, the very purpose of business interruption coverage would
have made Harleysville aware that if it breached its obligations
under the contract to investigate in good faith and pay:covered
claims it would have to respond in damages to Bi-Economy for the
loss of its business as a result of the breach
Furthermore, contrary to the dissent's view, the purpose of the
contract was not just to receive money, but to receive it promptly

Policy, Special Property Coverage Form, p. 10, para. o.
Policy, Special Property Coverage Form, p. 11, para. T.
4 Pol icy, Special Coverage Form, p. I, Paras A.I.a & b.
2

3
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I
so that in the aftermath of a calamitous event, as Bi-Economy
experienced here, the business could avoid collapse and get
back on its feet as soon as possible.

Bi-Economy Market, inc. v. Harleysville ins.
Co. o/New York 10 N.Y.3d 187, 195,886
N.E.2d 127, 132,856 N.Y.S.2d 505,
510 (N.Y.,2008), (emphasis supplied).
As a matter of law, the damages suffered by Plaintiff in this case were foreseeable by the
parties and this Court should allow the jury to consider al1 of Dan Harper's report.
C. The Hartford's Cited Cases Are inapplicable

1. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. o/Ida/lO, 115
Idaho 56, 764 P.2d 423 (1988).
The Brown's case involves a policy of title insurance that specifically set forth the losses
it covered. "The insurer has agreed to compensate for actual loss incuu'ed in clearing or
removing unexpected encumbrances not to exceed the amount stated in Schedule A." 115 Idaho
56,61-62, 764 P.2d 423,428 - 429 (1988). By contrast, in this case, the insurer has agreed to
pay lost business profits during the time the store is not operating and has agreed to pay sums for
personal property losses that will al10w the store to re-open. By its very terms, the policy
contemplates the loss of profits .

. 2. Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The HarVord Insurance Group.
This is not on point because it involved a dispute as to the amount properly due under the
policy. In the present case, there was no dispute as to what was due under the policy at the time
that the Hartford was withholding payments. As of May 20 t h, 2008, the Hartford had the
information it needed to calculate the calculated the business interruption claim up October

2008. 5 The Hartford made a business interruption payment in July 2008, and then did not again

5

Bates Stamped Affidavit of Dan Harper at bates 23.
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pay until November 2008. There is no evidence in tbe record whJtsoever to explain this

I

failure to pay. Unlike the BUs case, The Hartford has at no point alleged that it was relying on
any provision of the policy which would have allowed it to withhold payment.
DATED this

ME-

day February, 2010.

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTR T OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KO 'TENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

I

Case No: CV-08-7069
i
I
MORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
OTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

V!\.

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

Defendant's motion for a protective order is based on this Court's ruling that there are no
bad faith c1aims. This Court bas not dismissed the contract based claims. Likewise, this Court
has not ruled that damages beyond the 12 month policy limitation are not recoverable, which is
the suhject of other motions pending before this Court.
1h

Dated this 16 day of February, 2010.

--"
,
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
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Attomeys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 11-IE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C .•
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CV-08- 7069 '

I

i

I
I

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EXPEItT DAN
HARPER
'
:

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.
,
,

COMES NOW Defendant, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (..Hartford~'), by and

i

through its counsel, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A.. and hereby submits ~s reply in
I

support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Hazper ("Hartford' s Motion~'). For the
reasons stated herein. Hartford's Motion should be granted.

REPLY 1N SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EXPERT
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ARGUMENT
I

I

A.

Dan Hamer cannot offer expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of: adiuster
ru;tjons.
I

,

I

As an initial matter, plaintiff's attempt to frame the issue for trial as a question of
i

reasonableness of the actions of Hartford's adjusters'is incorrect Rather, as this Court has
,,

previously stated, the only remaining claim at issue in ,this matter is "plaintiff's claim ~r breach
I

of contract as relating to Hartford's determination of the dates of the 'Period of Restoration' at
issue in this matter." MSJ Order at 2. What

plai~ti:ff

I

seeks to do, however, is expand the
I

question of the determination of the October 31,2008 end-date for the Period ofRestor~tion (and
I

I

the bases therefor) to a broad-ranging attack on Hartford and the various' adjusters h~d1ing of
i

the claim - whether or not the actions related to

the selection of the October 31, 2008 date, and
I

1

,I

whether or not that adjuster was even involved in making that decision. TIlis, howev:er, would
simply be a bad faith claim, which this Coun bas already dismissed. The narure of !me actual
I

remaining issue for trial- selection of the October 3',1, 2008 - does not pennit a wide-ranging
I

'

I

I

attack on document requests. payment timing, etc.,
by the Court, and any such OpiniOIlB purporting to

as those claims have already been :dismissed
~dre5s

i
those areas should be excluded, as

they would not bear on any issue aotually set for trial. :
I

Further, Mr. Harper is not an adjuster; Mr. H~er is an accountant. Despite ~s, plaintiff
,

I

argues in Phrintiff's Response to Defendant'S MQtion in Limine Concerning

Dan

Harper

I

,

I

("Response"). Dan Harper can and will testify ~at - from the perspective of ~ forensic
I

accountant whose job it is to properly detennine the amount of the claim - it was not ~easonable
I

or necessary to withhold payment under the schedules to properly determine the :final! amount of
I
I

the claim." (Response at 2.) This argument disregards a critical points - fust.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION~lN LIMINE RE: EXPERT
DAN HARPER - 2
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accountant (MD&D), detennines payments under the policy, based upon the proof provi1ed to it,
I
I

,

and the lansuage and limitations on the Policy. It is Hartford - not its accountant (Mp&D) -

that issues payments under the Policy.

,,

'

,

,1

'

Plaintiff's ~laim that Mr. Harper will address the
,

reasonableness the timing of payments to Lakeland ;would be an opinion on the a~tions of
adjuster, not on another accountant (Mr. Harper's a~~al area of expertise). Again, Mt. HarPer
,

himselfhas expressly testified that he cannot testify ab~ut this Mr. Harper testified as foilows: t
1

'
I'

25

Q And based on that, I would assume th~n that you have

1
2
3
4

not served as an expert for any client, whether itls
Lakeland or any other client that you and y~ur company have
assisted since 1993, with respect to provi<Wt,g an opinion as
to whether a olaim was appropriately adjhsied and handled,

19 :
5 is that fair?
, ~
6 A. Yes, we wouldn't have opiDions to the adjusters'
7 actions or inactions.

as

,

13,6 :'

13 Q In providing these opinions, though, ';you certainly
14 acknowledge that you do not feel comf0~b1e testifying as
15 to what the insured's obligations are undef.the insurance
16 policy, correct?
, '
17 A Yes, that's probably getting more ~to the policy
18 interpretation arena.
' i:
19 Q And you cenainly, again, in the p~li¢y
20 interpretation arena. you certainly do ndt f~el you're
21 qualified to render any opinions as to ~ether the Fritzs
22 actually complied with the terms of the in~urance policy?
23 A I would agree tbat that' & beyon~ my scope.
:, 1'

1

i

(Counsel Aff., Exh. A, 11. 18;5-19:7; 136:13-23)(efi:lphases added), Thus, Mr. Harper cannot
testify on this subject area.

1

It is unclear why plaintiff contends

! ,

I

that "Dan Harper ... does not have any authority to agree to limit bis testimony
in any way." Response at I. Mr. Harper's deposition makes clear that he is unqualified to Tendor :lOme opinions.
and has not fonnulated some opinions on omer subjects. Plaintiff'a bald assertion cannot change that. :
, ;,
!
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I

i

Moreover, plaintiff reiterates its insurance irtterpretation position that Hartford! had no
I

I

I

basis to dela.y payments. but this has no bearing on J.,hat
Mr. Harper can testify about. Not
only
!
,
I

I

would testimony on this particular point require an: ~pinion on an adjusters' actions, butb in turn,
I

•

would require MI. Harper to offer expert opinion od interpretation of provisions of an i.hsuranoe
I

policy. Thus, any such opinion on what the

POli~Y required by timing
.

.

of paymentt is, too,

.

I

:

I

beyond Mr. Hatper's area of expertise, and should b~ ~c1udcd.
As such, Hamord's Motion should be grante!d, and. a.t the time of trial, Mr.
I

Harpbr should
I

I

•

,

I

be barred from providing any opinion regarding th~ reasonableness of Hartford's adjuStment of
i

I

,

,I

pi the policy at issue, especially wiih respect

the claim, and any opinion rega.rding interpretation

I

to whether or not certain claimed damages are cove~ed.

B.

i

I
Mr. Harper cannot testify abQut damages betond the scope of the Policy.
!

In responding to Hartford's argument that Mr. Harper cannot testify about an~ damages
I

•

II

'
I

beyond the 12-month maximum Business Inco~'e coverage under the Policy, plaintiff only
!

I

references to its opposition to Hartford's motion/in limine regarding consequential: d.a.:rn.ages.
I

I

:

Plaintiff offers no substantive response to this secllon. Plaintiff also fails to address !defects in
I
I

'

the damages calculated by Mr. Harper for his stated timc period of November 1, 2008 through
I

!

!

aI

December 31, 2009, such as the failure to include $23,313 Extended Business Income payment
already made by Hartford, and the inclusion

I

ofth~ Extended Business Income period!of August

.j
;
20,2009 through December 18, 2009, which wo~(i thereby render anot·insignificant1portion of
I

.

Mr. Harper's opined value an improper and inacmiissible double-recovery. In any

ev~nt, should

I

the Court grant Hartford's Motion in Limine

~e:

I

Damages - as addresses the

I

consequential damages - this Court should alsQ bar Mr. Harper from offering
I

~uestion

of

i

~y

damage

'

valuation opinion for any time period other than ~ovember 1,2008 through Januar;. 28, 2009,
I
I

I

I

JU:PLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: EXPERT
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I
I

I

I

I

which, as previously discussed, Mr. Harper cann~t do, as he has not calculated any such
I
I
i
valuation.
I

c.

I

. ab
Dan Hamer cannot opme
out'mventory'.lssues.

t~stimony
"buttressing Lakeland's allegation pertaining t~ the ttal value of the inventory at the ti~e of the
In its Response, plaintiff obliquely !arJs that Mr. Hmper can offer

collapse." Response at 3. Plamtiff does

!!!U

I

;

1

'

disPute, however, that Mr. Harper's ~roposed

,

methodology - the use of taX return.s and industry [averages - has no bearing on the Inventory
I

I

proof requirements under the Policy.

I

I

Further, plaintiff fails to expi';ll reievaru:e_/ Any question of the total inven~ value of
the store (which is contained in the 874-page comylete inventory report, which LakeUmd failed

~. aarper himself relies upon) does nJt bear on

to provide until November 2008. and which

I

:

any issue for trial. as the only issue set for trial
is
a breach of contract claim on "Hartford'
s
,
I
,
determination of the dates oftbe 'Period

ofR~stora1on' at issue in this matter." MSJ cirder at 2.

, I

~

Accordingly, Hartford's Motion should be granted on this point.

D.

!

I

,

I

Mr. Harper cmmot opine on the November 1. 2008 to January 28, 2009.

Mr. HalPer has not opined as to the'Valul of the Business Income claim

: I

fo~ the time
I

period of November 1, 2008 to January 28. 2009,. Cryptically, however, plaintiff argues that
I
!

'
'

, I

I

"there is no basis to claim that you oan exclude an eJ'pert witness because you don't like the form

used with which he presents his reports." ~s1se at 3. Whether or not Hartforrs cOWlse!
likes or dislikes the form of Mr. Harper's reports has nothing to do with Hartford's N1otion, nor

~inCIUding those retained by H~Ord) could

does the question of whether other .individuals

I

calculate that figure. Rather, the question, is whether OJ' not Dan Harper has fortnulated an

I

I

opllrion as to the time period at issue - he has DO;t - a point to which he a.grees. (C6unsel Aff.,
I

I
II

I
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I

-1r
I

El<h. A, 11. 84:7-85:8.) Thus, Mr. Harper is, in

,

~Oint

an expert without an opinion (a

:;ponse apparently .lso concedes), and he should

precluded from testIfYing

at ~ timc

I

The Court is fully empowered to exclude Mr.IHamer.
"
Plaintiff's final argument is that the COlm

rul~,

1

l~ks the power to exclude Mr. Harp,~r unless

Hartford puts on its own expert testimony to attack
no authority for this proposed

of

I

.

E.

tIu:

~undatiOn and methodology. P~ cites

and wholly
di6l'egards the
fact that it is the Court. not the
I ;
.

opposing party's own experts, that is the gatekeeper .of expert testimony. More specifically, Rule
,

I

;

I

702 requires this Court to act as a gatekeeper to eep from the jury expert testimony that is
:

:::::

'

,

I

scientifically or medically untrustworthy or that rests on an unreliable basis or methodology.
,
I:
i

:at~:. p~~::; ~:

;:~:)44 P.2d 691 '1;94 (1992); State v, Parkinson, 128;Idaho 29,

Plaintiff cites to only one example, the val :e of extant inventory that had beel stored in
the trailers, Response at 4. In making thai argtnent, plaintiff apparcndy suggesti that Mr.

~eopening.

Harper will be rendering an opinion as to wbeth! or not the Btore was capable of
.

:

,Ir·

;

despIte the fact that Mr. HEUper has already tcsti~r;d that "1 haven't fonnulated an

op~on as to

specifically when they would be able to reoperi yet." (Counsel Aff., Exh, A,

n: 133:8.9.)

~'S improper opinions, iack of opinions,
speculation, II1S.th errors, etc. (see generall; De1endant's Motion in Limine Re: ~xpert Dan

Despite Hartfotd'. lengthy discussion of Mr.

1,~

,

I

Harper, and Memorandum in Support. at pp. 17- :8) - all demonstrating the unreliability of Mr.
:
r
!
Harper's opinions. and areas beyond his expertise ~dlor the remaining issue for trial-- Lakeland
"

t.

otherwise opts to not to respond or otherwise ad : ess any of those arguments. Thus! other than
t

,

t

'
'

its contention that the Court cannot exclude the t )timony of Mr. Harper at this juncture and the
t
I

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTfN IN LIMINE RE: EXPERT
DAN HARPER - 6
i
,

,/.

I

:1'

207(i

,----'-

---,!'I:---- -

-"-

I

I

I

'I

,/

"

I

1

brief mention of potential testimony regarding the s :re reopening, Lakeland otherwise (toes not

1
,

addr." the deficiencies discussed by Hartford.

I~

,

Court should, thus, find that Mr. Hmpcr's

f

testimony is excludable.

i

In any event, plaintiff suggests that any con~ms that Hartford has with Mr. HaJer could

I'

;

be addressed in voir dire. Obviously, voir dire is' tthe incorrect avenue to challenge In expert"
I

'

(

I

but, to the extent plaintiff .intends to refer to questiJ' ning of Mr. Harper outside the presence of

,!r

:,

'

the juzy, plaintiff's argument does not provide ': appropriate remedy. What Hartford bas
presented to the Coun is the scope ofM!. Harper's ipinions, and demonstrated that

Mr.! Harper's

tundS, including relevancy and uJeliability.

testimony is inadmissible, based on a number of

'~

I

Mr. Harper has already been questioned (at depos":'on), and Hartford is now presentfug that to
i

the Court for the Court's gatekeeper

;

detenninatit as to whether or not Mr. Harpf will be

allowed to testify at trial. Plaintiff's preference

'I

ould accomplish little more than'mire Mr.

:

Harper's presentation of testimony in repeated i' erruptions to that testimony, to ~scnt the
\
If

I

,

arguments warranting exclusion of his testimony,:~ hich Hanford is now already doi:ng. Thus,
,\

the appropriate remedy is for the Court to act as

,I,

,I

e gatekeeper, and exclude Mr. HarPer for the
'

reasons outlined in Hartford's Motion.
In short, plaintiff cites ztrrO authority fo~ 'its position that the Court is pd,werless to

i; on, Daubert and/or Rule 702 con~ms.

exclude an expert before the time of trial based

,

This

I

argument is nonsensical, ignores the Rules, an

I

should be rejected by the Court.: As such,
:

,

Hartford's Motion should be granted.

I

Accordingly, for the reasons above, De' ~ndant' s Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan
Harper should be granted.

,~

,
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST runICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE.

L.L.C .•

Case No. CV-08-7069

I
I

I

I

Plaintiff,
VB.

SURREPLY IN SUPPORT Olf
MOTION FOR PROTECTm
ORDER
I

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant The Hartford Fire Insurance Company ~ereinafter
I
I

"Hartford"), by and through it.~ counsel of record. Hall, Farley. Oberrecht & Blanton; P.A., and
i

hereby submits this surreply in support of its Motion for Protective Order. and Mem~randum in
Support.

ARGUMENT
Hartford previously filed its Motion for Protective Order on December :29, 2009.
I

Plaintiff filed a response on January 6, 2010, simply arguing that the Court "hat not been

SURREPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1

2011)
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..., . . . . . .

,
I

I
I

presented "With or ruled on whether or not losses sustained after the period of restoration would
I

.

i

be tort or contract damages." Hartford subsequently rued its reply on January 11, 201~. Thus,
Hartford's Motion for Protective Order has previously been briefed by the ·parties.

,
I

Nevertheless, plaintiff has now filed a surresponse, its Memorandum in

Opp~sition to
I

Motion for Protective Order ("Surresponse").

In it. plaintiff' asserts, with no aPditional
I

i

responsive argument, that the Court has not dismissed Lakeland's breac~ of contract claim, and
I

.

j

has not ruled that damages beyond the 12-month maximum Business Inc~me coverage period are
unrecoverable at the time ofma!.
Plaintiff raises no issues not previously raised or otherwise addressed in Hartfo~d' s prior
I

briefing. Thus, by way of surreply, Hartford references and incorporates its prior briefing on its
,

Merion for Protective Order as

:

I

)

if fully set forth herein. For those reasons stated in 1uch prior

briefing. Hartford's Motion for Protective Order should be granted.

I

CONCLUSION
For these above reasons, Hartford's motion for protective order should be grant~d.
.

,'

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February, 2010.

I

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

By ~~=-==~~f-:-t"-i'h!:::-:-':"'----r--:--
Keely E. ilke
Bryan A. Nic
Attorneys fo
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Keely E. Duke
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-7069
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DAMAGES

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), by and
through its counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby submits this
reply in support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages ("Hartford's Motion"). For the
reasons stated below, Hartford's Motion should be granted.
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ARGUMENT

A.

Plaintiff cannot recover consequential damages.
1.

Plaintiff misconstrues Idaho law on consequential damages.

Plaintiffs opposition fundamentally turns on the position that the question of
foreseeability (in regards to consequential damages) is a question of fact to be determined by the
jury, citing Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). However, this argument

paints an incomplete picture of Idaho law.

What the Apnel decision actually said was as

follows:
Generally, a question of foreseeability constitutes a question of fact for
determination by a jury, unless the proof is so clear tbat reasonable minds
could not draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would
construe the facts and circumstances in only one way. Davis v. McDougall, 94
Idaho 61, 480 P.2d 907(1971).
135 Idi'lho Rt 117

(~mphflRis

added), Tn that case. the CQl.l1i actually affirmed a motion in limine

barring presentation of evidence on consequential damages, correctly putting the onus on
plaintiffs to offer proof in support of an argument for reasonable foreseeability of consequential
damages:
The district court determined as a matter of law that the consequential damages
sought by the Appels were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time
they contracted and, therefore, not foreseeable and not recoverable. The district
court stated:
The strongest argument that plaintiffs could make is that a flood warning
was issued on [February] 8th. And then, assuming that [February] 8th is a
time when the parties contracted, because foreseeability is determined as
of the time of their contract, that there would not only be a flood but that
the flood would damage personal property that would be moved by the
plaintiffs to a place unknown to the defendants but which the plaintiffs
would choose to be in the flood plain, is as a matter of law so remote as to
not be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting.
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for the sale of a home. There is nothing in the contract that indicates the parties
contemplated liability for flood damage to personal property moved out of the
home to land unrelated to the contract. The Appels had the opportunity to outline
for the district court the proof they would offer to support the claim. Nothing
indicated the damage was reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of
the parties.

Id Thus, at the motion in limine phase, the Court is empowered to review the evidence placed
before it to determine whether plaintiff has identified proof it might offer to support a claim of
reasonable foreseeability. Plaintiff cannot simply invoke a mantra of "question of fact", but,
instead, must demonstrate proof adequate to present such' a claim at the time of trial.
Jis\,;u:sst:J

2.

LduVV', however, plai1"1tiffhas fniled to do

As

GO.

Plaintiff inaccurately characterizes the terms of the Policy.

In addition to preeenting an incomplete picture of Idaho law, plRint.iff also fails to fully
outline the salient portions of the Policy, which are unambiguous and demonstrate that
consequential damages were not reasonably foreseeable by the parties and were, in fact,
expressly excluded by the Policy.
As an initial matter, the Policy expressly excludes and unambiguously consequential
damages:
4. Business Income and Extra Expenses Exclusions. We will not pay for:
b. Any other consequential loss.
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, filed February

8,2010 ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. B., p. 18. However, rather than quote this provision - or, indeed,
any other provision of the Policy - plaintiff inaccurately offers its characterization of Policy
terms.
}1'm:t, plamtltt contenas maT me pnh ..y ·'r.nnmmphll.r.:; ,.h\;; JJiLYlJlw.u' V1 l\l~t JI~v.Gb LC,",Q""''''
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it is a policy that pays lost profits when the insured business is not in operation." Response at 2.
More correctly, the salient portions of the Policy provides:

o. Business Income
(1) We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the
necessary suspension of your "operations" during the "period of restoration ".
The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of or physical damage to
property at the "scheduled premises", caused by or resulting from a Covered
.
Cause ofLoss.
(2) With respect to the requirements set forth in the preceding paragraph, if you
occupy only part of the site at which the "scheduled premises" are located, your
"scheduled premises" also means:
(a) The portion of the building which you rent, lease or occupy; and
(b) Any area within the building or on the site at which the "scheduled
premises" are located, but only if that area services, or is used to gain
access to, the "scheduled premises. "

(3) We will only pay for loss of Business Income that occurs within 12 consecutive
months after the date of direct physical loss or phYSical damage. This Additional
Coverage is not subject to the Limits ofInsurance.
(4) Business Income means the:
(a) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before income taxes) that would have
been earned or incurred if no direct physical loss or physical damage had
occurred: and
(b) Continuing normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll.

(5) With respect to the coverage provided in this -Additional Coverage,
suspension means:
(u) TIll: pudlul .l/vwJurv,. v'

"'v""jJl~t\:

""99Jlti01e vi

}'Vtl'Jf1

bu,ViJtJOll,f

activities,' or
(b) That part or all of the "scheduled premises 1/ is rendered untentantable
[sic} as a result of a Covered Cause of Loss if coverage for Business
Income applies to the policy.

12.

"Period of Restoration" means the period of time that:
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a.
Begins with the date of direct physical loss or physical damage
caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss at the "scheduled
premises, " and
b.

Ends on the date when:
(1)
The property at the "scheduled premises" should be
,·cpai,.cd, 1'obuj/t, or rop/Dead with r"oyonnhlp sJ1P'p,d and similar
quality;

(2) The dule when yuur uw'iltess is "I!surned at a new, pCI"ma1'lo1'lt
location.

(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, at pp. 10 & 24-25,) What this provides - unacknowledged by plaintiffis that the coverage is bounded by time on two fronts. First, it provides no coverage, under any
circumstance, beyond 12 months after the date of loss.

Second, it provides that coverage

terminates when the insured (here, Lakeland) should reasonably have been prepared to resume its
business, following repair of the premises. Thus, the coverage is not open-ended.
Second, plaintiff oontendE that "the policy provides that it will pay the money

it takes tQ

get the business re-opened so the insured can again generate the profit that it was before the
catastrophe." Response at 2. This contention is made, citing to the Policy's Extended Business
Income provision. Plaintiffs characterization of this provision, however, is wholly inaccurate.
The actual provision states as follows:

r. Extended Business Income

If the necessary suspension ofyour

"operations" produces a Business
Income loss payable under this policy, we will pay for the actual loss of
Business Income you incur during the period that:
(1)

(a) Begins on the date property is actually repaired, rebuilt or
rep/aced and "operations" are resumed; ...
(Counsel Aff., Exh. H, p. II.) Hy Its pJain terms, EBI coverage is inlt:IU1.;J lu

jJ1Uvid~

a

~ertAit'l

period of additional Business Income coverage (in this case, 120 days) after operations are

V~,

..1.u/
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guarantee that an insured will "generate the profit that it was before the catastrophe." In fact, no
provision of the Policy makes any such guarantees: Rather, the onus to resume operations falls
squarely on the insured, who even has an express contractual duty to do so - the Policy expresses
this duty twice, and explains that Business Income coverage is reduced by the failure to resume
operations:
3. Duties in the Event of Loss or Damage
You must see that the following are done in the event of loss of or damage to
Covered Property:
j. Resume part or all ofyour 'operations' as quickly as possible.

7. Resumption of Operations
In the event ofphysical loss or physical damage at the Il scheduled premises" you
must resume all or part ofyour "operations" as quickly as possible.
We will reduce the amount ofyour:
a. Business Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, to the extent you can
resume your 'operations', in whole or in part, by using damaged and
undamaged property (including merchandise or stock) at the 'scheduled
premises' or elsewhere. ...

(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, pp. 20 & 22.) Thus, the Policy is even constructed in such a way that it
addresses circumstances where an insured either cannot resume operations (12 months of
Business Income coverage, but no EBI coverage) or voluntarily will not resume operations
(termination of Business Income at end of determined Period of Restoration, and no EBI
coverage). The unambiguous tenns of the Policy, then, make clear that an insured is neither
provided Business Income coverage for an indefmite period of time, nor guaranteed a resumption
of operations (let alone a return to 100% of prior profit levels).

Plaintiffs argument on this
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point also fails.
Third, plaintiff contends that the Policy "pays for the damage to the contents of the store,
which includes inventory and the fixtures and equipment needed to sell that inventory."
Response at 1. Setting aside discussion of policy limits (here, a Business Personal Property
coverage limit of $370,000) and various exclusions/limitations that may apply (see, generally,
Counsel Mf, Exh. B), the implication of this contention, again, is that Hartford has some
obligation under the Policy to take actions to cause Lakeland's owners to re-open the business.
No such obligation exists. Rather, Hartford is obligated only to pay for Business Personal
Proporty and BUfineii Income (including ERT) that iR proven

to it by its insured. l It is the

insured's responsibility - and, indeed, its duty under the Policy - to resume operations, even if
only partially. Thus, plaintiff's argument again fails.
Finally, plaintiff's improper conclusory contention - that "it is foreseeable that failing to
payor unreasonably delaying payment under the policy would cause the damages that Lakeland
seeks in this lawsuit" - not only ignores the unambiguous language of the Policy as discussed
above, but attempts to recharacterize its lawsuit, again, into one of bad faith (e.g., ''unreasonably
delaying"). Plaintiff's claims for bad faith have been dismissed. The only question remaining is
a breach of contract claim on "Hartford's detennination of the dates of the 'Period of
Restoration' at issue in this matter." MSJ Order at 2. What this actual issue at trial further
implicates is another provision of the Policy, unacknowledged by plaintiff despite Hartford's
Ji:';l,;u::s:.;iull ill

its opel,h,g brief - the Ilpprlliolll proviEion. That liection provides:

2. Appraisal

If we and you disagree on the amount ofloss, either may make written demand for
an appraisal of the less. In that event, each party will select a competent and
I Again, plaintiff appears to suggest that advances are due under the Policy, but fails to cite any provision requiring
such.
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impartial appraiser. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot
agree, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having
jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the amount of loss.

If they fail to agree, they will submit their difference to the umpire. A decision
agreed to by any two will be binding. Each party will:
a. Pay its chosen appraiser; and
b. Bear the other expenses ofthe appraisal and umpire equally.

If there is an appraisal, we will still retain our right to deny the claim.
(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, p. 20.) Thus, what the contract expressly and unambiguously provides is
that there is a dispute over the value of the loss payments, an appraisal may be had. Thus, what
was actually reasonably foreseeable in the event of a disagreement over loss payments was not
inaction by Lakeland and a claim of ongoing, accruing damages, but rather that Lakeland would
invoke the appraisal provision and seek to address its concerns in that forum.
Thus, the unambiguous teons of the Policy - errantly characterized by plaintiff - more
than amply demonstrate that consequential damages were not reasonably foreseeable. Further,
1'laifttiffhas failed to put forth AE Euch, Hartford's Motion should hr.
3.

enmt~n.

Hartford's caselaw is appropriately considered by the Court.

Plaintiffs attempts to attack the authority cited by Hartford also fail, and such cited
decisions are appropriately considered by the Court.
•

The Streamline decision.
Plaintiff asserts that Hartford's reliance on Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins.

Co., 2003 WL 22004888 (2003) is "frivolous," claiming that Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v.
Harleysville 1m. Cu. uf Nt:w York, 886 N.n.2d 127 (N.Y. 2008) presents a more accurate
statement of the law in New York. However, this ignores the facts distinguishing Bi-Economy
from both Streamline and this matter. First, although plaintiff claims that "the insurance policy
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was almost identical to the policy in this case," the Bi-Economy case contains very few specific
policy citations, and makes no discussion of an appraisal provision, which has played a
significant role in precluding consequential damages in other cases. See, e.g., BUs Day Spa, LLC
v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F.Supp.2d 621 (2006); accord, Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford

Fire Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(barring claim for consequential damages
under policy containing appraisal provision, not utilized by insured - "The Policy sets forth an
explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be conducted by

~

appraiser, that either party may

invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of loss. There is no evidence in the
record before me on this motion that [plaintiff-insured] Lava ever sought, or obtained, an
appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other than that made in January 2002.")(attached).
Further, the Bi-Economy case involved a bad faith claim, and the Bi-Economy court took
pains to note that consequential damages were specifically being allowed in light of the nature of
the action: "in light of the nature and purpose of the insurance contract at issue, as well as BiEconomy's allegations that Harleysville breached its duty to act in good faith, we hold that
Bi-Economy's claim for consequential damages including the demise of its business, was
reasonably foreseeable and contemplated by the parties[.)" 886 N.E.2d at 132. However, in this
action, plaintiffs bad faith claims have been dismissed.
Accordingly, given the factual and legal differences in Bi-Economy, the Streamline
decision is appropriately considered by the Court, and no consideration of Bi-Economy is
necessary.
•

The Brown's Tie decision.
Plaintiff makes little discussion of the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Brown's Tie &

Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. ofIdaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 428 (1988), which
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rejected a claim for consequential damages which were not specifically contemplated by the
panies at the time of conLra(.;ling,

C1t1

JI;111utlstl'ated by the language of the contract (Epecifically, a

commitment for title insurance) which limited liability to "actual loss incurred in clearing or
removing

Wll;}U,;c;pkJ cJl~U.lubrA1..ees

ftot to cHcccd tho omount Ebted in Schedule A." fd

Ht

61-

62, 764 P.2d at 428-29.
Instead, plaintiff again fails to correctly summarize the coverages by the Policy at issue in
this action, ignoring the limitations of such coverage and the appraisal provision, as discussed
above. For those reasons, the Court should appropriately consider Brown's Tie in reaching its
decision on Hartford's Motion.
•

The BUs dec.ision
Again, plaintiff makes little discussion of holding in Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford

Ins. Group, 427 F.8upp.2d 621 (W.D.N.C. 2006), which also upheld the exclusion ofa claim for
consequential damages, relying, iu pC1lL, Ull tl.lC pvli~y1! A1'l'rni9nl provioion, which, aQ:iin,
plaintiff fails to address. Plaintiff, instead, claims that Hartford withheld payment without basis.

A lengthy recitation of the facts Hartford has placed into the record regarding Lakeland's failure
to document its claim - and Hartford's full payment of those claims that were proven to it - is

sununary judgment motion and subsequent opposition briefs responding to plaintiff s two
motions for reconsideration.

However, what is relevant to this question is that the Policy

expressly contemplates delay via the time needed for the parties to calculate and present their
positions (see, e.g., Counoel Aff., Exh. B, p. 20, ~ection 3.h (immrr:n tn provide

information

within 60 days of request); p. 20, section S.b (Hartford's notice of intent within 30 days after
statement of loss); p. 22, section g (pay within 30 days after statement of loss if all terms of
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policy complied with by insured and agreement on value of loss reached or appraisal award
made)), and also provides for a remedy in the event of a dispute (the appraisal provision).
Plaintiffs do not cite to any provision in the Policy that requires Hartford to make hundreds of
thousands of dollars in advance payments based upon incomplete and inadequate information
provided by the insured.
Thus, like the policy at issue in BUs, the Policy in this action both disclaims
consequential losses and provides an appraisal mechanism to address valuation disputes. 427
F.Supp.2d at 639-40; accord, Lava Trading, 365 F. Supp.2d at 447-48 ("In short, contrary to

T11{1' .. nn.. ition thllt thr Polirlr hnnmmr mnnin irlln HHrtfnrn to nnrlrntilnn thilt ilmr nrJilv in
payment or disagreement with respect to the claim would render it liable for the consequential
damages sought, the Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including potential delay of more
thim three month.,)

j" fnrt':~~~ahJ~")

Ar.r.nrrlingJy, plflintifrR f1re1Jmr.nt fails. lmd Hartford's

Motion should be granted.

B.

Lakeland should be precluded from offering any evidence or making any claim for
claimed expenses or damages at trial, otber. tban with respect to tbe time period at
issue, November 1, 2008 to January 28, 2009.
In Hartford's Motion, Hartford sought the exclusion of damages that extended beyond the

maximum 12 months of coverage afforded under the Policy for Business Income (that is, beyond
January 28,2009), or, otherwise, to preclude Lakeland from claiming any damages in excess of
the $54,990 amount-in-controversy identified at Mr. Harper's deposition.
Plaintiff did not address this argument section of Hartford's Motion and, as such,
Hartford's Motion on this point should be deemed unopposed.

c.

Lakeland's claims for damages that are not covered under tbe Policy and/or bave
already been paid sbould also be excluded.
In Hartford's Motion, Hartford also sought the exclusion of particular items of damages
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that wore inappropriatoly olaimed; specifically, 1) lost profits foJ' Just Ask Rental, whieh entity is
actually an assumed business name for the Fritzes and, thus, an unrecoverable personal claim; 2)
the $16,031 claim for "Unpaid Staff Wages" which have, in fact, been paid by Hartford; and 3)
any claim for inventory in excess of the $370,000 BPP limit in the Policy.
Again, plaintiff did not address these argument sections of Hartford's Motion and, as
such, Hartford's Motion on these points should be deemed unopposed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Hartford respectfully requests this Court grant its Motion in Limine Re:
Damages.
DATED this.tf= day of February, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

By:

~~~~~~-~O~f~th-e~F~inn----------

kels - Of the Finn
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Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208/665-7290
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Page I
365 F.Supp.2d 434

(Cite as: 365 F.Supp.ld 434)

United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
LA VA TRADING INC., Plaintiff,

v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
No. OJ CW. 7037(pKC).
March 30, 2005.
Background: Insured whose offices were destroyed as a result of a terrorist attack sued business
insurer, seeking a declaratory judgment and seeking
to recover damages for breach of contract, violations of the New York State General Business Law,
and consequential damages as a result of the alleged breach. Insurer moved for partial summary
judgment on consequential damages claim and
sought order declaring when "period of restoration"
under policy expired.
Holdings: The District Court, Castel, l, held that:
(I) under New York law, "period of restoration"
ended upon replacement of insured's rental offices,
not reconstruction of building in which offices had
been located;
(2) "property at the described premises" referred to
business property in rental offices;
(3) period of restoration ended with respect to insured when it moved into replacement offices and
construction was completed, not when insured fully
resumed all obligations; and
(4) insurer did not assume liability for consequential damages in event of breach.

217XVI(A) In General
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost
Profits
217k2163(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under New York law, "period of restoration" in
business interruption insurance coverage ended
when insured's rental offices, rather than entire
building in which offices were located, should have
been repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable
speed and similar quality after destruction of building in terrorist attack.

(2] Insurance 217 ~2163{1)
2] 7 Insurance
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVJ(A) In General
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost
Profits
217k2163(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under New York law, "property at the described
premises" for purposes of period of restoration under business interruption insurance coverage unambiguously referred to business personal property
located in insured's suite of rental offices in building that was destroyed by terrorist attack, and therefore period of restoration ended when insured's
business property in rental premises should have
been repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable
.
speed and similar quality.

Motions granted in part and denied in part.
(3) Insurance 217 (:::::;;'>2163(1)

West Headnotes

11] Insurance 217 ~216J(1)
2 I 7 Insurance
217XVr Coverage--Property Insurance

2 J7 Insurance
217XVI Coverage·-Property Insurance
217XVl(A) In General
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions
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Page 2
365 F.Supp.2d 434
(Cite as: 365 F.Supp.2d 434)
2]7k2163 Business Interruption; Lost
Profits
217k2163( I) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under New York law, purpose of providing business interruption coverage only during the ''period
of restoration" is to provide a limit, where necessary, to the amount of business income recoverable
in those situations where an insured's ability to restore its business income to previous levels may extend beyond any period during which it reasonably
"should" repair, rebuild or replace its damaged
property.

217k2163(1} k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under New York law, period of restoration under
business interruption coverage of insured, whose
offices were destroyed in terrorist attack, ended
when insured moved into replacement offices and
construction on those offices was completed, notwithstanding that insured did not yet have fully operational off-site back up center, as off-site back up
center had not been located at premises that were
destroyed and coverage did not extend until insured
again became fully operational.
(6J Federal Civil Procedure 170A €:=:>2547.1

(4) Insurance 217 €=2163(1)

217 Insurance
2]7XVJ Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions
217k2]63 Business Interruption; Lost
Profits
217k2 I 63( 1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under New York law, period of restoration in business interruption coverage was not measured by
time needed for insured to resume functionally
equivalent operations at former location or elsewhere; such construction would have rendered superfluous extended business income coverage,
which explicitly provided coverage for the potentially longer period, up to 30 days, that it might
take to restore operations to condition that would
have existed if no direct physical loss or damage
had occurred.
(5] Insurance 217 ~2Hj3(1)

217 Insurance

7.17XYI r.nvr:rilfr.--Prnpr.rty 1n~mntnce
217XVI(A) In General
2]7k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions
217k2163 Business Interruption; Lost
Profits

l70A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXVll Judgment
] 70AXVII(C) Summary Judgment
170AXVII(C)3 Proceedings
170Ak2547 Hearing and Determination
170Ak2547.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Where the record does not support the assertions in
a party's statement of facts provided under local
rule, those assertions should be disregarded and the
record reviewed independently in summary judgment proceedings. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28
U.S.C.A.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules S.D.N.Y., Civil Rule
56.1.
(7] Federal Civil Procedure 170A ~2547.1

170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXVII Judgment
170AXVTI(C) Summary Judgment
170AXVIl(C)3 Proceedings
170Ak2547 Hearing and Determination
]70Ak2547.1 k. In General. Most
Citid CJt:II£
Statement of facts required by local summary judgment rule is not itself a proper vehicle for making
factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported by
the record. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A
.; U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules S.D.N.Y., Civil Rule 56.1.
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217k2l63 Business Interruption; Lost

(8) Damages 115 €==>23
Profits
l]S Damages
IISIIl Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory
Damages
IISIII(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or
Prospective Consequences or Losses
I I SlII(A) I In General
11Sk21 Natural and Probable Consequences of Breaches of Contract
I lSk23 k. Under Circumstances
Within Contemplation of Parties. Most Cited Cases
Under New York law, in actions for breach of contract, the nonbreaching party may recover such unusual or extraordinary damages as were within the
contemplation of the parties as the probable result
of a breach at the time or prior to contracting.

(9) Damages 115 €=>23
liS Damages
I I SIlT Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory
Damages
J ISI1I(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or
Prospective Consequences or Losses
IISIll(A)l In General
Jl5k21 Natural and Probable Consequences of Breaches of Contract
11Sk23 k. Under Circumstances
Within Contemplation of Parties. Most Cited Cases
Under New York law, the availability of consequential damages for breach of contract in a given case requires an examination of: (l) the particular contract at issue; (2) whether there has been any

conscious assumption of liability by a contracting
party; and (3) whether, by words or deeds, one
party was reasonably led to believe that the other
had assumed such liability.
(10J Insurance 217 ~2I63(1)
217 Insurance
217XVl Coverage--Property Insurance
217XVI(A) In General
217k2139 Risks or Losses Covered and
Exclusions

217k2163(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Insurance 217 ~3374
217 Insurance
217XXVn Claims and Settlement Practices
2]7XXVll(C) Settlement Duties; Bad Faith
2]7k3373 Amount and Items Recoverable
217k3374 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Under New York law, insurer did not asswne liability for consequential damages in event of breach of
its obligations under business intenuption insurance policy, absent any evidence that parties contemplated, or insurer reasonably warranted. that insurer would be liable for such damages; thus, in
event insurer was found to have breached policy,
insurer would not be liable for costs insured incurred in securing interim funding after destruction
of its offices or for loss of clients during period of
nonpayment, particularly where policy contemplated substantial delay in payment of claim.
*436 Finley Harkham, Jeremy J. Flanagan, Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky, PC, New York City,
Jonathan O. Bauer, Anderson, Kill, et ano., Newark, NI, for Plaintiff.
Elizabeth R. Leong, Melissa Faith Savage, Robinson & Cole, LLP-NYC, New York City, Rebecca
Levy-Sachs, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Sarasota, FL,
Rhonda J. Tobin. Stephen E. Goldman, Wystan M.
Ackerman, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Hartford, CT,
for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASTEL, District Judge.
Plaintiff Lava Trading Inc. ("Lava") has sued defendant
Hartford Fire Insurance
Company
("Hartford") under a business insurance policy (the
"Business Insurance Policy" or "Policy") asserting
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coverage for certain losses resulting from the terrorist attack of September 11, 200 I. Plaintiff's business had been located in One World Trade Center.
In a March 18, 2004 Memorandum and Order, 326
F.Supp.2d 434 (SD.N.Y.2oo4), I granted in part
and denied in part Hartford's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., holding that
Lava had adequately pled a claim for consequential
damages. As I made clear, "it remains to be proven
... whether the parties contemplated that the type of
consequential damages alleged to be available here
would be the likely result of a breach by Hartford,
as well as whether Lava even suffered any losses
attributable to Hartford's alleged breach .... " 326
F.Supp.2d at 443.
Hartford now moves for partial summary judgment
dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages.
It also seeks a ruling, pursuant to Rule 56(d),
Fed.R.Civ.P., that the "period of restoration"
provided for in the Policy ended on April 30, 2002
and that certain business income losses are not
covered because they are excluded as consequential
losses or are speculative. For the reasons set forth
herein, Hartford's motion for summary judgment
dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages
is granted. Hartford's motion also is granted to the
extyi'\l thllt it ~~eks il lUIin~ that the "period of restoration" ended, at the latest, as of April 30, 2002.
The Court reserves ruling on the remainder of Hartford's motion.

*437 Lava's Operqtions FoUC'wing {he Seofember
I J ;waCK

Lava was founded in 1999 and sells computer programs to assist in the electronic trading of equities
in various equity markets known as Electronic
Communication Networks (ECNs). Allen Cert. "
3-4.FNI Lava describes its product as an innovative
means for equity traders "to take all the information
from all the ECNs and NASDAQ and put it into
one computer window that would allow for a ready
comparison [of the market] for a particular equity."

Jd ~ 12. Prior to September II, 2001, Lava maintained offices, including a functioning data center,
on the 83rd floor of One World Trade Center.
Those offices were destroyed in the terrorist attack
of September lJ, 2001. As of September 11,2001,
Lava also maintained a small, "nearly complete ( 1"
back up location at 75 Broad Street, which was not
destroyed. Allen Cert. , 15; Complaint ~ 33. As described in Lava's Complaint, the 75 Broad Street
location "was not yet fully operational in that it
lacked the connectivity necessary for Lava's complete operations." Complaint, 33.
FN 1. Although the parties appear to disagree as to how best to describe the specifics of Lava's business, see Defs. 56.1
Statement" 3-4 and Pis. 56.) Response "
3-4 & pp. 21-23, any such disagreement,
and a detailed description of Lava's business, are not material to the Court's decision on this motion.
Following the September II attack, Lava converted
its 75 Broad Street back up facility into a functioning data center. After briefly securing temporary office space at another location, Lava set up temporary offices at 75 Broad Street in October 2001.
Complaint ~ 37. According to Lava, these temporflry offir.r.s "hr.rJ'lmr. npr:rntinnl'll on Or.tober ll,
20ot." ld
According to internal Lava e-mails, by October 12,
2001, Lava had resumed operations sufficiently to
begin conducting live trades. Ackerman Aft't Exh.
IS. In the words ofT Lava C:hiflf InfonTIllt,'on Offir.r.r
Kamran .K.lltleyan, tnlS was accomp IShed by,
among other things, "getting a new data center built
in [Connecticut] as well as building out a totally
slick data center at 75 Broad St." ld At that time,
Lava executives believed it would be another
month (i.e., November 2001) "to get to where we
were.'" Id As of October 22, 2001, Lava CEO
Richard Korhammer wrote in an e-mail to Lester
Gray of Schroder Investment Management that
"[w]e have Merrill, Lehman, and Carlin trading
today (We started last Friday). Every week one or
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two more should be going live." Ackerman Afl't
Exh. 20 at LKR 107986. On November 14, 2001,
Lava's CEO wrote in an e-mail to a Bruce Rosenthal (whose connection to Lava, if any, is unclear)
that "[oJur volume is about 25% higher than it was
before the disaster now. We're back up and running'" ld. at LKR ] 07748.
In December 200], Lava signed a lease for office
space at its present location, 95 Morton Street.
Complaint ~ 38; Pis. 56.1 Response ~ ] 4.
On January 8, 2002, Lava, through an independently retained claims adjuster, submitted a preliminary draft Business Interruption and Extra Expense
claim for the period September I J, 2001 through
November 2001 for $933,658.39. Ackerman Aff't
Exh. ] 2 at LNF 00308, 316. In the preliminary
claim submission, Lava's independent adjuster also
stated that "the period of interruption has not been
determined." ld at LNF 00308. This initial claim
appears to assert that Lava's projected revenues
would grow from an estimated $600,000 in September 2001 (based on actual revenues for September 1
through 11, 2001 of less than $200,000) to "'438 almost $350,000,000 in August 2002. ld. at LNF
00311. Lava has not provided evidence of any
claim made by it with respect to its alleged losses
under the Policy other than the preliminary estimate
of its adjuster. See Pis. 56.1 Response '1f 21. Although Lava states that it submitted a claim to Hartford for approximately $59 million prior to the
commencement of this litigation (see id), it cites
only to its Complaint in this action in support of
that assertion.
By April 8, 2002, Lava had moved into its new permanent location at 95 Morton Street, while its data
center remained at 75 Broad Street. Defs. 56.1
Statement & PIs. 56.1 Response '1f 16; Complaint '11
44. Construction was completed at 95 Morton
Street on April 22, 2002. Defs. 56.1 Statement, ) 7
& Exh. A at HFIC 0017; PIs. 56.1 Response' 17.
The parties appear to dispute when a new back up
data center in Connecticut was completed. Lava asserts that it was "completed and operational some

time after October, 2002" (Complaint ~ 45; bur see
Ackerman Afft Exh. 15), while Hartford asserts
that the back up center (which it claims was not necessary for Lava to be fully operational) was completed in August 2002 (Defs. 56.1 Statement ~ 18).
As previously noted, prior to the September I] attack, Lava's then back up facility had not become
fully operational.
On December 4, 2002, The Wall Street Journal
published an article on Lava's resumption of operations, which Lava posted on its website. Ackerman
Aft't Exh. 19. In that article, Korhammer is quoted
as stating that "[o)ur customers were out of service
[for about a] month and it took about two months
before we got everyone back up and running to the
levels [they) were prior to 9/1 1." ld In describing
Lava's history on its website, Lava states that
"[w]ithin two months of [September 11] the determined and spirited team regrouped and rebuilt
their business and data centers ... The company's
growth continued and in November 2001, it reached
profitabili ty." Ackerman Atrt Exh. 19 at third page.
In June 2003, Hartford determined Lava's operations were suspended for the period September ll,
200 1 through October 3 I, 2001, quantified Lava's
business loss during that period and paid Lava over
$2 million on its claim under the Business Insurance Policy written by Hartford. Ackerman Atrt
Exh.14.
Lava alleges that by failing to pay its claim for lost
business income in December 2001, and by only
paying for business income losses through October
31, 2001, Hartford breached the Policy, and as a
result, Lava "was forced to obtain funding [in
March 2002] to continue its operations, obtain suitable office space, and build a necessary back up
location." Complaint , 42. Lava appears to claim
that because of Hartford's delay in payment, it was
forced to obtain $30 million in financing that it otherwise would have not needed, although it submits
no evidence on this point. See February 16, 2005
Tr. at 16-18; Pis. 56.1 Response. Lava asserts that
its business was not fully restored until a new back

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

201U&

",,-,.J.V,'-V..LV

.Lv . . . . . .

"'-'''4''

......................................... ....

Page 6
365 F.Supp.2d 434
(Cite as: 365 F.Supp.2d 434)
up facility was completed in October 2002. Complaint 'lI45; Allen Cert.

have been earned or incurred; and (2) Continuing
nonnal operating expenses incurred, including
payroll." Policy at LAV 00028.

The Policy

The Business Insurance Policy also provides coverage for "Extended Business Income" for a limited
period. This coverage pays:

The Business Insurance Policy held by Lava covers
the period January 12, 2001 through January 12,
2002. It provides coverage for physical loss or damage to Lava's property, the loss of business income
caused by a suspension of operations in the wake of
physical loss or damage to its property, and certain
extra expenses incurred as a result of such a suspension. As part of its coverage, the Business Insurance Policy provides that Hartford would pay Lava
"for the actual lO~1i of *439 Rmdnr.'I.'1 lnr.nme you
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your
'operations' during the 'period of restoration.' Th e
suspension must be caused by direct physical loss
of or damage to property at the described premises
... caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause
of Loss." Policy (Bauer Cert. Exh. C) at LAV
00028. It is coverage under this provision that is at
issue on this motion.

;'the actual loss of Business Income you incur during the period that:
(1) Begins on the date property is actually repaired,

rebuilt or replaced and 'operations' are resumed;
and

(2) Ends on the earlier of:
a) The date you could restore your 'operations'
with reasonable speed, to the condition that
would have existed if no direct physical loss or
damage occurred; or
b) 30 consecutive days after the date determined in
(1) above.

Under the Business Insurance Policy, "Operations"
is defined as ''the type of your business activities
occurring at the described premises and tenantability of the described premises." Policy at LA V
00039. The Policy defines "period of restoration" as

Loss of Business Income must be caused by direct
physical loss or damage at the described premises
caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause
of Loss." Policy at LAV 00029.

"... the period oftime that:

1. SUMMARY ruDGMENT STANDARD

(a) begins with the date of direct physical loss or
damage caused by or resulting from any Covered
Cause of Loss at the described premises, and

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c).
In considering a summary judgment motion, the
Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in Jts favor, and may grant summary judgment only when no reasonable trier of
fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party."
Allen v. Coughlin. 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir.1995)
(citation and quotation marks omitted); accord

(b) ends on the date when the property at the de-

scribed premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar qual. ity,"
Policy at LA V 00039.
"Business Income" is defined as "(I) Net Income
(Net Profit or Loss before income taxes) that would
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Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 8.Ct. 1348, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, when the moving
party has asserted facts to demonstrate that the nonmoving party's claim cannot be sustained, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial," and cannot
rest on "mere allegations or denials" of the facts asserted by the movant. Rule 56(e).
It is the initial burden of a movant on a summary
judgment motion to come forward with evidence on
each material *440 element of its ~Iflim Qr defew;.
demonstrating that it is entitled to relief. The evidence on each material element, if unrebutted, must
be sufficient to entitle the movant to relief in its favor, as a matter of law. Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v.
1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d
Cir.2004). When the moving party has met this initial burden and hoa oaaortod facts to den10nstrate
that the non-moving party's claim cannot be sustained, the opposing party must "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"
as to a material fact. A fact is material if it "might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.... " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 8.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 {I 986).
An issue of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Id. Thus, in order to survive
summary judgment, plaintiffs must come forth with
more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
their position; they must come forward with evidence "on which tbe jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff" Id at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In the absence of any genuine dispute over a material fact,
summary judgment is appropriate.

II. PERIOD OF RESTORATION

[1] As noted above, the Policy defines the "period
of restoration" as ending "when the property at the
described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality."
Policy at LA V 00039. As a result, there are two is-

sues that arise on this motion relating to the "period
of restoration." First, what constitutes the "property
at the described premises," the potential replacement of which triggers the end of the "period of
restoration" under the Policy? Though offering different interpretations of the language, neither side
claims. that the definition of "period of restoration"
contains an ambiguity material to this dispute. I
agree that the language is unambiguous and thus it
raises an issue of contract interpretation, a question
of law for the Court. See Us. Fire Insurance Co. v.
General Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 571 (2d
Cir.' 991) ("(T]hr. rlr.tr.rminlltinn of whr.thr.r (l con.
tract is ambiguous ... is a threshold question of law
for the court.") (citation omitted). For the reasons
discussed below, I conclude that the "period of restoration" ends when the property in Lava's 83 rtl
floor offices (and not the entire World Trade Center
complex or the One World Trade Center building)
/l1i.:,ul':] lnlvc Lccu ICJ.1I1iICU, n:lJuill ur replaced with
reasonable speed and similar quality.
Second, is there any disputed issue of fact as to
whether the event triggering the end of the "period
of restoration" has come to pass? For reasons also
discussed below, J conclude that Hartford has come
forward with evidence that the date on which the
property at Lava's 83 111 floor offices was replaced
is, at the latest, April 30, 2002, and that Lava has
failed to come forward with any evidence to refute
this date.
What Constitutes "Property
Premises" Under {he Policy?

at the Described

[2] Hartford seeks a ruling that the "period of restoration" ended when Lava should have replaced its
business personal property that had been located in
its offices on the 83 rd floor of] World Trade Center at a new location with reasonable speed and
similar quality. Hartford urges that I construe the
phrase "property at the described premises" to
mean the property in Lava's offices on the 83 rtl
floor of the World Trade Center. Lava contends that
the phrase "property at the described *441
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premises" refers to the entire One World Trade
Center building, and because that building could
not be rebuilt within the twelve months following
September 11, 2001, the "period of restoration"
should be the maximum twelve months (plus 30
days for certain coverage) permitted under the Policy.
In support of its argument, Lava relies heavily on

Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 279 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y.2003), a
case brought by the owners of a retail store at the
World Trade Center whose business depended on
foot traffic by potential customers. On the facts and
policy language before it, the Court found that the
term "property" in the applicable period of restoration provision unambiguously referred to "the specific premises at which Duane Reade operated its
WTC store." Id at 238. The ruling implicitly turned
on the contracting parties' understanding of the necessity of a walk-in consumer popUlation to the
success of a retail operation. The Court rejected as
"untenable" the very argument Lava makes herethat the period of restoration "must be coterminous
with the time actually required to rebuild the entire
complex that will replace the Word Trade Center."
Id at 239.
Here, the "described premises" in the Policy is
Lava's suite of offices on the 83 n1 floor of the
World Trade Center.PN2 If, as Lava suggests, this
Court were to adopt a construction of "property"
similar to that in the Duane Reade case-that is, that
the term "property" itself refers to the specific
premises at which Lava operated-the phrase
"property at the described premises" would be redundant. I decline to adopt such an interpretation.
FN2. Although the 22nd floor of 75 Broad
Street appears to have been added to the
Policy as a covered location for certain
purposes, see Policy at LA V 0014, Lava is
not arguing that 75 Broad Street should be
considered
part of the
"described
premises" for purposes of the issues before
the Court on Ihis motion.

Nor do I find the Second Circuit's recent decision in
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. ABM Industries,
Inc., 397 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.200S) controlling in this
case. In Zurich American, the Second Circuit held
that the insured-which provided janitorial, lighting
and engineering services throughout the World
Trade Center complex pursuant to a contract with
the Port Authority-was entitled to swnmary judgment on the issue of whether, under the policy at issue, it had an "insurable interest" in the common
areas and premises of the other tenants in the World
Trade Center. The Second Circuit found that "[t]he
existence and configuration of the common areas
and tenants' premises were vital to the execution of
ABM's business purpose ... [and] were the means
by which ABM derived its income .... " 397 FJd at
165-66. For similar reasons, the Second Circuit
found that ABM was entitled to coverage for areas
of the World Trade Center that were not part of
ABM's own offices, but that ABM "occupied" by
its use of the space, even though ABM did not have
a legal interest in the space. Id at ] 66-67. The
Zurich American decision turned on the policy language and unique facts of a business dependent
upon providing services to other tenants.
Lava's Policy specifically provides that there is "no
coverage" for the "building." Policy at LA V 002
(Declarations). Here, the "premises" covered by the
Policy is specified-suite 8369 of One World Trade
Center. Id (In its "Iocation/building rating detail,"
the Policy even appears to indicate the square footage of the covered space-7S00 square feet. Id at
LA V 008) In *441Streamline Capital, L.L.C. v.
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WL
22004888, at *9 (S.DN.Y. Aug.2S, 2003), the
Court held, under identical policy language, that the
phrase "property at the described premises" referred to the insured's business personal property
located in its rented office suite. The Court found
that the "described premises" under the policy was
the insured's office suite on the specified floor of
One World Trade Center, and not the entire building. The Court concluded that the "period of restoration" therefore should end when the insured's busi-
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ness personal property in its World Trade Center
offices should have been repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality.
I find the reasoning of the Streamline decision persuasive in this case. As the Court concluded, "[i)t is
wholly unreasonable to think that the period of restoration should be tied to the rebuilding of real
property over which neither the insured nor the in-

Rllrr,r MflIt IIny ......ntrl'll, in5t....3d of ly ih~ jl

(u it

IJIl...

cess that the plaintiff controlled: the acquisition of
replacement office space and the installation of the
plaintiffs personal property in that space." 2003
WL 22004888, at *8. Nothing in the Hartford training materials relied upon by Lava supports a different conclusion. See, e.g., Bauer Cert. Exh. E at
HCAS 2560 (noting that "the direct physical damage must be at the 'described premises' " and
providing an example of damage elsewhere in a
building that would not give rise to coverage for a
premises that was described as "10 State StreetUnit 80]" as opposed to simply "to State Street").
Two points of clarification are in order. First, although I agree that the Policy does not tie the
"period of restoration" to the rebuilding of One
World Trade Center, and that the phrase "property
at the described premises" refers to property located in Lava's rented office suite, I refrain from ruling whether the coverage for such property could
ever include property other than the insured's busi·
ness personal property at the "described premises."
There does not appear to be any claim that any
property other than Lava's business personal property is at issue. It suffices to rule that the "period of
restoration" end s when the property at Lava's 83rd
floor offices should have been repaired, rebuilt or
repJaced with reasonable speed and similar quality.

(3] Second, I do not read the Streamline decision to
have ruled, as defendants suggest, that ''the period
of restoration concludes by the time plaintiff should
have been able to reestablish its operations, either
at the World Trade Center site or in some other location." Defs. Br. at 12 (quoting Streamline, 2003
WL 22004888, at *7). The Court's holding was de-

cidedly narrower: the "period of restoration" ends
when the property necessary to resume operations
should have been repaired, rebuilt or replaced with
reasonable speed and similar quality, and not when
operations have been actually resumed, whether to
their pre-loss levels or otherwise. The unambiguous
definition of "period of restoration" does not look
to the resumption of a policyholder's "operations"
as a measuring stick. It looks to "when the property
:d the utI.:t:ribwd prllmi!:1I1l Ehould bll rllpllirod, robullt
or replaced." The purpose of providing coverage
only during the "period of restoration" is to provide
a limit, where necessary, to the amount of business
income recoverable in those situations where a policyholder's ability to restore its business income to
previous levels may extend beyond any period during which the policyholder reasonably "should" repair, rebuild or replace its damaged property. See,

e.g., Business Interruption Insurance Current Issues, 702 Prat..iicing Law Institute/Litigation 233, at
253·54 (2004) ("The theoretical period [of restoration] is the length of time needed to replace or repair the damaged property in *443 the exercise of
due diligence and dispatch ... Thus, the insured will
not recover for any additional contingent business
interruption loss beyond the theoretical period in
the absence of expanded ... coverage. The theoretical period can terminate while the insured is still losing sales."); see also Duane Reade, 279 F.Supp.2d
at 239. FNl
FN3. Of course, the reverse is also true: a
policyholder's business income claim could
end on the date that It actually resumes
"operations," even if that event happens
prior to the end of the theoretical period of
restoration. Although the evidence on this
motion suggests that Lava may well have
resumed its operations prior to April 30,
2002, Hartford has not sought summary
judgment on this basis.
[4] Thus, I disagree with Lava's assertion that the
"period of restoration" should be measured by ''the
time needed for the policyholder to resume fune-
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tionally equivalent operations"-whether at its
former location or elsewhere (Lava Br. at 5). Such a
result would be contrary to the unambiguous definition of "period of restoration," and would render
superfluous the provision for Extended Business Incoma Covorage, whioh ollplieitly I'rovides ~o'VerA~e
for thc potentially longer-i.e., "eXlemJIaI"-pt:rimJ,
up to 30 days, that it may take to "restore [the in~\lr~g'~l OUf¥fUtiQO:l III to the I:onrlition thllt wOllin
have existed if no direct physical loss or damage
occurred." See also Pis. 56.J Counterstatement p.
30 (quoting Hartford training materials that note
that "the Extended [Business Interruption] Period
often begins immediately after the Period of Restoration ends. The two periods do not overlap.");
Duane Reade, 279 F.Supp.2d at 239 (any losses
continuing beyond the "hypothetical ... (as opposed
to actual) time for rebuilding ... would be addressed
by the 'Extended Recovery Period' provision in tbe
Policy.").

Is There a Triable Factual Dispute as to Whether
the "Period of Restoration" Extended Beyond April

30, 2002?
[5J Having construed the Policy language "property
at the described premises" to mean the property in
Lava's 83 111 floor offices, the question remains
whether Lava has succeeded in raising any genuine
issue of material fact as to when that property
should havc been repaired, rebuilt or l'epllb::eJ,
thereby ending the "period of restoration." Hartford
has come forward with evidence that Lava had replaced the property at in its 83'" Floor offices when
construction was completed and Lava occupied its
new location, 95 Morton Street, which was, at the
latest, by April 30, 2002. See Defs. 56.1 Statement
Ti 16-18. Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. See
Pis. 56.1 Response
16-18 and Counterstatement
p. 28 (stating that Lava moved into 95 Morton
Street on April 5, 2002 and that construction was
completed on April 22).

n

As I read Lava's opposition papers, the only factual
issue it seeks to raise is whether Lava had fully re-

stored its operations as of April 30, 2002. And the
only fact Lava points to in this regard is that its
Connecticut back up data center was not fully operational by this date. See Allen Cert. Ti 20-30; Pis.
56.1 Response , 18; Pis. 56.1 Counterstatement pp.
25-29. A:;:.uuailll;; {i:ll> I Jv} L1111l L"vl1 lau::! rcll::!l::d i:I
genuine dispute over this fact, I conclude it is not
material to a determination of when the "period of
m"tnriltinn" t'nnrn 'ny IOhnrtrnm inn of T1,,1'r naUt
back up data center cannot serve to extend the
"period of restoration. II As I have ruled, the "period
of restoration" is measured by when the property
that was in the "described premises"-Lava's 83 nl
Floor offices-should have been repaired, replaced
or rebuilt, and not by the resumption of operations.
*444 Rather than disputing that this was accomplished by April 30, 2002, Lava argues only that it
needed a fully functional back up data center to be
fully operational, and that its Connecticut back up
center was not fully functional until the fall or
winter of 2002. But before September II, 2001,
Lava's back up data center was not part of the
"described premises"-it was several blocks away.
Therefore, the time it took to rebuild the off-site
back up center is not included within the "period of
restoration." For the reasons I have fully discussed,
the point in time when Lava fully resumed all operations, including those not originally within the
"described premises," is immaterial to the issue of
when the "period of restoration" ended. Because
Lava offers no evidence to contradict Hartford's
liilvwiug lhi:!l thl:: "pl::riud of rl::slurittiun" should end,
at the latest, on April 30, 2002, Hartford is entitled
to a ruling in its favor on this issue. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505
("Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted."); Knight v. US. Fire Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.1986) ("[T]he
mere existence of factual issues-where those issues
are not material to the claims before the court-will
not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment.") (citation omitted; alteration in original).
{6][7] Although not material, Lava has. failed in any
event to create any factual dispute as to whether a
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fully functioning back up center was necessary for
Lava's operations. Lava sets forth no evidence in
opposition to that portion of Hartford's 56.1 Statement addressing the back up data center and its date
of completion. Instead, Lava states simply that
"Hartford's entire statement is argument" and that
"Lava did indeed have a back up center prior to the
loss as required by several of its clients." Pis. 56.1
Response -U 18. But characterization and conclusory
description do not create a triable issue of fact See
Patterson v. County of Oneida. 375 F.3d 206, 219
(2d Cir.2004) (opposing party may not create a
genuine issue of fact "merely by the presentation of
assertions that are conclusory"). Nor is "a Local
Rule 56.1 statement ... itself a [proper] vehicle for
making factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported by the record. Where ... the record does not
support the assertions in a Local Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions should be disregarded and
the record reviewed independently." Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.2001).FN4
FN4. The Certification of Lava's Chief Operating Officer, Charles C. Allen, cited in
support of Lava's response to paragraph 18
of Hartford's 56.1 statement-which appears
to address technical difficulties at 75
Broad Street after September 11 unconnected to the damage to Lava's property at the
premises covered in the Policy-does not in
fact address the facts in the cited paragraph. See Allen Cert. 1 28.
Indeed, Lava's Chief Operating Officer acknowledges that as of September II, 2001, the 75 Broad
Street back up center was only "nearing completion" (Allen Cert. , 27) and the facility's servers
were not installed. Jd , 24 (noting that "the completion of the [75 Broad Street] data center was ...
90 days away"). See also Pis. 56.1 Response , 2
(admitting that as of September II, 2001, construction at 75 Broad Street was not complete). The AlIen Certification also acknowledges that Lava's customers do not require a completed data center in or·
der to do business with Lava. Allen Cert. , 25

(attesting that customers "insisted that Lava have a
backup data center that was near completion before
doing business with Lava"). In short, nothing in
Lava's response to Hartford's 56.1 statement with
respect to the role and functioning of Lava's off-site
back *445 up data center creates any genuine issue
of material fact as to the appropriate end date of the
"period of restoration."

III. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
In addition to all sums that it alleges are due and
owing uilder the Policy, Lava seeks as
"consequential damages," inter alia, the following:
(1) costs to secure funding which should have been
provided by Hartford; (2) damages resulting from
the alleged loss of clients; and (3) damages result·
ing from the alleged loss of future business growth.
At the pleading stage, I denied Hartford's motion to
dismiss. The parties have now had a full opportunity to conduct discovery and Hartford moves for
summary judgment.
[8][9] In Keriford Co. v. County of Erie. 73 N.Y.2d
312, 540 N.Y.S.2d I, 537 N.E.2d ]76 (1989) ("
Kenford Il "), the New York Court of Appeals held
that "[i]t is well established that in actions for
breach of contract, the nonbreaching party may recover ... such unusual or extraordinary damages
[as] have been brought within the contemplation of
the parties as the probable result of a breach at the
time or prior to contracting." Jd at 319, 540
N.Y.S.2d J, 537 N.E.2d 176 (citations omitted). In
order to determine what damages are reasonably
contemplated by the parties, "the nature, purpose
and particular circumstances of the contract known
by the parties should be considered ... as well as
'what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed
to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted
the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed.
when the contract was made.' " Jd (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Trademark Re.vearch
Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc., 995 F.2d 326,
332-33 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that plaintiff had
"failed to establish its lost future profits with the
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degree of certainty required by Kenford 1 ... ami
has failed to establish that liability for such damages were contemplated by the parties at the time of
contracting."). As the quoted language makes clear,
the availability of consequential damages in a given
case requires an examination of: (I) the particular
contract at issue; (2) whether there has been any
conscious assumption of liability by a contracting
party; and (3) whether, by words or deeds. one
party was reasonably led to believe that the other
had mum", riLl,h liflhililY, Thllli. 1111 inniroiltr.d in
my prior rulings on the subject. the Court in Kenford 1/ looked to whether there was a "provision in
the contract" or "any evidence in the record to
demonstrate that the parties, at any relevant time.
reasonably contemplated or would have contemplated that the [defendant] was undertaking a contractual responsibility" for the consequential damages sought by the plaintiff. KeJiford II. 73 N.Y.2d
at 320, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1. 537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis
added); see also Trademark Research Corp., 995
F.2d at 334 (finding that "[t]he record contains no
specific evidence that. at the time of contracting,
[rlr:fr:nrlant] IIl~cepted liability for nine years of Im:t
profits. No evidence was offered that the parties
ever discussed lost profits liability.").
In order to prevail, Lava is required to .. 'establish
that liability for [the consequential damages sought]
were contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.' ., Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford FIre Insurance Co., 2004 WL 943565, at "2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 3, 2004) (quoting Trademark Research Corp.,
995 F.2d at 332-33). Plaintiff must present evidence
"of 'whnt the I'lU'ties would l,avG G6JI.:.luJ"J t. ..J
they considered the subject,' or that, in light of the
parties' discussions on the subject, one party would
have been led to believe that the other was assuming liability for such damages." Id

*446 [10] On its motion for summary judgment,
Hartford has pointed to a lack of any such evidence.
and has presented evidence that neither it nor
plaintiff contemplated that Hartford would be liable
for consequential damages in the event of a breach.

@

"In moving for summary jnrlemr:nt Re:RinSt a party
who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial,
the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point
to an absence of evidence to support an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga
v. March of Dimes Birth Defoe's Fdn., 51 F.3d 14,
18 (2d Cir.1995); see also Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P.. 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d
Cir.J994) ("[TJhe moving party may obtain summary judgment by showing that little or no evidence mil)' 00 found in £upport of tho nonmo\'iftg
party's case."). "In other words, the moving party
does not bear the burden of disproving an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim." Bussa v.
Alitalfa Linee Aeree llaliane. S.pA, 2004 WL
1637014. at "'3 (S.D.N.Y. Ju1.21, 2004). In light of
Hartford's initial showing that there is no evidence
that the parties contemplated, or that Hartford reasonably warranted, that Hartford would be liable for
the consequential damages sought here in the event
of a breach of the Policy. the burden shifts to Lava
to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial," and it cannot rest on "mere
nlleglltionn or denillls" of thc facts assertGd by th~
movant. Rule 56(e). Fed.R.Civ.P.
In opposition to Hartford's motion, Lava points
only to internal Hartford documents demonstrating
that Hartford was aware of the reasons why people
buy business interruption coverage. and the importance of resolving such claims promptly to minimize
actual lost income. Thus, Lava quotes from certain
training materials that acknowledge that when a
business is experiencing downtime, its net earnings
!IItly Lc i1.I1'e"lcd, tllld lhi1l swift ucdon on
pan of
the insurer may be beneficial to the policy holder.
Lava also relies on certain advertising material~ in
which, it asserts, Hartford touts-the type of policy at
issue as security against "unexpected loss [ J
wip[ing] out your bottom line" (Bauer Exh. I at
HCAS 02545) and claims that "you simply can't afford to be caught short on insurance protection"
(Bauer Exh. K at HCAS 02539). Lava also relies on
certain statements from Hartford claim adjuster
Peter Pollicino, who acknowledged, not surpris-

me
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ingly, that a lack of insurance coverage could "be
It bUlilne5s" and/or "wIpe out .. a ousmess
financially. Bauer Cert. Exh. L at 471.

JctlJl y tv

None of this "evidence," however, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hartford
was assuming liability for consequential damages
in the event of a breach. The evidence adduced by
Lava simply illustrates the rather unremarkable proposition that business interruption insurance is
meant to insure against loss of business income and
other expenses, and that if a company does not have
such insurance, they stand the risk of financial consequences if they are not otherwise prepared. It is a
significant leap of reasoning to conclude from this
that Hartford understood that it would be liable for
the consequential damages sought here, or was warranting to Lava that it would be so liable. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
Of course, New York law also requires that the
Court consider "the nature, purpose and particular
circumstances of the contract known by the parties"
in determining whether consequential damages are
available. Keriford I/, 73 N.Y.2d at 319, 540
N. Y.S.2d I, 537 N.E.2d 176. The Appellate Division, Third Department, has held that "[t]he very
purpose of business interruption coverage would
makedefendant*447 aware that if it breached the
policy it would be liable to plaintiffs for damages
for the loss of their business as a consequence of its
breach or made it possible for plaintiffs reasonably
to suppose that defendant assume such damages
when the contract was made." Sabbeth Industries

Ltd v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 238 A.D.2d 767, 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475
(3d Dep't I 997). But in Sabbeth, the insurer disclaimed any coverage under the policy, and
plaintiff sought the "lost value of its business" and
other damages. It is not clear from the Court's opinion which of these losses would have been due under the policy had the insurer met its obligations.
Certainly, if an insurer breaches its policy, it should
expect to be liable for covered losses under the
policy. But most importantly, Sabbeth was decided

in the context of a motion to dismiss. As in Sabbeth, 1 denied Hartford's motion to dismiss and
have given Lava the opportunity to prove its allega
tions. This plaintiff's "consequential damage" claim
fails because there is no evidencc to stippOi't it.
4

Nothing in the Policy before me would lead either
the insured or the insurer to understand that the insurer, in the event of breach, would be liable for
costs to secure funding that should have been
provided by Hartford, the loss of clients or the loss
of future business growth. Lava relies on language
in the Policy itself that provides, for example, that
there is no dollar limit for business interruption
coverage, which is limited only by a maximum of
twelve months plus thirty days. Policy at LA V 0028
& 0029. From this provision, and the fact that the
Policy was designed to pay Lava for certain eX
penses and lost income during the period it could
not operate (up to a maximum of 13 months), Lava
extrapolates that "[bJoth parties understood ... that
Lava's lost income would be greater if (1) business
interruption coverage were denied or delayed; or
(2) of the Period of Restoration were miscalculated
or abbreviated by Hartford's own wrongdoing; and
(3) that Hartford would be responsible for paying
the costs of its delay or wrongdoing." Lava Br. at
18. Lava's conclusion, however, does not foHow
from the cited Policy provisions. Indeed, it is undermined by the fact that the Policy contemplates
substantial delay in payment, during which time
both the insured and the insurer presumably are assessing the losses, the insured is submitting its
claim, and any differences between the insured and
insurer are resolved. See Policy at LA V 0035-0038
(providing, inter alia, that the insurer will pay for a
covered loss within 30 days of receiving the signed
statement of loss only if (1) the insured has complied with all of the terms of the Policy and (2) the
insured and the insurer have agreed upon the
amount of the loss or an appraisal award has been
made). Thus, the Policy contemplates that a period
of at least 90 days may pass before Hartford indicates its intentions with respect to a claim, and contemplates payment within 90 days (or less) of a
4
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covered loss only if the insured has complied with
all the terms of the Policy and the insured and insurer have reached an agreement as to the amount
of the loss or "an appraisal award has been made."
Id The Policy sets forth an explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be conducted by an appraiser,
that either party may invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of loss. Id at LA V
0036. (There is no evidence in the record before me
on this motion that Lava ever sought, or obtained,
an appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other
than that made in January 2002. See PIs. 56.1 Response , 21.) In short, contrary to Lava's position
that the Policy language would lead Hartford to understand that any delay in payment or disagreement
"'448 with respect to the claim would render it liable for the consequential damages sought, the
Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including
potential delay of more than three months) is foreseeable.
Although the Policy language may have a direct
bearing on whether damages sought were within the
contemplation of the parties, it is not necessarily
controlling on the issue. Lava Trading Inc. v. HartTara ./'ire insurance Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 442
(S.D.N.Y.2004). I have considered the Policy exclusions and payment provisions cited by Lava in
support of its contention that liability for consequential damages are contemplated by the Policy,
as well as the entirety of the Policy, and conclude
they, either alone or in conjunction with other evidence, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the parties contemplated consequential
damages of the kind and character sought.

The parties knew that Hartford would be liable for
the sums paid and they knew that if those sums
were not paid, Hartford would be liable for simple
interest at 9% per annum from the date of the
breach. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5001 & 5004
(McKinney's 1992 & 2005 Supp.); Feb. 16, 2005
Tr. at 18. In response to Hartford's motion, Lava
has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether anything further was contemplated.

CONCLUSION
Hartford's motion for summary judgment dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages is
GRANTED. On Hartford's motion, I conclude under Rule 56(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., that the following
fact "appear[s] without substantial controversy":
the "period of restoration" ended no later than April
30,2002.
Hartford has also moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the damages sought by Lava are
excluded under the Policy or are too speculative to
be recovered. I rysyrYy mUD!! on this m.1l1 of Hartford's motion.
SO ORDERED.
S.D.N. Y.,2005.
Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
365 F.Supp.2d 434
END OF DOCUMENT

The loss of business income that arises from a
covered loss such as the destruction of the World
Trade Center was, indeed, contemplated by the
parties. That was the purpose of the contract of insurance. But, with the benefit of the full summary
judgment record before me, I conclude that the consequential damages that this plaintiff seeks were
not contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a
breach of Hartford's duty to pay under the Policy.
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702 West Idaho, Suite 700
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(208) 395-8500
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. CV -08-7069

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING RE
DEFENDANT'S. MOTION TO STRIKE
RE: DAMAGES, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE SECOND MOTION TO
COMPEL, AND REQUEST FOR FEES
AND COSTS 0

\L-

Date: March 9, 2010
Time: 1:00 p.m.
The Hon. John T. Mitchell, Presiding

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant, the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, by and through its counsel, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., will bring on for
hearing its Motion to Strike Re: Damages, or in the Alternative Second Motion to Compel, and
Request for Fees and Costs before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, March 9, 2010.
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE RE:
DAMAGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL, AND REQUEST
FOR FEES AND COSTS· 1
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commencing at 1 :00 p.m., at the Kootenai County Courthouse before the Honorable John T.
Mitchell.
DATED

thiS~ay of February, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the dday of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following;

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208/665-7290

IZI

o
o

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
~ Email

o

,

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE RE:
DAMAGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL, AND REQUEST
FOR FEES AND COSTS- 2
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Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\3\3-4 72. 9\Reconsideration 02--0rder. doc

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.c.,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CV-08-7069

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Second Motion for Reconsideration, filed
February 4,2010, is DENIED.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

lb f\..; day of February, 2010.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~l;

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

;&' U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

o
o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

o
o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.c.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-08-7069
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, filed
December 30, 2009, is DENIED.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

;26~ay of February, 2010.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.2k day of February, 20ID, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

o

o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

o
o
o

Hand Deli vered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

cTeffthe Court
:Bryan A. Nickels--
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.c.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-08-7069

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT E. UNDERDOWN

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert E.
Underdown, filed February 16,2010, is GRANTED.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT E.
UNDERDOWN - 1

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DA TED this

J Gf-aay of February, 2010.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814

,¥U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D Telecopy

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

D
D
D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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~
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702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\3\3-472.9\Amend Complaint Punitive Damages-ORDER.doc

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV -08-7069

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the reasons as stated on the
record at the time of the hearing held on February 22, 2010,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, filed February
11,2010, is DENIED.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 1
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this $rlay of February, 2010.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!JJf.t;

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

)s;(j/u .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

-0

D
D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

D
D
D

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Cler of the Court

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT- 2
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
LAW OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
ISB: 5216

2010 f,tR -5 PM l,: 56

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,

Case No: CV-08-7069

L.L.C.,
FFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER IN SUPPORT
F MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Kootenai

I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that:
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington;
2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained;
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.;
4. Attached is a true and correct copy of my analysis of True Value Hardware's
Employees' claims.
DATED this

5±h-day of March, 2010.

AFFIDA VIT OF DAN HARPER

-]
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\

\

/---,

~l-~.~
__
DAN HARPER
HARPER, INC.

SUBSCRIBED AND S WORN to before me this

0B-

day of March, 2010.

NOTARY JBLIC III and for Washm~ton
Residing at: _~Dt.fA.h.L .
Commission Expires: (O/20/2.DI (

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER
-2
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1 hereby certify that on the S-th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
PO Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271
FAX: (208) 395-8585

[]
[]
[ ]

~

Hand-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Facsimile
Email

BY:~~
Sherry Stevens

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER
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March 5, 2010
INCORPORATE)
i:nrensit.'

/\~l OI.Wliillh

V:lIllati')lI Advl',)rS <\:
'l~'stiryil'~~ FUHh)lIlic'

Mr. Arthur Bistline
Bistline Law
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d Alene, ID 83814

Expcrh

Re: Lakeland v Hartford

Dear Mr. Bistline:

J have reviewed the documents and conespondence produced in this case as it relates to
the on-going Lakeland True Value staff payroll, which excludes the Fritz's wages/draws.
Based on this review ofthe records I have reached the following opinions.
Opinion l-Harrford was Timely Provided lhe NecessOlY b?formalion
Estimate and Fund the Staff Payroll on a Contemporaneous Basis.

fO

Reasonably

Harford had received the monthly Lakeland statements of income by fax dated March 5,
2008. These statements listed the actual monthly staff payroll and payroll taxes for 2007
(MDD000428-MDD000449) (Exhibit A). In my opinion the same month prior year
actual staff payroll expense provided a reasonable basis for Hartford to fund these costs
on a contemporaneous basis. Any over or shOli funding, when compared to the
subsequent actual, could have been adjusted for in the next month.

Opinion 2-The Actual Amounts Paid to the Store StajJwere lvlaleriaf(v Less than the
Prior Year Due to Harrford's Lack o.fTimely Funding.
Hartford had been informed by Mr. Fritz on March 13, 2008 that he was planning on
continuing the entire payroll during the period of restoration (1-100017) (Exhibit B).
Hartford had been timely provided the information they needed to not only estimate and
fund the staff payroll currently but also fund the monthly lost store income. J
Hartford's delinquent funding of the continuing staff payroll and monthly lost store
income caused Mr. Fritz to make financial cuts or reductions to the normal continuing
staff wages (Exhibit C).

I

E-mail fi'om Ms. Kale indicating she had received the MDD report of loss (HOOOO 18).
hO/ }-FtcS1 lHlIill t1Velllle •.,>'uire 8/./
,)'pokallc,

HA 992(J/

e-/II(/I/: //(/ IjH' n Ill.' (if) C{'iil/C. ljit' rI, 1"0111

It:('hsi II':

H'l\ 'IV,{'(IJI1f",l/'('I'I, (. (Jill

51J 1) 747.5850, fAX j(J<;.747.,SS5')
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Mr. Arthur Bistline
Re: Lakeland v Hartford
March 5, 2010
Page 2

The employees that would have otherwise received their normal wages were damaged to
the extent they were not able to find a replacement job.
I have computed the difference between what the Lakeland employees were actually paid
in 2008 and 2009 and what they likely would have been paid if the store had remained
fully open and each had remained employed at the store during those time frames. These
amounts total $114,128.78 (Exhibit D).

Very truly yours,
HARPER INCORPORATED

\\
DanieIJ.~p~

~
.

,
MBA

djh/sjh

s:

Bistline re staff payroll damages 3·5·1 O.d.doc

"1""
;.,;

;.,;;.,;

ti\h;6+ r4

I·~~;:;:y.~~~~~=..,~""""",~~*-"""---""",...,..",,,

I

. = ' . ' __

""~="""tI~41~_II:~"''''«~_1Si~~Il>~ _''1

I

Hartford Payment of Normal Continuing Staff Payroll Costs

Per Insurance Policy·-Continuing Normal Payroll Expenses Will Be Reimbursed

Actual Staff Payroll from 2007
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$
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$
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August
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October

$
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November

$
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by Fax on March 5, 2008
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Hartford Payroll Payments Were Delinquent in all but 2 Months after the Roof
Collapse From Feb 2008 to Oct 2008
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Hartford Computed Combined Lost Income and Payroll Costs
Compared to Actual Hartford Payments Reveal a $80,000 Deficiency
Preventing the Store from Opening In October 2008
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Exhibit D

EmQlo~ee

Name

James Ahlman
Carolyn Beard
Jason Jacobs
Pam McMaster
Jerry Moreau

Paid

Payroll
Report

Shortage

Payroll
Report

2007

2008

2008

2009

21,090.75
30,511.93
12,901.51
26,646.90
13,271.25

12,516.00
16,327.00
10,102.38
13,218.76
7,565.25

(8,574.75)
(14,184.93)
(2,799.13)
(13,428.14)
{5,706.00~

(44,692.95)

9,205.88
7,953.25
0.00
10,703.13
7,124.25

Shortage

2009
(11,884.87)
(22,558.68)
(12,901.51 )
(15,943.77)
{6,147.00~

(69,435. 83 l

(114,128.78)
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

ase No.: CV-08-7069
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

Plaintiff,

o CONSOLIDATE

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

FACTS
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, operated a hardware store and the roof collapsed.
Lakeland had an insurance policy with Hartford which promised to pay continuing operating
expenses incurred during the cessation of operations, including payroll. Lakeland filed suit in
this case for breach of the insurance contract. The employees of Lakeland filed suit in Kootenai
County Case CV10-774 based on the same transaction and occurrence because they did not
receive the payroll they would have had the store been operating. I

I

Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at I.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
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ARGUMENT
"It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far as possible. When claims

arise out of the same accident and one trial is sufficient to determine all the facts, separate trials
would be a waste of time and expense." Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 597, 768 P.2d 1321,
1330 (1989) citing Nelson v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 60 Idaho 443,92 P.2d 790 (1939). The
basis for the suit in Kootenai County Case CVlO-774 is that the employees of Lakeland were
entitled to be paid what they would have earned if the store had not been destroyed during the
period of time the store was not operating. The issue in that case is the same as this - whether
~artford

reasonably performed its duties under the insurance contract. The only additional item

of proof that is required on the issue is a simple calculation of the difference between what each
employee was paid in 2008 and 2009 and the estimated amount each would have been paid if the
store was fully operational.

A. The adjusters handling this loss have admitted the employees of Lakeland were
entitled to full payroll during the time the store was not open. The employees
are third party beneficiaries of the contract and entitled to enforce it in a
direction acton.
The policy in question provides for the payment of continuing operating expenses,
including payroll, during the period ofrestoration. 2 This provision provides a direct benefit to
the employees of Lakeland - that being that those employees are paid what they would have
been paid if the store had been fully operational. 3 The adjuster handling the claim as well as her
supervisor have dmitted that this was the proper interpretation of the policy language. 4

1 Affidavit

of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley affidavit) at H419, Paragraph 0, (I) and 0, (4)
Furthermore, Hartford's argument that Mike and Kathy should not have been paying themselves from the insurance proceeds, which this Court
touched on in dismissing their bad faith claims, is not even supported by Hartford's own agent's testimony. On this point also see below where
the adjuster knew all along the income payments were intended to cover the Fritz's draws/payroll from the company.
4 Affidavit of Julia Kale attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 38: 15 to 39: I.
3
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In order for a party to be a "third party beneficiary", the parties to the contract must so
intend, and that intention is a question of fact to be detennined by the facts and circumstances.

Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co. 107 Idaho 511, 525, 691 P.2d 375, 389 (1984) "That intent must
appear from the contract itself or be shown by necessary implication." Id.

In Williston on Contracts (Third Edition) § 369 the rule is stated:
In practically every jurisdiction, a beneficiary to whom the insurer
has promised the insured that the insurance money shall be paid is
given a right to enforce the policy, and generally by a direct action.
This result has been reached in jurisdictions adhering to the strict
doctrine of privity of contract by statute; but in most states without
the aid of a statute.
Ordinarily, a beneficiary of such an insurance contract may
maintain an action thereon, though not named therein, when it
appears by fair and reasonable intendment that his rights and
interests were in the contemplation of the parties, and were being
provided for at the time of making the contract.
Id
A provision in a contract which provides that employees will be paid the full amount they
would have earned if the store would have been operating clearly was intended to benefit the
employees. "A third party may only enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc. 118 Idaho 297,305,
796 P.2d 506, 514 (1990) citing Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho at 532, 446
P.2d at 901; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,464,583 P.2d 997, 999
(1978). The policy sets forth it will pay "payroll" during the period of restoration, and the
adjusters admit that the employees are a member of a class of individuals who are entitled to
receive payment under the policy and are third party beneficiary of the contract. At a minimum
it is a question of fact.
II

B. Lakeland's Employees did not receive the payroll each would have if the store
opened because of Hartford's breach of the insurance contract.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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Hartford's agent, Sedgwick, hired an accounting firm to corne up with schedules by
which Hartford could make advances on the policy to assist the insured while the business was
not operating. 5 The information provided to the accountants was more than sufficient to
estimate the estimate the entire business income claim - including payroll - for advance
purposes and Hartford refused to advance the sums because of "lacking information," but still
have provided no indication whatsoever of what infonnation they thought they were missing.
The adjuster, Julia Kale, (Kale) and Mike Fritz had a conversation on February 1st, 2008,
and in that conversation, Mr. Fritz advised her that his payroll expense ran roughly $4,000 per
week and that he had five full time employees. 6 The accounting firm hired by Kale received the
required financial infonnation from Lakeland in early March 2008 and this information included
profit and loss statements. 7 In mid-March, the accountant developed schedules from which to
make advances to Lakeland and called to discuss those with Kale. Those schedules were for
making advances over the next four months. The schedules estimated for advance purposes
payroll expense $18,622 but the accountant was very clear that the numbers did not include
amounts for payroll other than for Mike and Kathy Fritz. Kale called Mike Fritz and was told
they were paying the entire payroll, not just their own. 8 There is no evidence that Kale ever told
that to the accountants or in any way directed that they recomputed their schedules based on this
infonnation so they could recomputed the schedules. At deposition Kale testified:
By Mr. Bistline
Q.

Okay. And did you ever call MD&D and advise they needed to rework the
schedules based on the amount of actual payroll?

5 Deposition

of Julia Kale at 36:24 to 37:8

Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley affidavit) at 1-14 (claim notes)
7 Affidavit of Dan Harper filed in opposition to Hartford's Summary Judgment Motion at paragraph 5.
8 Copley affidavit at H 17.
6
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A.

We discussed on numerous occasions the missing documentation that was needed
and requested from Mr. Fritz.

Q.

What was missing at that point on March 14th about the payroll?

A.

We did not have his complete payroll information.

Q.

And who told you you didn't have the complete payroll information?

A.

Per the discussion with Patrick, all we had was the information for Mike Fritz and
his wife. We did not have the other employees' documentation and -- to show
what was paid to them.

This is an outright falsehood. As March 14th, 2008, MD&D, the accountants had in their
possession everything they need to know to calculate the payroll for each and every month of
this loss - they had the prior year's monthly payroll expense. If Kale had called the accountants
and conveyed this to them, it would have been a simple matter to re-compute the schedules based
on the prior year's payroll information which was in the possession of the accountants. Either
Kale did not tell them this information or the accountants did not do anything with it. Either way
it is negligent and rendered Lakeland unable to pay its Payroll.
The total payroll expense from the four months of the prior year was $61,503 9, which is
roughly 330% higher than the payroll estimate used to pay Lakeland during the months of
February through May 2008.
Besides already having reason to know of this error, the adjuster was further made aware
of the problem in mid-April when Lakeland's independent adjuster informed her of Lakeland's
cash flow problems, 10 and on May 2, 2008, Kale was informed that Lakeland had not been able
to pay its payroll since mid-April. 11

Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 7
Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 4 - 'The insured is in dire need ofthese funds to assist them in meeting their current financial shortages ... "
II Copley affidavit at H30

9

10
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Then in May, MD&D issued another schedule that reflected the actual payroll paid
through April 2008, as well as the estimated payroll for the month of May. Hartford immediately
issued another check to bring the account current. 12
Thereafter, for inexplicable reasons, Kale refused to advance anything on payroll until
she had verification that it had actually been paid. Kale advances on estimates from the first
schedule, but refused to do it any thereafter unless Lakeland verified it had paid that payroll by
the production of bank statements. 13 Lakeland informed Kale that they could not pay payroll
until the money for payroll was received 14 and therefore could not verify with bank statements
that the checks had been cashed.
Lakeland's allegation is that Hartford did not timely pay under the policy and that fact
did not allow them to open the store. The evidence developed in the recent deposition indicate
that Hartford was at minimum in breach of contract, and more likely than not negligent.
The schedules utilized for advancement purpose are not difficult to understand. The first
set of schedules developed in this case could have been used to estimate the loss through the year
2008.

The schedules provide the numbers for a simple calculation: prior year's revenue in any

given month multiplied by the projected growth in sales multiplied times the gross earnings less
non-continuing expenses percent (BI%).15 The first page of that schedule tells you the projected
lost revenue of $354, 189 and the BI% is 18.83% for a lost business income estimate (other than
payroll) for the months covered of $66,694 ($354,189

* 18.83%).

In order to calculate the

month of June, which his not included in the $66,694, all that has to be done is multiply the BI%
times the 2007 sales for June l6 times the projected growth of revenue of 11 %.17 This calculation

Copley affidavit at H31
Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 5
14 Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at 6
12
IJ

I~

Affidavit of Arthur Bistline at Exhibit 1 page I.

16

Id at page three.
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is demonstrated on the second page of those schedules. Plug in the numbers for any month and
you know your lost business income for that month, other than payroll. This is first grade math.
Julia Kale, the adjuster assigned to this claim, testified in deposition that she had no idea
what those schedules represented.
Q.

Okay. So if in any given month would you take, for example, the lost revenue,
the projected lost revenue that he did not earn, and multiply it times that 18.83
percent to come up with the business income portion of the income for that
month.

A.

I do not know that answer. I am not a certified accountant.

Q.

Okay. So you don't know what a 18.83 percent was to be used for?

A.

That determines what his percentage of his gross earnings less his ongoing
expenses Therefore, he has 18.83 percent.

Q.

And did you -- so you didn't understand how they calculated the lost income then?

A.

Yes--

MS. DUKE: Object to the form.
BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Did you understand how they calculated the lost income for that time frame?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And how did they do that?

A.

Based on the documentation that Mr. Fritz provide for the lost income.

Q.

I'm not talking about the calculation. They came up with a number 66,694. Do
you know how they arrived at that number? What that's a product of?

17

ld.
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A.

It's his lost revenue, his gross earnings less his continuing expenses and his lost
income, to determine the lost income.

Q.

Okay. And do you understand that 18.83 percent was multiplied against that
354,189?

MS. DUKE: Foundation.
A.

I did not know that precisely. 18

[ .. ]
Q.

But do you understand specifically how that 11.38 percent would be utilized to
make that calculation?

MS. DUKE: Foundation.
A.

Could you repeat that?

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

I'm just asking if you understand how that 11.38 percent figure would be used in
the calculation to compute lost business income for any given month.

A.

Yes.

MS. DUKE: Foundation. Go ahead.
A.

Yes. Based on the documentation in the profit and loss statements.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

What I'm saying is that you calculate business income by basically multiplying
numbers together. And do you understand what that 11.38 percent would be
multiplied against in that calculation?

MS. DUKE: Foundation.
A.

I'

No, I don't know precisely.

Kale deposition at 48: 16 to 49:7
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Ms. Kale not understand the information she was presented and neither did her supervisor Ms.
Reynolds.

Q.

At this point, if! gave you that 18.83 percent, if you wouldn't know how to plug
that in to calculate lost business income?

A.

Well, with a loss of this size we defer to the professional accountants on that.
Hartford had everything it need to calculate business income. The adjusters
assigned to this case just did not have any idea what they were looking at when
they received schedules.

The adjusters claim to not have enough information to make advances, because the
':lccountants could not complete their schedules. They could not testify what the information was
missing and deferred to the accountants.

Ms. Copley testified:

Q.

Okay. What was missing?

A.

For specific missing information you'd have to go back and talk to MD&D. 19

Ms. Kale testified

Q.

Did -- at some point you received a schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that
point. Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we cannot generate this
schedule because we don't have the information we need?

A.

Amy at Matson & Driscoll had continuously advised that we were missing
documentation needed to have another schedule. 2o

[.. ]

'9 Deposition of Melanie Copley at 12:21
20

Deposition of Kale 73: 15
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Q.

But she didn't say I cannot calculate an advance schedule without this
information?

MS. DUKE: Object to the form. Asked and answered.
A.

She advised she needed additional information.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Again, the question is she never did say, though, I cannot give you an advance
schedule without it?

A.

I don't know if she used those exact words, but we could not continue to make
payments based on speculation.

Q.

And you view those schedules anything paying past May, based on those
schedules, would be speculation?

A.

Yes. We don't have hardcore -- we don't have hard numbers. We can only pay so
much on speculation until it gets to the point where we need to have hardline
numbers.

Q.

What hard number were you missing?

MS. DUKE: This has been asked and answered now several times.
MR. BISTLINE: Well, she hasn't actually told me the hard number. Because we know it
could be a hard number on profit and loss because that's, by definition, an estimate.
BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

So a hard number, to me, says you're looking for something actually done. And
what actually were you looking for that had actually occurred?

A.

We continuously needed the insured's financial statements, we needed the wage
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documentation. All the things that we've been requesting through this whole
time.
Q.

Was it just the wage documentation primarily?

A.

No. Like I said, all of the insured's financials in order to determine his lost
income. 21

Obviously, the accountants had the financials because they had already estimated the
loss. Contrary to Ms. Kale's testimony, the only thing they were missing was payroll and they
only reason they could not issue a new schedule was because Kale told them to wait for actiual
payroll. They could have completed the schedules based on prior years information and then
made adjustments later, and even could have finished the schedules without that information, but
did not at Kale's direction.
Amy Kohler, Kale's accountant, testified as follows regarding the alleged missing
information:
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And there's numerous references throughout this case of
you trying to complete your schedules, and what does that mean? If I say that to
you, "I have to complete my schedule for July," what would that mean to you?
A. In my memory, the main piece that we were continually trying to obtain
was related to the payroll disbursements. 22
Had Ms. Kale been willing to pay based on estimated schedules for payroll, which she had
already done in the past, then Kohler could have calculated the schedules simply by using last
year's numbers and then made minor adjustments after the fact. 23

2'

Deposition of Kale 78: 10 to 79:24

22

Deposition of Amy Kohler at 32:14

2J

Affidavit of Dan Harper at page I of his report.
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There is no explanation for Kale's refusal to pay payroll based on estimates as she
already had paid based on estimates. Her insistence on actual payroll paid was not reasonable
and it this insistence is why further schedules were not created. Even if Kale was justified in
requiring actual disbursements before payment of payroll, it was not reasonable for her to with
hold all payment pending receipt of that information. She could have paid something pending
receipt of the payroll information. Her own accountant testified to this fact. Amy Kohler
testified:
Q:

So from what I understand before, though, you could have completed your
schedule other than payroll, and payroll could have been treated separately as far
as, you know, Here's your business income claim and here's the payroll part of it,
two separate items?
MR. NICKELS: Objection; form, foundation, and speculation.

A.

I suppose it could have been done that way. That wasn't the way we were asked
to do it.

Q.

(By Mr. Bistline) Okay. And who asked -- when you say "it wasn't the way we
were asked to do it," who told you how to do it?

A.

In our conversations with Julia, we would have talked over how she would want
to see schedules, what information she needed to have. 24

Kale could have authorized payroll estimates based on the prior year and then adjusted
for any actual changes in the next month. 2s Amy Kohler agreed that the schedules are the
projection of loss based on historical data and then you use current information to slightly adjust
the claim. She testified:

24

Deposition of Amy Kohler at 32:22 - 33: II

25

Affidavit of Dan Harper at page I of his report.
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Q:

So if I understand what you're saying is, you come up with a projection of lost
business income based on historical data, and then as the claim progresses, utilize
current information to slightly adjust the business income claim.

A.

I would agree with that--

Q.

Okay.

A.

-- description.

Hartford had schedules that allowed the calculation of lost business income in mid-March
2008. It had everything it needed to calculate the lost business income, including payroll,
through the year based on that schedule. The adjusters conduct amount to negligence at a
minimum for the mistake made, and more likely than not, the conduct of withholding payment
based on "missing infomlation" that is not missing at all and refusing to make advancements
when you have in the past, amounts to intentional misconduct performed with knowledge of how
it was strangling Lakeland True Value Hardware.
Lastly, the inventory in this case was not paid for until 8 months after the issuance of the
certificate of occupancy for the store. Melanie Copley calculated the period of restoration as
October 30 th , 2008. The undersigned and Ms. Copley had the following exchange regarding the
fact that the inventory claim had not been paid at that point:
Q.

But it does say that the inventory has to be replaced before the period of
restoration ends.

A.

It does not. Where does -

Q.

Doesn't it say that?

A.

It doesn't say that.

Q.

Wouldn't inventory be property at the scheduled premises?
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It would, but it says the property at the scheduled premises should be repaired,

A.

rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality. It doesn't say has
to be, it says should be. 26
How exactly the inventory "should be" replaced at the store when the insured has not
been paid for it by the insurance company is a mystery. No reasonable person would think that
the policy would be so interpreted. This is bad faith. Michelle Reynolds apparently cannot even
read the policy.
By Ms. Duke

Q.

Does period of restoration, pursuant to that policy provision, in any way take into
account whether the insured is ready to move back in to the building?

A.

No, it doesn't.

Q.

And why is that?

A.

Because it's outside the policy. The period of restoration is when the building is
rebuilt?7

BY MR. BISTLINE:

Q.

You read from the period of restoration and then in response to another question
you said the period of restoration ends when the building is rebuilt. Is that your
opinion that that period of restoration ends when the building is rebuilt?

A.

That was using my own terms without reading from the policy.

Q.

Okay. Because the policy says the property at the scheduled premises should be
repaired, rebuilt or replaced.

MS. DUKE: I'm just handing her the policy so she can look at it.

'6 Deposition ofM. Copley at 19:7
27

Depositon of Reynolds at 55: 1
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A.

Right.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Well, part of the property that would have to be replaced would be the inventory;
correct? You could rebuild the building, but you'd have to replace the inventory
before the period of restoration would end?

A.

Well, the property is referring to the scheduled premises.

Q.

The property at the scheduled premises. Wouldn't the inventory be at the
scheduled premises when the roof collapsed?

A.

Well, of course it would.

Q.

Okay. So it would have had to have been replaced for the period of restoration to
end;

A.

That's not my understanding, no.

Q.

Okay. Well, isn't that what it says, you have to replace the property at the
scheduled premises?

A.

Yes, but the property is referring to the premises, the scheduled premises.

Q.

So you're saying that the property at the scheduled premises is only referring to
the building?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Is there anything in the policy that tells you that? Wouldn't it read the
scheduled premises should be repaired if that's what it was trying to convey?

A.

I didn't write the policy.28

The policy plainly says the period of restoration end when the property at the scheduled
premises is replaced (amongst other things). For Reynolds to interpret it in the way she did is

28

Deposition of Reynolds at 73:22 -75:16

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

- 15

plain intentional misconduct. Furthermore, it seems that the adjusters involved don't think that
the timing of payments is really very important. Michelle Reynolds testified:
Q. Okay. So you acknowledge that there is an aspect of this policy that deals with the

timing these payments are made?
A. No, I would not say that at all. 29
Hartford did not pay for the inventory until approximately 10 months after it alleges that
store should have been open. 30
During the years of2008 and 2009, the employees were shorted over $44,000 and in the
year 2009 they were shorted over $114,000. 31 The employees were not paid because Hartford
~ailed

to sufficiently and timely fund Lakeland's claim. If Hartford is responsible to pay lost

business income up until the point the store opened in August of 2009, then Hartford is
responsible to pay the full payroll the employees would have earned as that is a component of
lost business income according to the policy.

29

Deposition of Michelle Reynolds at 33: 11

30

Copley affidavit at paragraph 2m, and paragraph 5.

31

Affidavit of Dan Harper at page 2 of his report.
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CONCLUSION
The issues in this case and CV 10-774 arise out of the same occurrence and are identical
in all respects. Not consolidating these cases would result in two trials with identical issues
which would be a waste of time and which could result in inconsistent determinations on the
same issues, which is also to be avoided if possible. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen ofAmerica,
Inc. 532 F.2d 674, 690 (C.A.Cal. 1976); also see LR.C.P. 19(a)(l) which requires the joinder of
a party who could be subject to inconsistent liabilities.
The only additional evidence the consolidation would require would be the difference
between what was paid to the employees and what should have been during the years 2008 and
2009. That is a simple calculation that is completed and can be verified by Defendant's
accountant. Consolidating these cases will not delay this trial.
DATED this 51\ day of March, 2010.

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _ day of February, 2010, I seryed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
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Keely E. Duke
US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Bryan A. Nickels
Hand Delivered
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
P.O. Box 1271
Facsimile (208) 395-8585
Boise,ID 83701
~Email

60~
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 'OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

Case No: CV -08-7069
FFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
) ss.
)

I, Arthur M. Bistline, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that:
1. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the complaint filed in Kootenai
County Case. No. CV-1O-774.
2. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition
transcript of Julia Kale. Exhibit I is a copy of Exhibit 3 to her deposition.
3. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition
transcript of Melanie Copley. Exhibit J is copy of Amy Kohlers deposition.
4. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the deposition
transcript of Michelle Reynolds.

AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
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5. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter written by Chris Glenister
to Kale, and provided to me out of the files ofMD&D by the Hartford.
6. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of a series of correspondence
between myself and Julia Kale.
7. Attached as Exhibit G is a correspondence between myself and Amy Kohler.
8. Attached as Exhibit H are true and correct copy of the 2007 profit and loss statements
for the months of February through May that were provided to me from the file of
MD&D and received by MD&D on March 5t \ 2008, according to the fax
identification. The total payroll and associated expense for those four months in
2007is $61,503.
DATED this

S-

day of March, 2010.

~-'-ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
,2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.s--c.

I hereby certify that on the
day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
PO Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271
FAX: (208) 395-8585

AFFIDA VIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
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Hand-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Facsimile
Email
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COU~iY OF KOOTENAI)
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

t:~~'~
DfPIJ~Y

~

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MICHELLE FRITZ, JAMES AHLERMAN,
KELLY FRITZ, CAROLYN BEARD, JASON
JACOBS, RYAN FRITZ, PAMELA
MCMASTER, JERRY MOREAU, and MIKE
AND KATHY FRITZ

Case No:

cv- 10 -ll\..\

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

For a cause of action, Platiniff's allege as follows
1) All plaintiffs are or were employees of Lakeland True Value Hardware.
2) Defendant is a Connecticut Corporation in Good Standing engaged in providing insurance
in the State ofIdaho.
3) The contract for insurance at issue was entered into in Kootenai County, Idaho, and the
covered property was and is located in Kootenai County, Idaho. Jurisdiction is proper
before this Court.

COMPLAINT

- 1-

4) Defendant provided a contract for insurance for Lakeland True Value Hardware and that
policy provided that Defendant would pay payroll during the period of any restoration.
Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of that contract.
5) On or about January 28

1h

,

2008, Lakeland suffered a loss when the roof of its store

collapsed and caused the immediate cessation of operations.
6) Defendant was obligated to pay Plaintiffs pending resumption of operations the payroll
they would have earned if the store had been operating. Defendant has refused to do so
which is a breach of the parties agreement
7) Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for breach of the insurance contract in an amount in
excess of 10,000 to be proved at trial and to an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred
in this matter
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter judgment for Plaintiffs against Defendant
in an amount in excess of$10,000 to be proved at trial, for attorneys fees and costs and
any other relief that this Court deems fair and equitable.
A jury trial is demanded.

~

\

~---------------------------

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE

COMPLAINT
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1

fit?

A.

2

That is correct.

However, we need to know

3

what he -- we need to have documentation on what he

4

spent it on after he spent it, and what it pertained

5

to as far as his business.

6

7

Q.

And did MD&D tell you that they needed

that information?

8

A.

I

9

Q.

And do you understand what a point of sale

10

don't recall.

system is?

11

A.

Yes,

12

Q.

What is a point of sale system?

13

A.

That's how he -- that's his process of

14

15
16

I

do.

sales.
Q.

The next note I want to refer to is dated

March 14th, 2008, on page 17.

17

A.

Okay.

18

Q.

And it looks like you're having a

19

conversation with a Patrick at MD&D.

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And is that Patrick DeLangis,

22

A.

I do not recall his last name, but I would

23

24
25

is that it?

assume that is correct.
Q.

Okay.

I see it up above there.

And in

that claim note it refers to a schedule for

J.
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1

advancement purposes.

2

advancement purposes?

A.

3

What's the schedule for

That is in order to assist the insured in

4

his business and his loss and his continuing

5

expenses while his business is down.

Q.

6

7

So that's -- that's a schedule to make

payments according to?

8

A.

Right.

9

Q.

And it says he advised there are several

Correct.

10

items not included, as they either did not have

11

documentation or were not sure about.

12

lists two things.

13

didn't have information on, or were there other

14

items?

A.

15

Well,

And then it

Are those the only two things he

there were other items.

This is

16

pertaining to the business income itself, not the

17

inven tory.

Q.

18

Okay.

So but as far as MD&D was concerned

19

at that point, that was the two pieces of

20

information that they were missing?

21
22

23

A.

Per the conversation with Patrick at that

Q.

And one of the issues was whether the

time.

24

insured is paying his entire payroll.

25

to me like right shortly after that conversation you

And it looks

. '.

Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR

,~

www.huseby.com

HUSEBY, INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, #408, Charlotte, North Carolina 28208

(800) 333-2082

-

?ll!"')?

,-

Lakeland True V

Hardware, L.L.C. v. The Hartford

e Insurance Co.

Julia Kale

CV-08-7069

March 1, 2010
Page 48

1

times that 18.83 percent to come up with the

2

business income portion of the income for that

3

month.
A.

4

5

Q.

10

A.

Q.

And did you -- so you didn't understand

how they calculated the lost income then?
A.

14

Yes
MS. DUKE:

Object to the form.

BY MR. BISTLINE:

16
17

That determines what his percentage of his

Therefore, he has 18.83 percent.

13

15

So you don't know what a 18.83

gross earnings less his ongoing expenses.

11

12

Okay.

percent was to be used for?

8

9

I am not a

certified accountant.

6

7

I do not know that answer.

Q.

Did you understand how they calculated the

lost income for that time frame?

18

A.

Yes, I did.

19

Q.

And how did they do that?

20

A.

Based on the documentation that Mr. Fritz

21

provide for the lost income.

22

Q.

I'm not talking about the calculation.

23

They came up with a number 66,694.

24

they arrived at that number?

25

of?

Do you know how

What that's a product
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1

A.

It's his lost revenue, his gross earnings

2

less his continuing expenses and his lost income,

3

determine the lost income.

4

5

Q.

8
9

10

And do you understand that 18.83

percent was multiplied against that 354,189?
MS. DUKE:

6

7

Okay.

A.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Okay.

When you received these schedules,

did you discuss them with Miss Reynolds?
A.

I did.

12

Q.

And what

14
15

16
17
18

Foundation.

I did not know that precisely.

11

13

to

-- if you can recall, what did

you cause with her about these schedules?
A.

We discussed in order to get additional

advancements to Lakeland True Value, our insured.
Q.

Did you discuss the actual calculations

that were contained in this four-page document?
A.

We discussed the document itself.

I don't

19

know precisely, exactly what we discussed.

We

20

discussed what payment needed to be -- what

21

advancement, based on the information we had,

22

advancement purposes and how we were going to

23

advance additional payment to Mr. Fritz based on

24

what Mr. Fritz, Lakeland True Value, based on what

25

documentation we had at this time.
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1

to you that you were behind,

2

term, by about $73,951?
MS. DUKE:

3

A.

4

for lack of a better

Same objections.

It provided the documentation to show

5

additional payment warranted that we did not

6

previously have.

7

BY MR. BISTLINE:

Q.

8

9

I

And who told you that it -- that you

had -- I mean, who told you you didn't have the

10

information to generate this schedule prior to this

11

time?

12
13
14
15

MS. DUKE:

Object to the form.

She didn't

generate the schedule.
BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Did -- at some point you received a

16

schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that point.

17

Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we

18

cannot generate this schedule because we don't have

19

the information we need?

20

A.

Amy at Matson & Driscoll had continuously

21

advised that we were missing documentation needed to

22

have another schedule.

23

Q.

Did she ever indicate to you that the

24

missing documentation somehow impeded her ability to

25

properly evaluate the claim?
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1

2
3

A.

To determine the insured's lost income.

BY MR. BISTLINE:

Q.

Okay.

And did she tell you without this

4

information I cannot calculate the insured's lost

5

income?

6

A.

She advised on multiple occasions that she

7

needed additional information in order to determine

8

and have a substantial -- a concrete number for the

9

loss of income.

10
11

Q.

But she didn't say I cannot calculate an

advance schedule without this information?

12

MS. DUKE:

13

answered.

14

A.

15

information.

16

BY MR. BISTLINE:

Object to the form.

Asked and

She advised she needed additional

17

Q.

18

though,

19

wi thou t i t ?

20

A.

Again,

the question is she never did say,

I cannot give you an advance schedule

I don't know if she used those exact

21

words, but we could not continue to make payments

22

based on speculation.

23

Q.

And you view those schedules anything

24

paying past May, based on those schedules, would be

25

speculation?
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1

A.

Yes.

We don't have hardcore -- we don't

2

have hard numbers.

3

speculation until it gets to the point where we need

4

to have hardline numbers.

5

Q.

7

This has been asked and

answered now several times.
MR. BISTLINE:

8
9

What hard number were you missing?
MS. DUKE:

6

We can only pay so much on

Well,

told me the hard number.

she hasn't actually
Because we know it

10

could be a hard number on profit and loss

11

because that's, by definition,

12
13

an estimate.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

So a hard number,

to me,

says you're

14

looking for something actually done.

15

actually were you looking for that had actually

16

occurred?

17

A.

And what

We continuously needed the insured's

18

financial statements, we needed the wage

19

documentation.

20

requesting through this whole time.

21
22
23

24

25

Q.

All the things that we've been

Was it just the wage documentation

primarily?

A.

No.

Like I said,

all of the insured's

financials in order to determine his lost income.

Q.

And again,

there's no cor -- never mind.
"",
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1

if you reference the claim notes, it looks like

2

based on this report they authorized another $73,000

3

in business income, which would be the difference

4

between 123,951 minus the 50 that has already been

5

advanced.

Does that sound correct?

6

A.

I have a question as to who authorized.

7

Q.

Well, it's in your claim notes that as

8

soon as they received the second schedule I believe

9

they would send a request for payment for that

10

$73,000.

11

A.

All right.

12

Q.

And I guess my question is this.

As of

13

the end of May when you had these new updated

14

schedules, it's your testimony you didn't have

15

anything to put together an estimate of the next few

16

months of business income loss?

17

A.

And I would tell you that based on my

18

review of the file,

I still think that there was

19

missing financial information that did not allow us

20

to do an actual loss projection.

21

Q.

Okay.

What was missing?

22

A.

For specific missing information you'd
I will tell you

23

have to go back and talk to MD&D.

24

that we typically ask for the last either two or

25

three years financial information, which would
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The expiration date of this policy will

1

2

not cut short the period of restoration.

3

doesn't say that the inventory claim has to be

4

adjusted and paid before the period of restoration

5

ends.

6

BY MR. BISTLINE:

7
8

Q.

So that

But it does say that the inventory has to

be replaced before the period of restoration ends.

9

A.

It does not.

10

Q.

Doesn't it say that?

11

A.

It doesn't say that.

12

Q.

Wouldn't inventory be property at the

13
14

Where does

scheduled premises?

A.

It would, but it says the property at the

15

scheduled premises should be repaired,

16

replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality.

17

It doesn't say has to be, it says should be.

18

Q.

Okay.

rebuilt or

So it's your position then that as

19

of that date Lakeland should have been able to order

20

all the inventory and all the fixtures and had them

21

in the store by October 30th?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Okay.

And did you have an accountant or

24

somebody help you come up with that calculation

25

based on the cash flow that had been provided to
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1

any regular payments and just calculated the total

2

loss and paid it all at once at the end?
MS. DUKE:

3
4

that.

5

BY MR. BISTLINE:

6

Q.

I'm sorry, I need you to repeat

I don't understand it.

I'm asking if you think it would have been

7

proper for Hartford to make one big payment on this

8

policy at the conclusion of the period of

9

restoration.

10

A.

No,

I would not say that.

11

Q.

Okay.

So you acknowledge that there is an

12

aspect of this policy that deals with the timing

13

these payments are made?

14

A.

No,

15

Q.

So you think you could make a payment

I would not say that at all.

16

whenever you wanted and not be in breach of that

17

policy?

18

MS. DUKE:

Object to the form.

19

misstates her testimony.

20

if you can.

21

A.

Okay.

That

Go ahead and answer

Payments are made as soon as the

22

documentation is received to support it.

23

sooner.

24

BY MR. BISTLINE:

And no

I

25

Q.

Okay.

So if you have sufficient
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1

A.

Correct.

Yes.

2

Q.

Does period of restoration, pursuant to

3

that policy provision,

in any way take into account

4

whether the insured is ready to move back in to the

5

building?

6

A.

No, it doesn't.

7

Q.

And why is that?

8

A.

Because it's outside the policy.

9
10

11

The

period of restoration is when the building is
rebuil t.

Q.

With respect to Lakeland's claims, do you

12

recall who made a decision as to what the period of

13

restoration would be for the Lakeland claim?

14
15

A.

It -- the examiner makes that decision

based upon the information at hand.

16

Q.

And who would that have been?

17

A.

That would have been Melanie Copley.

18

Q.

Did you and she discuss that period of

19

restoration determination that she ultimately made

20

at all?

21

A.

I don't recall, no.

I'm sure that I saw

22

that calculation or saw that analysis in the file

23

and I felt it was reasonable.

24

Q.

And do you recall what her analysis was?

25

A.

It was based upon when the building
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ADJUSTERS INTERNATIONAL

PRoPllSSIONAL Loss CONSUJ.TANlS

April 18, 2008

400 0tsn!R PoINr Ilout.!vARI>, SUrnlS19
S. SAN l'RANoscD, CA 94ll!().1921
(650) ,583.4300

(800) 248-3888

YJA U.S. MAlL & ELECTRONIC MA.JL

FAX (65(1) !iI!'.H049
Call£. Uc. No. Z7f!022

, JuliaKale
Sedgwick CMA

POBox 14436
Lexington. KY 40512

RE:

DOL:

Insured:
Location:
Insurer:
Policy No.:
Claim No.:
Our File No.:

January 28, 2008
Lakeland True Value Hardware Store
] 6658 N. Highway 41, Rathdrum lD 83858
Hartford Fire Insurance Company
83 SBP SXS295 Kl
A818400416-0001·02
PNW·20790-408

, pear Ms. Kale:
PursulllIt to instructions from the above captioned Insured, please find enclosed the Preliminary and Partial
, Business lncome Loss calculation as measured tbrougli August 31, 2008 in the amount of $282,736. In
~ddition, please find enclosed the following claim documentation:

Idaho Monthly Sales & Use Tax Returns - For the months of February and March 2008.
Quarterly Federal Payroll Tax Return (941) - For the first quarter of2008.
'
Notification from Westwood Rentals conceming the Insured's temporary office location. ,
Monthly Historical Gross Sales Summari~ (plan Sheet) which includes sales for Retail, Rental and
Internet - From January 2005 through January 2008.
.
5) Inventory Evaluation (By Class and Dept) for the damaged areas of the store (79 pages) - In the
preliminary amount oU] 47.053.78 and the Hillman quote of$23,OOO for a total of$170,053.78

1)
2)
3)
" '4)

·With regard to the enclosed Inventory Evaluation, please note that this 79 page report including summary
,sheet was prepared by the Insured's employees OYer ~e last 6 weeks and is based on the Insured's
perpetual inventory system using B running average cost value per SKU tag. The report was prepared in
this manner in order to allow the Insured to be able to specifically identifY any items by class number, then
"department 8lCll. You will find on each of these pages, the post loss SKU count (item count), Cost Value
(Electronic Receipt Posting which comes dir~tly from True Value Corporate), and a Finals Total which
sums each of the classes. The quote for the bulk nutslbolts from Jack Carpenter ofHiIIlt:Jan in the amount
of $23,000 (~ot part of the perpetual inventory system) will be provided shortly',
'
. The report that makes up each oftbe indiyidualline items was too voluminous 10 be included in.these
, enclosures but is available for physical inspection. My suggestion for auditing these: cost prices and
quantities would be to select a sample of your choosing by class and department and the Insured will then
',be able to generate the de~i1ed items showing the cost and quantities for each of the SKU items.

~

J r+
E'/J11-J

f

,

MDD000236
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Ms. Julia Kale
4/1812008
Page2of2

As for the remaining salvaged inventory in storage, those items will have to be evaluated when the Insured
, begins restocking his store. As you and I discussed previously, the Insured bas expressed concern that this
stored inventory bas been exposed to moistUre and humidity over the last several months and they will want
, . to carefully inspect the condition of the merchandise and fIXtures prior to its return to the store upon
reopening. As such, the Insureds expressly reserve their right to make claim for any merchandise or
fixtures which has been damaged as a result of this storage condition.
. nased upon the enclosed preliminary claims which to1ll1 $452,790, the Insured at this time respectfully
requests that Hartford Insurance Co~pany provide an additional interim payment in the amount of

"':

$200,000. The Insured is in dire need of these fimds to assist them in meeting their current fmancial
shortages brought about as a result of this loss and note the $100,000 that have been previously advanced.
While we tmderstand the need for Hartford to be given time to conduct a thorough review these claims, we
believe the enclosed documentation will supp?rt;;~~e.~.est,of,these funds.
'
:.

':

'.

"":..::

:

~.

: Finally, please advise us if Steve Bonnano of GAll ,Robbins is still active on this file and if you wish us to
forward any of the preceeding documentation to his, a.ttention and further review.
'.
;Please feel free to-contact me or Drew Lucurell should you have any questions concerning the above. We
look forward to working with yOl,l ~~Il~¢.!. tile ~~ssM,re.$()ltlti!lnQ,(t.b,j~ ,matter. Thank you again for
yoW' courtesy and cooperation Bnd\ve:3W~it'1:Iartford'i:favQrible,r.e$pQilSe to the Insured's request
Very truly yours,
-...
:::;:{~~~:'::'::;:~:L>:-:,

,,:,:;::,:<,,:: . :; :;'.':

.",'

AD~TERS INTERNATIONAL ' ': .::. " : '

'1J~1..

Chris Gicnister, CPA
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Drew Lucurell, Adju~er~ International - via E:lllail
Mike & Katby Fritz, UikeJand True Value H~d~are- via E-mail
Amy Kohler - Matson;T>.riscoll & Damico - y#i E-mail
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Jennifer
Amy Kohler [akohler@mdd.net]
Friday, August 29, 2008 8:55 AM
Arthur Bistline
Kale, Julia N.; Patrick Delangis
RE: Fritz

From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:
Mr. Bistline,

Please see your last e-mail below on August 20, 2008. We have not yet received documentation of payroll paid, or to be
paid, for all of July 2008 or the first half of August 200B. Unless we receive documentation showing otherwise, we will
prepare updated schedules for Ms. Kale assuming no payroll for those periods. Please advise.
Respectfully,
Amy Kohler, CPA
Senior Accountant
akohler@mdd.net

MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040
Bellevue, WA 9B004
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052
Please visit us at:

http://www.mdd.net

From: Arthur Bistline [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com]

Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2008 1:49 PM

To: Amy Kohler
Cc: 'Kale, Julia N.'

Subject: Fritz
How are we coming on payroll?
Art .

•....•. •,'.--_ ..• '

"'

....,-, ... <.<.' •..•.... " .•. -< •••••

From: Arthur Bistline [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 1:44 PM
To: Amy Kohler
Subject: RE: Payroll information

1

21(j5

Arthur Bistline
From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:

Attachments:

Kale, Julia N. [Julia.Kale@sedgwickcms.comJ
Friday, August 01, 2008 4:45 AM
arthurmooneybistline@me.com
RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
image001.png

I agree with the accountant. We need the documentation from our insured to reflect actual incurred expenses If the
employee quit, we do not owe for that salary as it is not an ongoing expense any longer.
From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto :arthurmooneybistline@me.com]

Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 11:58 PM
To: Kale, Julia N.
Subject: FW: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
What is your position on this?
From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net]

Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 11:00 AM
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com
Cc: Patrick Delangis; Kale, Julia N.
Subject: RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
Mr. Bistline,
It is the adjuster's responsibility to interpret the policy language. We have been instructed to obtain documentation
from the insured to support our calculations reflecting the normal operating expenses actually incurred. There has been
some miscommunication in the past as to disbursements actually incurred and those planned to be incurred.
It is our understanding that one or more employees have quit since our most recent schedules were issued for June 30,
2008. We will need to know who these individuals are, if it is not clear from the documentation of disbursements
forthcoming from Mr. Fritz.

Amy Kohler, CPA
Senior Accountant
akohler@mdd.net

MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040
Bellevue, WA 98004
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052
Please visit us at:
http://www.mdd.net

16
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From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 10:32 AM
To: Amy Kohler
Subject: RE: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02

(4) Business income means the:
(a) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss

before income taxes) that would
have been earned or incurred if no
direct physical loss or physical
damage had occurred; and
(b) Continuing
normal
operating
expenses
incurred
including
l

payroll.
When the roof fell down, my clients had a certain number of employees and no longer had anything for those
employees to do. In order to keep those employees from finding other employment, my client needs to keep paying
them while the store is rebuilt. Calculating payroll would them simply be a function of taking the last pay-roll from
before the roof collapse and adjusting it for any anomalies in that pay period, such as someone taking unpaid time off,
and then applying it each month that the employees cannot be employed. This would obviate the need for anything
other than the last pay roll before the roof fell down, unless one or more employees has quit.
Is this how you are viewing pay roll? And if so, what is the purpose in seeing bank statements etc?
Art.

From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.netJ
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 20088:58 AM
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com
Cc: Patrick Delangis; Kale, Julia N.
Subject: RE: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
Mr. Bistline,
We use the documentation the insured sends us of his payroll expenses for a given month. This documentation
includes, as we stated below, the check register from his QuickBooks reflecting the payroll disbursements made
(paychecks, tax and insurance payments). We need to check this against the bank records to confirm these
disbursements were indeed issued. Also, so that we can include any payroll due to employees for past periods that has
not yet been paid, we have requested written detail ofthose planned disbursements.
I hope this answers your question. Please feel free to call me if anything is not clear.

Amy Kohler, CPA
Senior Accountant
akohler@mdd.net
17
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MATSON, DRISCOll & DAMICO, llP
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040
Bellevue, WA 98004
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052
Please visit us at:
http://www.mdd.net

From: arthurmooneybistline@me.com [mailto:arthurmooneybistline@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 8:47 AM
To: Amy Kohler
Subject: RE: lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
How are you determining payroll?
.__.•_.--_ •. --................ ••.".. "•. ·..
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From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2008 3:57 PM
To: arthurmooneybistline@me.com; Kale, Julia N.
Cc: Patrick DelangiS
Subject: Lakeland True Value Hardware, Claim #A818400416-0001-02
Mr. Bistline,
Thank you for the documents you e-mailed today. We received the following:

1.
2.
3.

lakeland True Value's bank statement for June 2008
The Summary and Detail reports from the QuickBooks bank reconciliation for June 2008
The Demand letter from True Value Company

The provided documents are not the same as the documents provided for prior periods. There are a couple of
additional pieces of information that we will need to update our schedules, as we stated in our document request sent
to you on July 28,2008. The insured is familiar with the documents that he has been sending us each month since
February 2008; we need the same document types reflecting all July 2008 activity:
(1) check register detail out of QuickBooks for the cash account
(2) a note from Mr. Fritz detailing any payroll disbursements for July that have not yet been made that he intends to
make
(3) a print-out from the True Value bank account through the end of July to support the previous two items
In our letter dated July 28,2008, we also requested lease payment documentation for the JAR and Great American
Leasing leases. Please provide this also at your earliest convenience.
Thank you for your assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions.

Amy Kohler, CPA
Senior Accountant
18
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Tanica Hesselgesser
From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:

Arthur Bistline [arthurmooneybistline@me.com]
Wednesday, September 10, 2008 1:33 PM
'Amy Kohler'
RE: Did you see this? FW: Payroll information

The checks are cut, waiting to be delivered and have not. There is nothing to substantiate. If the concern is that his
money will not be paid to the employees, then that is insurance fraud and not difficult to figure out.

From: Amy Kohler [mailto:akohler@mdd.net]

Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2008 1:23 PM

To: Arthur Bistline; Kale, Julia N.
Subject: RE: Did you see this? FW: Payroll information
Mr. Bistline,
As indicated in the string of e-mails attached in the last set I forwarded to you, we did receive this attachment. Our
requests have been for additional substantiation supporting these copies of payroll checks for August 2008 and for July
2008 payroll.
Respectfully,

NOTES: WE'RE MOVING OUR OFFICE LOCATION ON SEPTEMBER 30. 2008!1I

Amy Kohler, CPA
Senior Accountant
akohler@mdd.net

MATSON, DRISCOLL & DAMICO, LLP
10900 NE 8th St, Suite 1040
Bellevue, WA 98004
Phone: 425.455.0056 Fax: 425.453.0052 Please visit us at:
http://www.mdd.net

MATSON, DRISCOll & DAMICO, LLP
19125 North Creek Parkway, Suite 208

1
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MAR-OS-2008 WED 06:30 PM

P. 009

l:A9PM

EVERGREEN-FRITZ

03105100

Profit & Loss
J!ebruary 2007

ACmJiI:Il 6118is

Feb 07

Ordinary IncomalExpenaa

Income
411G -SALES
500 • Gm5s Sales
402 • NONTAXABLE SALES

To1a1499 • SALES
TOlallncome

37.38328
1.802.46
39,185.74

39,185.74

coat of Ooods Sold
853 • Purchases· Cotlsr & CO
655 • Purchues • OOtWIS
695 • FreIght In
751 • WIIQ•• " Payroll Coati
768' Work Comp

2,.081.47

508.20
0.00
77.58

Total 781 • WalJll$ " Payroll Costs
TCJlaI COGS

2.667.25
36,518.49

Groa& Profit

Expense

sseo . Payroll
~1

• Regular Payroll

6602 • Overtime Payroll
8580 • 1"wyrolI. OlMr

ToCal6S60' Payroll

1Z.010.50
393.38
0.00
12,403.88

eeoo . Payroll Tex Expemie
111101 • FICA Expo!llC
6602 - MedJcam ExpIInsa
6603 • SUTA ExplHlU

8604· FUrA !xp9llS9
Tobll 6800' P~D Tu Expense

761 • InaUliU'le&
760 • Ufllintrul'lllnce • Partner
.TobII761·1n1lU1'lII0CII
798 • Computar Support. '1'I1:ad
811- Rent
813 - utltJUIIS

815· Telephone
845 • Bad Debt
849 • Bank ServICQ Chargll!;
850· Employee Expe!llC
8'S' eaeh OvvrlShort
BeS • DooIollo~
885 • Offte$ Supplies & EltpenH
8111 • Store Suppllll' .. Expense

Tolll1 ExpelJ&ll
Net Ordinary Income

765.48
179.26
117.94
98.88
1,162.56

111.00

51.00
817.74
4,-432.00
1,050.33

o.aO
127~

43.17
~'OO.OO

2.26
4.58
'6.10
-84.74

10,726.73

16,701.78

otber JncomaiE!Xpenae

Other Expans.
941 • Int.1'IIIIt i:xPDnsa • aanl< !.oan

TOW Oti1erExpensv

Net Other Income
Net Income

M49.16
1,649.16
.1,649..16
1~.14Z.60

Page 1
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WED 06:30 PM

P. 010

5:49 PM

EVERGREEN-FRITZ

03105108

Profit & Loss
March 2007

A=rual Basis

Mar 01

Ordinary looom8/E)<,pon;.
Income

..at·SALES
liDO • GI'DJIII Salae

60.2 • .NONTAXABLE SALES
ToIal-499· SALES

59,064.86
2,520.95

61,565.81
61,585.81

Totallnootn.
Cost ofOoods Sold
653 • Purchaass • Cotler & Co
555' Purchalos, 0thIIr&
695 ' Froight In
751 • W;tUes & Payroll C05\s
758 • Wort Comp

28,089.37
1,535.92

0.00
71.58

Total 751 . Wage!! & r>lI)Iroll Costs
790 • Advertlalng
197 . Am..rtJalng • Othar
TobI1790' Advertising
TotlllCOGS

-42.00

42.00
29,660.87

<il"osa Profit

31.924.94-

Expell$Ct
8580 • I>ayroll
6581 • Regular Payroll
8582 • Overtime Papoll
SSM • VaCQlion 1".,.
6560 • Payroll - Otmt

lolal 6560 ' PayroD
8 * • Payroll T8lI; Expense
B001 • FICA t;xpcnse
6602 • MedicDI'G EXJHtnsa
Gao3' SUTA Expansll
6604· FUTA ExpenlQ
T~'

77.58

0000 • I>ayroll Tax Expense

10.551.76
1.132.1~
~1a.(lO

0,00

12,202.41
754.72
176.49
116.12
97.40
1,144.73

161 ·lnsunlOC8

7110 • LIfe Ins UTarlCII • PlIrtnOr
B25 • Insuntnce - SIDI9
To~17B"

• InsUl'lU')c.

798 • Computer Support· Triad
su· Rent
813 • Utilities
815' Tal.phonD

821 • Malntananca &. ~palr$
B36 • Laud Equipment
B45 • Bad Dtlbt
849 • Bank Sa~ ChN"gn
850 • EmployaA
853 • Cash Ovarl8hort
86S • Donations
889 ' Lagal &. Accounting
an . Weens.. IIQC! PDrmltl
m ' OffIce Suppftlll " Exp.nae
881 • Store Supplies &. Expnnaa

Ex,..",.

153.DO

407.62
:j60.e2
580.112
3,249.00

"17.11
428.22

306,65
566.48

125.73
1-40.09

391.73
-62.13
~7,OO

567.12
24.00
520.87

1,641.74

MDD000431
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MAR-u5-2008 WED 06:30 PM

P. 011

3!49 PM

EVERGREEN-FRI1Z

03lOSlO8

Profit &loss
March 2007

,At:cru:lJ B:I&I&

Mer 07

893 ' Travel & Bn!

895'Tl'llval

TObll8113 •.Travel &cnt
Tatallilxpense

Net.Ordllary InGOme

-0.24

.0.24

23,831.05
8,093.39

O~lnco~xpens6

Other Inoome
911 • DIvidend Income

Total Other Income

4,413.64
4,413.64

other ExpttnH
V41 • Interest EXPense· Bank Loan

To..1Othor expense
NIIt Othar Incoma

Natlncoma

1,633.02
1,633.02
2,780.62
10,874.01

Paglt2

MDD000432
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MAR-05-z~oe

WED 06:30 PM

p. 012

3:49PrJI

EVERGREEN·FRITZ

03/05108

Profit & Loss
April 2007

Accrual Basl~

Apf07

ordln.,y Inoomllll:xpen8.
IntOll'le

49i·SAlES
!iOO • Gross

s..I....

502 • NONrA)(AI3LE $All!.S·
Total 4119 • SALES
TotallnCOll\~

Cost of Goods Sold
653 • Pun:haaas • Coltar & Co

855' PurCbasas • othen
69& • Fre1llilt In
751 • Wagas & Payroll Costs
768 • Worl( Comp
Tobil T51 • Wages & PlI)'folt Costs

8O,MSt35

3,431.9483,881.29
83,861.29

49,966.62
3.176.67
676.30
2,792.58

2.792.58

790 . AdVertl&lng

197' Advertising -Other

Tgt'" 790 • Advertising
Total COGS
OrouProftt
Expense
6560 • Peyron
6561 • Regular Payroll

6562 • Ovvrtlma Payroll
6560 • Payton - CIIl.r
Total 6560 • Payroll
6&00 • Payroll Tax Expense
6801 • FlCA gponsc
6802 • Medlcs1'8 Expense
6603, 6UTA EXpens.
6804 • FlITA El(pon&9
TotIII 6600 - PII)'TOII Tme Expenae

7111 • Insuranco
825· Insuranee - Store
Tota1161 • lneurance

798 . Computer SuPPOrt· Triad
811'Renl
813 • utllltlas

815 . T"ephono
821 • Maln~ & bpalro
8!5 • Leased Equlpmant

845 • aad bebt
Nt . aank Servioe Charges
$60 • Emp"""" Expernle
8'3 • Cesb 0ver1S00rt
SH • DonaUons

885.- Offio. Supplies" Expense
51 . Stor8 Suppllos & Expense
Tolal Expense
~t OrdInIlfY Im;ome

-42.00

--42.00
56,574.11
27.3\17.12

15,BlI7.38
1.323.02

0.00
17.310.40
1.071.62
250.62

11K89
98.22
1.565.35

-17.82

-17.82

G17.74
3,170.00
688.71
242.36
511.25

126.00
24.11
60.77
1,331.52
321.89
35.77
140.87
999.57
27,149.15
151.97

other Inoomtlflxpen.e
other Ineema
912 • OIher Incoma

5,476.01

Total Other Income

5,476.01

Pa.,.1

MDD000433

217:1

·

MAR-05-2~D8

P.013

WED 06:30 PM
EVERGREE"N-FRITZ

a:u PM

Profit & Loss

03105108
Accrual a"sls

April 2007
Apr 01
Olber~~nse

V41 'InWnI&i Expcm... S.nk I.oln

Total Olh8rExp_a

Not other Income
HetlncoJn8

1,729.00
1,729.0{)

3,747.01

M04.98

=

PB9l' :2

MDD000434

P. 014

MAR-05-2008 WED 06:30 PM
EVERGRf:EN~FRITZ

3:50 PM

Profit & Loss

03/0:1108
Accruaf BasIs

May2D07
May 07

OrdInary fncarnaJeJcpanSD

Ineom.

ABS-SAlES
lIOO· "1'(1$$

s.'e$

1502· NONTAXABl.E SALES

Tot81499 • &AlES
Tololll1OOme

Cost or Qoocl$ SOld
651 • lnventol)' Adjustmont
O~ . Purchase. Cotter & Co
655' Purc:hBliH • 0IhenI
695 • Fmlght In
761 • Wages .. PayrDll Costa
753 • Wagaa • Sales

lSI • Wor\( Comp

Total 151 • Wauus & Payroll COllts
190 • AdYf:l'tlslng
797 • AdYariblng • otho'!'

Total 780 • Advortllling

Total COGS
GI'I)$.\l Profit

123.354.14
3.361.38
126.715.52
126.715.52

23.962.00
59.874.93
8.252.10

Big.7!!
142.14
77.58
819.72

498.43
498.43

94.226.93
32,488.59

ElI~

8560'''11)'1'011
1I15G1 • Regvlar Payroll
8582 • Overtime Payroll
85110 • PII)'rOII • Other

Tolal6560 • Payroll
Expense
8l1Oi • FICA ElIpenx

13,801.00
762.38
0.00

14.56U8

6t!OD • P~roIf Tax

ft802 • Mer:flcanl, ~n5e
6803· SUT.A ~
6604 • FUTA J;xpunse

Total 6600 . Payroll Tax ~&I\$e
761 • IIIsUl1l11C&
760· Ufllinsuranca· Parln.r
826-~nca.S~

ToI&1781 • Insurance
798 • Computer Support· Triad
811'Rcnt
813 • UtiJiU..

816' Telephone
ez1 • Malntenance & Rtpalrs
83(1- I.e_ad equipment

84l'I • Bad Dubl
849 • BlIIlk SIJIVIc» C~
850· Employee Expense

853 • caatI OVll1Short
865 • Donations
885 ' OfftCII Buppllot> & ExPIlI15I1

891 • Store 6uppIK .. ExP*f1,ti8

901.85
210.93
138.77
84.63
1.316.18

102.00
75.60
177.50
1.181.24
3.801.00

1.113.68
e.1~.84

333A8
106.00
123.20

53.37
498.15
356.75
111.64
106.48
61.86

TOIa! Expenso

24,405.83

Net OrdlllBIY \neome

8.082.75

Plaa1

MDD000435

2175

P. 015

· MAR-05-200B WED 06:31 PM

3:50 PM

EVERGREENhFRITZ

03lO5fOIl

Profit & Loss
May 2007

Accrual .BilBis

May 07
~r !IIQQIJI,/J;l(pt/n..

Olntr ExpefIM
941 -Interest Expense· Bank LollI!

2.028.81

ToIsl Other Expense

2.028.31

Net other ll'lcomo
Net Income

-2.028.31
6,054.45

MDD000436
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Matson, Driscoll & Damico

Schedule 1

Summary of Business Interruption - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY
Lakeland True ValUe Hardware
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008

Description

Schedule
Reference

January 28,2008 - May 31, 2008
Lost Revenue

2

Gross Earnings Less Non-Continuing Expenses
Percent

4

As
Calculated

$

354,189

~\

18.83%

-Lost Income

66,694

~

1

Plus:
Ordinary PayroU
Temporary Location Expenses
Total Loss

5

18,622

$

85,316

Background & Issues:
- Period of Restoration has yet to be defined by adjuster. For the purposes of an adva·nce calculation, our projection is from the date of loss
through the current expected date to re-open per the insured-January 28,2008 through May 31, 2008.
- We have not received documentation of expenses related to the temporary location from the insured.
- Calculations presented do not take into account any deductibles or previous advances.

Summary of Schedules -Lakeland True Value - Schedule 1

Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only

~l

Matson. OrisCO» & Damico

Scheoule 2

Analysis of Lost Revenue - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY
LakeianQ True Value Hardware
Oate of Loss - January 28. 2008

Actual

2001

Period

January 28-31
February
March

$

April
May
Total Revenue

$

Projected
2008
(@ 111.3S·,4)
Sch 3

6,632 (A) $
39,186
61,586
83.881
126,716

7.386
43,645
68,594
93,427
141,136

318.001

354,189

$

Cumulative

Actual
2008

$

Loss

$

7,386
43.645
68,594
93,427
141.136

$

Loss

$

..L.'

7,386
51.032
119,626
213,053

354,189

$ 354.189

~

(A) : January 28-31 revenue was calculated by dividing total January 2007 revenue by 30 days, multiplyiOQ by 4.

\

~/

Summary of Schedules - Lakeland

True Value - Schedule 2

Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only

=
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Matson, Driscoll & Damico

Schedule 3

Analvsis of Revenue - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY
Lakeland True Value Hardware
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008

..,.'
Month

2005

nfa
nfa
"fa
"fa
nfa
n/a
nfa
"fa
nfa
nfa
n/a

February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

,.

2005/2006

$

37,733 .
45,498
65,153
87,343
76,159
81,433
72,173
65,329
57,906
56,421
17.818

Increase f
Decrease

n/a
nfa
n/a
n/a

200t~OO7

65,800
66,42155,364

6.25%
1.07%
6.54%
10.75%
32.43%
19.66%
17.56%
10.61%
13.63%
17.72%
210.72%

795,211

19.95"/0

40.092
45,987
69,414
96,732
100,854
97,444
84,845

$

nfa

nfa
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
nfa

72,258

n/a

Increase I
Decrease

2007/2008

39,186
61,586
83,881

$

l26,1l6

Increase f
Decrease

-2.26%
33.92%
20.84%

3UQ"!!...

0.45%
101,306
14.39%
111,466
9.93% J
93,270
8.68%
78,528
14.43%
75,296
65,i07___ . __:1.07%t~- .
_ .. _48,7~3 _. ~1."~:~8!,?~
885,675

11.38%

Subtotal

n/a

January

40,303

39,474

-2.06%

49,738

26.00%

nfa

n/a

Subtotal

40,303

39,474

-2.06%

49,738

26.00%

nfa

nfa

40,303

$ 702,440

844,949

20.29%

Total

$

662.,966

1642.90%

$

$

885,675

4.82%

Notes:
- Source: QuickBooks Monthly Profit & Loss Statements

Summary of Schedules -lakeland True Value - Schedule 3

Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only

-=
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Schedule 4

Matson, Driscoll & Damico

Page 1 of 3

Analysis of Gross Earnings Less non-Continuing Expenses - FOR ADVANCE PURPOSES ONLY
Lakeland True Value Hardware
Date of Loss - January 28, 2008

January - December 2005
Amount
%

Description
Ordinary Income I Expenses
Income
499 - Sales
500 - Gross Sales
502 - Nontaxable Safes
499 - Sales - Other
Total 499 - Sales
Total Income
Cost of Goods Sold
651 - Inventory Adjustment
653 - Purchases - Cotter & Co
655 - PUrchases - Other
695 - Freight In
750 - Guaranteed Payments
751 - Wages & Payroll Costs
758 - Work comp
Tolal751 - Wages & Payroll Costs
790 - Advertising
793 - Advertising Newspaper
797 - Advertising - Other
790 - Advertising - Other
Total 790 - Adversising
TolalGOGS
Gross Profit
Expense
6560 - Payroll
6561 - Regular Payroll

6582 - Overtime Payroll
6564 - Vacation Pay
6585 - Holiday Pay
Tolal6560 - Payroll

$

720,252
29,687
(46,669)
703,270
703,270

102.41%
4.22%
-6.64%
100.00%
100.00%

(5,368)
343,536
22,738
7,824
50,000

-0.76%
48.85%
3.23%
1.11%
7.11%

4,628
4,628

0.66%
0.66%

59

0.01%
0.54%
0.02%
0.57%
60.77%
39.23%

3,800

166
4,025
427,383
275,887

112,909
5,755
2,234
1,602
122,500

Summary of Schedules - lakeland True Value - Schedule 4

Gross Earnings
Less Non-Continuing
Expense Percentage

16.05%
0.82%
0.32%
0.23%

100.00%

48.85%
3.23%
1.11%

0.66%

16.05%
0.82%

0.32%
0.23%

17.42%

Preliminary - For Discussion Purposes Only

Lakeland True Value

Fire Insurance

Amy Kohler, 9/21/2009

Page 32
1

know,

I don't know it's bad to make a distribution

2

pending receipt of this because we can adjust it

3

later?
MR. NICKELS:

4

Objection; speculation.

5

A.

That wasn't our place --

6

Q.

(By Mr. Bistline)

7

A.

8

Q.

If Ms. Kale would have asked you,

"Should I withhold

information," what would have been your response?

10

11

MR. NICKELS:
A.

Objection; speculation.

I -- it wasn't our place to make that call, so I
probably would have put it back on her.

13
14

so no.

this distribution pending receipt of this

9

12

Okay.

Q.

(By Mr. Bistline)

And there's numerous references

15

throughout this case of you trying to complete your

16

schedules, and what does that mean?

17

you, "I have to complete my schedule for July," what

18

would that mean to you?

19

A.

In my memory,

If I say that to

the main piece that we were continually

20

trying to obtain was related to the payroll

21

disbursements.

22

Q.

SO from what I understand before, though, you could

23

have completed your schedule other than payroll, and

24

payroll could have been treated separately as far as,

25

you know, Here's your business income claim and here's

Central Court Reporting

800-442-DEPO
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the payroll part of it, two separate items?

1

MR. NICKELS:

2

speculation.

3
4

A.

5

6

Objection; form, foundation, and

I suppose it could have been done that way.

That

wasn't the way we were asked to do it.
Q.

(By Mr. Bistline)

Okay.

And who asked

when you

7

say "it wasn't the way we were asked to do it," who

8

told you how to do it?

9

A.

In our conversations with Julia, we would have talked

10

over how she would want to see schedules, what

11

information she needed to have.

12

Q.

There's a claim note from Ms. Kale that -- it's an

13

e-mail she wrote me.

14

not received any additional documentation for June or

15

July and has been requested multiple times.
Do you recall requesting additional

16

documentation for June or July multiple times?

17
18

And she says that you all had

A.

I remember multiple e-mails going back and forth where

19

we would attach our previous document requests.

20

believe there were document requests issued in June

21

and I believe again in July requesting the information

22

that we were still missing.

23

Q.

I

And were those -- just to the best of your

24

recollection, were those attachments of prior

25

correspondence, were those e-mailed to me?

Central Court Reporting

800-442-DEPO
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County of KOOTENAI
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPAN~

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV 20087069

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Plaintiff Lakeland True Value Hardware LLC (Lakeland) owned a hardware store in
Rathdrum, Idaho. Complaint, p.

1,1111 1,4.

On January 28,2008, due to snow load, the

roof of the hardware store collapsed, causing immediate cessation of the hardware store
business. Id., p. 2,

1I 5.

Lakeland was insured by The Hartford (Hartford). Lakeland

made a claim under its policy with Hartford for Lakeland's loss. Id.,

11 6.

On September 4,2008, Lakeland filed this lawsuit against Hartford, alleging delay
in payment of the claim, bad faith and breach of contract. Id.,

1111 7, 8.

0 n August 20,

2009, Hartford filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming there was no dispute of
material fact that Hartford had paid Lakeland what was owed under the policy, both for
the Business Personal Property loss, and under the Business Income portion of the
policy, and thus, both Lakeland's breach of contract claim and bad faith claim should be
dismissed. Memorandum in Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 24. Oral argument on the Hartford's Summary Judgment motion was held on November 4,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Page 1

2121:1

2009. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court held Lakeland's bad faith (breach of
the duty of good faith) claim must be dismissed, and summary judgment was granted in
favor of Hartford because Lakeland had failed to prove that the claim was not fairly

debatable, primarily due to the fact that Lakeland's demands for amounts due under the
policy kept changing. Lakeland's breach of contract claims relating to Hartford's
determination of the "period of restoration" survived summary judgment and remained for
determination at the jury trial. November 23, 2009, Order Granting Defendant's Motion to
Compel and Order Granting Defendant's Summary Judgment in Part and Denying in Part,
pp. 1-2.
On December 16, 2009, Lakeland filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The basis of
Lakeland's motion to reconsider was that because Hartford's motion for summary
judgment was based on the theme that the Hartford had paid all that was owed Lakeland
under the policy, such theme wasn't the primary issue; the primary issue was delay in
making payments under the policy. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, pp. 1-2. On January 13, 2010, oral argument was held on Lakeland's
Motion for Reconsideration. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court denied
Lakeland's Motion for Reconsideration, finding that the Court had considered Lakeland's
claims of alleged delay in making payments at the summary judgment hearing and
decision, that the dispute in value of the claims was caused by Lakeland in the first
instance, due to: 1) inconsistent and different figures at different times, and 2) due to
Lakeland's failure to timely provide Hartford with material it had requested. At the
conclusion of the Court's decision, counsel for Lakeland claimed "the Court just said ... the
Court is making a finding of fact that it is Lakeland's fault that Hartford didn't timely make
payments ... that is a finding of fact." Digital record, 12:33:08-27. The Court pointed out
that the Court was finding that Lakeland had not proven that the claim was not fairly
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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debatable due to Lakeland's unsupported, inconsistent and changing demands upon
Hartford.
In spite of that clarification by the Court, on February 4, 2010, Lakeland filed
"Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration." This time Lakeland claims: "The Court
made findings of fact which it cannot do as a matter of law." Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. Lakeland states: "This appears
to be a finding of fact that the delay was Lakeland's fault." Id. Lakeland then made the
following argument which not only ignores this Court's findings, but shows complete
misunderstanding of the law of bad faith in Idaho, the elements of that tort, and which
party bears the burden of proof as to those elements:
The Court said it was not finding that it was Lakeland's fault, which only
leaves that the Court found that the issues surrounding the information
being provided to Hartford at least made it fairly debatable as to whether the
claim was timely paid. Another way to say it is that the Court found that it is
at least fairly debatable as to whether or not Hartford was reasonable to
withhold payment given that a dispute about whether the information was
being provided exists. Under the Court's holding, there could never be a
bad faith case if there is a dispute centered on whether the insured
provided the necessary information for the insurance company to timely pay
the claim.

Id. It is unknown how Lakeland can make the claim that " ... Hartford at least· made it fairly
debatable as to whether the claim was timely paid". In an insurance claim, the ball starts
rolling with the insured making a claim upon the insurer, putting the insurer on notice of
the claim. Then the insurer must evaluate that claim and act in good faith. But to prove
bad faith, the insured must prove that: 1) the insurer denied a claim in which coverage
was not fairly debatable, and 2) that the insured had proven coverage to the point that
based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer intentionally and
unreasonably withheld the insured's benefits. Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 137 Idaho 173, 178,45 P.2d 829, 834 (2002). In the present case,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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this Court has found that when Lakeland started the ball rolling by making its claim,
Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford. It
is entirely Lakeland's business for Lakeland to characterize that as this Court laying "fault"
upon Lakeland, but such exercise is not productive. At summary judgment on Lakeland's
bad faith claim, fault upon Lakeland is wholly irrelevant. However, proving the claim was
not fairly debatable and proving coverage to the point that based on the evidence before
it the insurer then intentionally and unreasonably withheld benefits is not only relevant, it
is dispositive, and, most importantly, it is Lakeland's burden to prove at summary
judgment. Because Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim
demands upon Hartford, at summary judgment Lakeland could not prove its own claim
was not fairly debatable, and Lakeland could not prove coverage to the point that based
on the evidence Lakeland had given to Hartford that Hartford then intentionally and
unreasonably withheld benefits.
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on February 22, 2010. At the
conclusion of that hearing, this Court denied "Plaintiff's Second Motion for
Reconsideration. "
On February 22,2010, this Court heard oral argument on several other motions.
The Court denied Lakeland's Motion to Amend Complaint (which sought to add a claim
for punitive damages when all that is left is Lakeland's breach of contract claim against
Hartford), granted Hartford's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Robert E. Underdown, and
denied Hartford's Motion for a Protective Order (regarding some upcoming depositions).
The Court took under advisement Hartford's Motion in Limine re: Harper and Hartford's
Motion in Limine re: Damages. This lawsuit is scheduled

fo~

a ten-day jury trial beginning

March 22, 2010.

I
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: HARTFORD'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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II. ANALYSIS.

A. HARTFORD'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: (CONSEQUENTIAL) DAMAGES.
On February 9, 2010, Hartford filed its Motion in Limine Re: Damages, Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, and Memorandum in
Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages. Hartford seeks a ruling from this Court barring
at the jury trial Lakeland's claims of: 1) consequential damages for any alleged breach of
contract by Hartford, and 2) expenses and damages that are either personal to the
owners of Lakeland, Michael and Kathy Fritz, undocumented damages or damages which
the Hartford has already paid. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re:
Damages, pp. 1-2. On February 16, 2010, Lakeland filed "Plaintiffs Response to
Defendant's Motion in Limine." On February 18, 2010, Hartford filed "Reply in Support of
Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages."
1. Consequential Damages.

Hartford seeks a ruling in limine from this Court barring Lakeland's claims of
consequential damages for any alleged breach of contract by Hartford. In addition to 1)
"Contract damages for lost business income for the balance of the period of restoration,
January 28

th

,

per the report of Dan Harper $30,400", (these damages are clearly allowed

if the period of restoration is proven to be later than October 31,2008), Lakeland also
claims as damage: 2) "Tort damage for lost business income from January 2009 through
September 2009 per the report of Dan Harper -- $136,400; 3) Contract damages for
continuing normal operating expenses through the balance of the period of restoration,
January 28

th

,

2009, per the report of Dan Harper -- $24,500; 4) Tort Damages for

continuing normal operating expenses through September 2009, per the report of Dan
Harper -- $39,000; 5) True Value back charge for lease hold improvements that had to
be repaid due to late account status -- $17,219; 6) Miscellaneous charges due to cash
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flow problems though May 2009; 7) Colonial Pacific Leasing Group has filed suit and
has obtained a default. The amount of this judgment is not yet determined. Kootenai
County Case No. CV09-1981; 8) Great American Leasing - Judgment $$51 ,759.58 +
$657.55, plus interest of 18% per anum; 9) Contract damages for Adjusters International
-- $16,000; and 10) Punitive damages -- $500,000, or such other sum as a jury deems
appropriate." Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re:
Damages, Exhibit A: Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Response to Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pp. 4-5. Lakeland's policy with Hartford
reads:
4. Business Income and Extra Expenses Exclusions. We will not pay
for:

***
b. Any other consequential loss.
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, Exhibit B,
p. 18. Hartford argues Lakeland is claiming damages beyond the twelve-month period
following the January 28,2008, roof collapse. That twelve-month period ended on
January 28, 2009. Hartford argues "These damages were not specifically contemplated
as recoverable by the parties at the time of contracting because [the above] provision in
the Policy specifically excludes coverage for consequential damages; rather, they were
expressly contemplated as damages that were excluded from coverage." Memorandum
in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 5.
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the
breach and are reasonably foreseeable. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136
Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d 672, 677 (2002); citing Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 136-37,
15 P. 3d 1141, 1144-45 (2000). Damages need not have been precisely and specifically
foreseeable at the time of contracting, but only reasonably foreseeable by the parties. Id.
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However, "Under general contract principles, consequential damages are not recoverable
unless specifically contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. Id., citing Appel,
135 Idaho 133,136-37, 15 P.3d 1141, 144-45; Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago
Title Co. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 428 (1988); Suitts v. First Sec. Bank
ofldaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15,22,713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985). Consequential damages
are not recoverable where they are not specifically contemplated by the parties. Silver
Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879,884,42 P.3d 672,677, citing Appel,
135 Idaho 133, 137, 15 P.3d 1141, 145; Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co.
of Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61,764 P.2d 423, 428. Hartford accurately cites these cases
(Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 3-6) for the rule of
contract law stated in those cases, but these cases do not deal with policy language
under an insurance contract. Hartford cites other cases for insurance policy provisions
with identical language to Lakeland's policy with Hartford regarding exclusion of
consequential damages: Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F .Supp.2d
621 (2006) (interpreting North Carolina law); and Streamline Capital, LLC v. Hartford
Casualty Ins. Co., 2003 WL 22004888 (U.S. Dist.Ct. S.D. N.Y. 2003) (interpreting New
York law). Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Damages, pp. 5-10.
Streamline is a breach of contract case involving a Hartford policy, specifically
business income loss and the "period of restoration". Streamline provided computer
services to other businesses (securities traders, brokers and dealers) in the World Trade
Center. Streamline's headquarters and many of the businesses Streamline served were
completely destroyed by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Hartford paid
Streamline $200,000 to lease another space, but that space resulted in a conflict with a
competitor, and Streamline felt it needed to relocate again. Because Hartford would pay
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no more than the $200,000 to Streamline, Streamline lost the ability to rent space at a
different location. Streamline sued for not only the additional payments it claimed were
due under their version of when the "period of restoration" ended, but also for
"consequential damages, which include business opportunities that were lost because of
the defendant's alleged failure promptly to meet its payment obligations under the
contract." 2003 WL 22004888, p. 4. The analysis of that issue in Streamline is set forth
below, and begins with a discussion of contract law identical to the Idaho cases of Brown'
Tie & Lumber, Appel and Silver Creek Computers:

Citing a Second Circuit case that incorporated an earlier New York
State Court of Appeals ruling, we stated that" 'to recover damages
beyond those flowing naturally from the breach, "such ... damages must
have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable
result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting." " , Continental,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 682, at *15 (quoting Harris v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 80 n. 3 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Kenford Co.
v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1,4, 537 N.E.2d 176
(1989))). We continued:
Thus, it is clear that unless a plaintiff alleges that the specific
injury was of a type contemplated by the parties at the time of
contracting, a claim for consequential damages should be
dismissed. See Brody Truck Rental, Inc. v. Country Wide Ins. Co.,
277 A.D.2d 125, 126,717 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1st Dept.2000)
(dismiSSing the action because the insurance contract did not cover
consequential damages and the parties did not contemplate
recovery of consequential damages at the time of contracting);
Martin v. Metropolitan Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 238 A.D.2d 389,
390, 656 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (2d Dept.1997) (dismissing action
where party sought reimbursement for foreclosure allegedly caused
by non-payment of premiums as foreclosure was not foreseeable at
the time of contracting).
Specifically, in order to determine whether such damages
were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting, New York courts take into consideration whether there
existed a specific provision in the policy itself permitting recovery
for the loss. See e.g. Brody Truck Rental, 277 A.D.2d 125 at 126,
717 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (dismissing defendant's claim for consequential
damages and specifically noting that "the insurance policy ...
contains no provision or language indicating that recovery of
consequential damages was within the contemplation of the
parties. "); High Fashion Hair Cutters v. Commercial Union
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Insurance Co., 145 A.D.2d 465, 467,535 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d
Dept.1998) (holding that the "plaintiff was not entitled to
consequential or indirect damages since the policy did not contain
a specific provision permitting recovery for such loss.") Martin, 238
A.D.2d 389 at 390,656 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (dismissing the claim for
consequential damages and explaining that "... the contract of
insurance does [not] contain any language which permits recovery
for consequential damages.").
Continental, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 682, at *15-*16.
Here, the complaint does not even allege that the parties
contemplated at the time of contracting that Streamline would incur
additional harm from financing costs and loss of business in the event
Hartford failed promptly to meet its obligations under the Policy. Nor is
there a provision in the Policy making Hartford liable for such damages.
And significantly, the Policy itself contains a provision specifically
disclaiming any liability on Hartford's part for such losses. Specifically, the
Exclusions section of the Policy reads:
4. Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions. We will not
pay for:
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss,
caused by or resulting from:
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or
resuming "operations", due to interference at the location of the
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease or
contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly
caused by the suspension of "operations", we will cover such loss
that affects your Business Income during the "period of restoration".
b. Any other consequential loss.
Policy at 11 (PI. Cross-Motion Ex. A at STM 61).
The meaning of this provision is unambiguous. Black's defines
"consequential/oss" as 'Taj loss arising from the results of damage rather
than from the damage itself." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999).
Losses that Streamline incurred only because of Hartford's alleged failure
promptly to meet its obligations under the Policy are clearly losses arising
from the results of the damage at the World Trade Center rather than
from the damage itself. Thus, the language of the contract, a key factor
under New York law in determining whether consequential damages for
breach of an insurer's policy obligations were within the contemplation of
the parties, in this case further demonstrates that the parties did not
anticipate the insurer would be liable for such damages. See Crawford
Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 244 A.D.2d 881,
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668 N.Y.S.2d 122, 122-23 (4th Dep't 1997) (reversing trial court's denial of
motion to dismiss request for consequential damages where "[p]laintiff
failed to establish that such damages were reasonably foreseeable or
contemplated by the parties" and "the contract at issue contain[ed] a
provision excluding from business interruption coverage 'any other
consequential loss" ').
Plaintiff relies heavily on Sabbeth Indus. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut.
Ins. Co., 238 AD.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475 (3d Dep't 1997). In that case,
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court dealt with a trial
court ruling prohibiting plaintiff from amending its complaint to include a
claim for consequential damages on the ground that the insurance policy
lacked express provisions or other language demonstrating that recovery
of consequential damages was contemplated. Sabbeth Indus., 238
AD.2d at 767-68, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77. The Appellate Division
overruled, calling the lack of express policy language dealing with
consequential damages "immaterial," and concluding that, in view of the
"specific protection [business interruption] coverage provides, ...
consequential damages were reasonably foreseeable and within the
contemplation of these parties." Id. at 477.
We believe Sabbeth is inconsistent with the weight of authority of
New York cases, which have focused on the specific language of the
contract to find that consequential damages were within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting. Those cases include cases we
cited in Continental, such as Brody Truck Rental, 277 A.D.2d at 126, 717
N.Y.S.2d at 44 (1st Dep't 2000), High Fashion Hair Cutters, 145 AD.2d at
467,535 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (2d Dep't 1998), Martin, 238 AD.2d at 390,656
N.Y.S.2d at 319 (2d Dep't 1997); as well as Sweazey v. Merchants Mut.
Ins. Co., 169 AD.2d 43, 45, 571 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't 1991)
(reversing trial court's refusal to strike claim for consequential damages
and stating that consequential damages "must have been brought within
the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach at the
time of or prior to contracting" and finding that U[t]he insurance policy in
this case contains neither provisions nor language which demonstrates
that recovery of consequential damages was within the contemplation of
the parties"). See also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 01 Civ.
11200(JSR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973, at *15-*16 (S.D.N.Y. May 29,
2003) (dismissing, in declaratory judgment action, defendant's claim for
consequential damages based on 1) court's rejection of some of the
claims for breach of contract underlying the consequential damages claim,
and 2) court's finding that defendant "utterly failed to specify nature of its
alleged consequential damages or adduce competent evidence showing,
as required for any such claim, that the consequential damages were
foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was made") (citations omitted).
Moreover, Sabbeth did not include the compelling fact that exists
here: that the only contract language specifically dealing with
consequential damages precludes them. Thus, we conclude that making
the insurer liable for consequential damages stemming from the insurer's
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own alleged breach was not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting, and we grant defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
claim for consequential damages.
Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, pp. 4-7. (bold and italics added). Lakeland argues:
Reliance on this case [Streamline] is frivolous. This is an unpublished
federal case interpreting New York law in 2003 and the interpretation is not
a correct statement of current New York law on the subject.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine, p. 2. Reliance on Streamline is in
fact not frivolous. Streamline is solidly on point. Streamline is in fact not an "unpublished"
decision, but is simply a decision not reported in Federal Supplement 2d. Streamline
concerns the same insurance company, Hartford. Streamline concerns identical policy
language to that of the present case. Streamline interprets New York state case law on
contracts which is similar, if not identical, to Idaho case law on contracts.
Lakeland claims Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 10
N.Y.3d 187, 194,886 N.E.2d 127,856 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. 2008), involves a policy that
"was almost identical to the policy in this case". Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's
Motion in Limine, p. 2. Nowhere in the Bi-Economy decision is the consequential damage
exclusion discussed. The Bi-Economy decision makes no mention of an "appraisal
provision" in the applicable insurance contract. Thus, without that policy language, it is
difficult to understand Lakeland's argument that the policy "was almost identical to the
policy in this case." Apparently Lakeland claims Bi-Economy is the correct current
statement of New York law on the subject. Id. What Lakeland ignores is the fact that BiEconomy is a bad faith case, and Streamline was not a bad faith case. Lakeland's case
is no longer a bad faith case, as summary judgment has been granted against Lakeland
in favor of Hartford on Lakeland's bad faith claims. The foll,?wing quote from Bi-Economy
shows that it is a bad faith case, and shows how important the fact that it is a bad faith
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case is to the majority's decision:
Thus, the very purpose of business interruption coverage would
have made Harleysville aware that if it breached its obligations under the
contract to investigate in good faith and pay covered claims it would have
to respond in damages to Bi-Economy for the loss of its business as a
result of the breach (see Sabbeth Indus. v Pennsylvania Lumbermens
Mut. Ins. Co., 238 AD2d 767, 769 [3d Dept 1997]).
10 N.Y.3d 187, 195,886 N.E.2d 127, 132,856 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510. (italics added). A
breach of the covenant to act in good faith is the tort of bad faith. The dissent in Bi-

Economy shows how intertwined the tort of bad faith was intertwined with the decision to
allow a claim for consequential damages:
The majority achieves this simply by changing labels: Punitive
damages are now called "consequential" damages, and a bad faith failure
to pay a claim is called a breach of the "covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."
10 N.Y.3d 187,196,886 N.E.2d 127, 133,856 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511.

Bi-Economy, in turn, cites several cases for the proposition that an exclusion
provision regarding consequential loss does not bar recovery of consequential damages.
10 N.Y.3d 187, 188. One of those cases is, Hold Brothers~ Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Ins.
Co. 357 F.Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Another case is the first version of Lava

Trading, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434 (SD.N.Y. 2004),
These cases must be discussed.
Neither Lakeland nor Hartford discussed Hold Brothers, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty

Ins. Co. 357 F.Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), in their briefing or in oral argument. Hold
Brothers is the case that Lakeland should have been advocating this Court adopt. Hold
Brothers is factually very similar to Streamline. Hold Brothers was in the securities
trading and software development business, and had just completed about $1 million in
improvements in their offices in the World Trade Center when that office was
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completely destroyed in the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. 357 F.Supp.2d 651,
653. Hartford insured Hold Brothers for property damage and loss of business income.
357 F.Supp.2d 651,652. The reasoning in Hold Brothers is as follows:
Hartford maintains that, at any rate, the Policies expressly exclude
recovery of consequential losses. Thus, Hartford argues that
notwithstanding Hold Brothers' allegation that "[t]he parties understood
and contemplated that a breach by Hartford of its obligation to pay
business income and/or extra expense losses under the Policies would
likely cause Hold Brbthers to suffer further loss of income and/or extra
expenses," (footnote omitted) Hold Brothers fails to state a claim for
consequential damages. Specifically, Hartford points to two exclusions in
the Policies. First, the Policies state that Hartford "will not pay for loss or
damage caused by or resulting from ... Consequential Losses: Delay, loss
of use or loss of market." (footnote omitted) Second, under the heading
"Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions," the Policies provide
that:
[Hartford] will not pay for:
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss,
caused by or resulting from:
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or
resuming 'operations,' due to interference at the location of the
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease or
contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly
caused by the suspension of 'operations,' we will cover such loss
that affects your Business Income during the 'period of restoration.'
b. Any other consequential loss. FN52

FN52.ld. § BA. (emphasis added).
Hartford contends that these provisions excluding coverage for
consequential losses preclude Hold Brothers' claim for consequential
FN53
damages resulting from Hartford's alleged breach of the Policies.
FN53.See Hartford Mem. at 13; J.R. Adirondack, 739 N.Y.S.2d at
797 (dismissing claim for consequential damages because "[t]he
insurance policy at issue here expressly excludes coverage for
consequential losses"); Crawford, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 122-23 (holding
that consequential damages are unavailable because "[p]laintiff
failed to establish that such damages were reasonably foreseeable
or contemplated by the parties when the contract was formed ...
and, indeed, the contract at issue contains a provision excluding
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from business interruption coverage 'any other consequential
loss" ') (citations omitted).
Hold Brothers responds that the cited provisions are coverage
exclusions and have no bearing on the availability of consequential
FN54
damages resulting from breach.
FN54.See Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 13-15; see also
Lava Trading, 326 F .Supp.2d at 442 ("The scope of a policy's
coverage and the damages that are recoverable if the insurer
breaches the policy are, of course, distinct concepts.").
"Under New York law, the initial interpretation of a contract is a matter of
law for the court to decide." (citation footnote omitted). "Part of this
threshold interpretation is the question of whether the terms of the
insurance contract are ambiguous." (citation footnote omitted). "Where
there are alternative, reasonable constructions of a contract, i.e., the
contract is ambiguous, the issue should be submitted to the trier of fact."
(citation footnote omitted). For the purposes of this motion, it is only
necessary to say that the provisions cited by Hartford do not
unambiguously exclude the recovery of consequential damages
resulting from breach of the Policies. Neither provision makes any
reference to losses or damages resulting from breach; on the
contrary, both provisions appear in the context of exclusions of
coverage for certain kinds of losses. Hold Brothers' construction is,
therefore, eminently reasonable. FN58
FN58.See Lava Trading, 326 F.Supp.2d at 442 (holding that an
identical provision "speaks only to what constitutes a covered
loss under a policy of insurance, and not to what remedies are
available for breach of a policy"); but see Streamline Capital,
2003 WL 22004888, at *7 (holding that the same provision
precludes consequential damages resulting from breach).
Thus, while the cited policy language may ultimately have a direct bearing
on what damages for breach were within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of contracting, a question of fact exists as to whether these
provisions exclude the recovery of consequential damages.
Having determined that (1) New York law requires that in order to
recover consequential damages for breach of an insurance policy, the
policyholder must show only that such damages were within the
contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time
of or prior to contracting and (2) the provisions of the Policies excluding
consequential losses do not unambiguously exclude the recovery of
consequential damages, I conclude that Hold Brothers' claim for
consequential damages satisfies the permissive pleading standard of Rule
8. In keeping with this standard, Hold Brothers need not plead specific
facts to support its claim; it is more than sufficient at this stage that Hold
Brothers has alleged that "[t]he parties understood and contemplated that
a breach by Hartford of its obligation to pay business income and/or extra
expense losses under the Policies would likely cause Hold Brothers to
suffer further loss of income and/or extra expenses." FN59 Thus, Hold
Brothers has adequately pled a claim for consequential damages.
(footnote omitted).
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FN59. Compl. 11 17. Hartford argues that Hold Brothers fails to
state a claim for consequential damages because the complaint
fails to allege that the parties contemplated that Hartford would be
liable for the specific consequential damages sought. See Hartford
Mem. at 7. Not only is this argument out of sync with Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema and the rest of the Supreme Court's and Second
Circuit's Rule 8 jurisprudence, but it is also premised on a
misreading of Kenford. On a motion to dismiss, a court must draw
all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. It is reasonable to infer
from Hold Brothers' allegations that Hartford assumed liability for
losses resulting from a breach of the contract. In any case, as
stated earlier, in order to impose liability for consequential
damages, the plaintiff must show that such "unusual or
extraordinary damages ... [were] within the contemplation of the
parties as the probable result of a breach." Kenford, 73 N.Y.2d at
319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis added).
357 F.Supp.2d 651,658-660. (bold added). The bold portion of the Hold Brothers
decision shows the court in Hold Brothers found the exclusion of consequential
damages provision to be ambiguous. In making that finding, the Hold Brothers decision
at footnote 58 cites the first Lava Trading (Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
326 F.Supp.2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y.2004)) decision. As shown below, that first Lava

Trading decision found the exclusion clause unambiguous, but distinguished between
"covered loss" under a policy of insurance, versus "what remedies are available for
breach of a policy". In the second Lava Trading (Lava Trading Inc., v. Hartford Fire

Insurance Company, 365 F.Supp.2d 434 (S.D.N.Y 2005)) decision, the court tackled
the exclusionary clause on consequential damages directly, and held that the language
of the exclusionary clause regarding consequential damages, coupled with the
arbitration provision, made it clear that "consequential damages that this plaintiff seeks
were not contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's duty to
pay under the Policy." 365 F.Supp.2d 434, 448.
As shown above in the bold and italicized portion of the analysis in Streamline,
the Court in Streamline specifically found the exclusionary language unambiguous:
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The meaning of this provision is unambiguous. Black's defines
"consequential loss" as "[a] loss arising from the results of damage rather
than from the damage itself." Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999).
Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, p. 5. (italics added). Lava Trading did not really

mention ambiguity, but the decision obviously finds the exclusionary clause on
consequential damages to not be ambiguous. Blis Day Spa (discussed below) did not
mention ambiguity, but the decision obviously finds the clause not ambiguous. Thus,
the only case that finds the clause ambiguous is Hold Brothers, and the court in Hold
Brothers makes that conclusion by making the distinction between exclusion of

coverage vs. damages, a distinction which no other case makes.
Lava Trading Inc., v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 365 F.Supp.2d 434

(S.D.N.Y 2005) also involves Lava Trading's lost business which was destroyed in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. As a result of that
destruction, Lava Trading had to relocate its business. Lava Trading also sought
damages for its costs to secure funding, for damages resulting from loss of clients and
from damages resulting from the alleged loss of future business growth. 365 F.Supp.2d
434,445.
The portion of Lava Trading which discusses consequential damages shows how
important the "appraisal provision" in the applicable insurance contract was to the Federal
District Court judge:
In Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1,
537 N.E.2d 176 (1989) (UKenford 11"), the New York Court of Appeals held
that "[i]t is well established that in actions for breach of contract, the
nonbreaching party may recover ... such unusual or extraordinary
damages [as] have been brought within the contemplation of the parties
as the probable result of a breach at the time or prior to contracting." Id. at
319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176 (citations omitted). In order to
determine what damages are reasonably contemplated by the parties,
"the nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known
by the parties should be considered ... as well as 'what liability the
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defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to
have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when
the contract was made.''' Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added); see
also Trademark Research Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc., 995 F.2d 326,
332-33 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that plaintiff had "failed to establish its lost
future profits with the degree of certainty required by Kenford [ ] ... and
has failed to establish that liability for such damages were contemplated
by the parties at the time of contracting."). As the quoted language makes
clear, the availability of consequential damages in a given case requires
an examination of: (1) the particular contract at issue; (2) whether there
has been any conscious assumption of liability by a contracting party; and
(3) whether, by words or deeds, one party was reasonably led to believe
that the other had assumed such liability. Thus, as indicated in my prior
rulings on the subject, the Court in Kenford " looked to whether there was
a "provision in the contract" or "any evidence in the record to demonstrate
that the parties, at any relevant time, reasonably contemplated or would
have contemplated that the [defendant] was undertaking a contractual
responsibility" for the consequential damages sought by the plaintiff.
Kenford 11,73 N.Y.2d at 320,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176 (emphasis
added); see also Trademark Research Corp., 995 F.2d at 334 (finding that
"[t]he record contains no specific evidence that, at the time of contracting,
[defendant] accepted liability for nine years of lost profits. No evidence
was offered that the parties ever discussed lost profits liability.").
In order to prevail, Lava is required to " 'establish that liability for
[the consequential damages sought] were contemplated by the parties at
the time of contracting.' " Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
2004 WL 943565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3,2004) (quoting Trademark
Research Corp., 995 F.2d at 332-33). Plaintiff must present evidence "of
'what the parties would have concluded had they considered the subject,'
or that, in light of the parties' discussions on the subject, one party would
have been led to believe that the other was assuming liability for such
damages." Id.
On its motion for summary judgment, Hartford has pointed to a lack
of any such evidence, and has presented evidence that neither it nor
plaintiff contemplated that Hartford would be liable for consequential
damages in the event of a breach. "In moving for summary judgment
against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the
movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence
to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim."
Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Fdn., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d
Cir.1995); see also Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F.3d
1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994) ("[T]he moving party may obtain summary
judgment by showing that little or no evidence may be found in support of
the nonmoving party's case."). "In other words, the moving party does not
bear the burden of disproving an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim." Bussa v. Afitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 2004 WL
1637014, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Ju1.21, 2004). In light of Hartford's initial
showing that there is no evidence that the parties contemplated, or that
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Hartford reasonably warranted, that Hartford would be liable for the
consequential damages sought here in the event of a breach of the Policy,
the burden shifts to Lava to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial," and it cannot rest on "mere allegations or denials"
of the facts asserted by the movant. Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.
In opposition to Hartford's motion, Lava points only to internal
Hartford documents demonstrating that Hartford was aware of the
reasons why people buy business interruption coverage, and the
importance of resolving such claims promptly to minimize actual lost
income. Thus, Lava quotes from certain training materials that
acknowledge that when a business is experiencing downtime, its net
earnings may be affected, and that swift action on the part of the insurer
may be beneficial to the policy holder. Lava also relies on certain
advertising materials in which, it asserts, Hartford touts the type of policy
at issue as security against "unexpected loss [ ] wip[ing] out your bottom
line" (Bauer Exh. I at HCAS 02545) and claims that "you simply can't
afford to be caught short on insurance protection" (Bauer Exh. K at HCAS
02539). Lava also relies on certain statements from Hartford claim
adjuster Peter Pollicino, who acknowledged, not surprisingly, that a lack of
insurance coverage could "be deadly to a business" and/or "wipe out" a
business financially. Bauer Cert. Exh. L at 471.
None of this "evidence," however, creates a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Hartford was assuming liability for
consequential damages in the event of a breach. The evidence adduced
by Lava simply illustrates the rather unremarkable proposition that
business interruption insurance is meant to insure against loss of
business income and other expenses, and that if a company does not
have such insurance, they stand the risk of financial consequences if they
are not otherwise prepared. It is a significant leap of reasoning to
conclude from this that Hartford understood that it would be liable for the
consequential damages sought here, or was warranting to Lava that it
would be so liable. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
.
Of course, New York law also requires that the Court consider "the
nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known by the
parties" in determining whether consequential damages are available.
Kenford II, 73 N.Y.2d at 319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176. The
Appellate Division, Third Department, has held that "[t]he very purpose of
business interruption coverage would make defendant aware that if it
breached the policy it would be liable to plaintiffs for damages for the loss
of their business as a consequence of its breach or made it possible for
plaintiffs reasonably to suppose that defendant assume such damages
when the contract was made." Sabbeth Industries Ltd. v. Pennsylvania
Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 238 A.D.2d 767, 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d
475 (3d Dep't 1997). But in Sabbeth, the insurer disclaimed any coverage
under the policy, and plaintiff sought the "lost value of its business" and
other damages. It is not clear from the Court's opinion which of these
losses would have been due under the policy had the insurer met its
obligations. Certainly, if an insurer breaches its policy, it should expect to
be liable for covered losses under the policy. But most importantly,
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Sabbeth was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss. As in
Sabbeth, I denied Hartford's motion to dismiss and have given Lava the
opportunity to prove its allegations. This plaintiff's "consequential damage"
claim fails because there is no evidence to support it.
Nothing in the Policy before me would lead either the insured or the
insurer to understand that the insurer, in the event of breach, would be
liable for costs to secure funding that should have been provided by
Hartford, the loss of clients or the loss of future business growth. Lava
relies on language in the Policy itself that provides, for example, that there
is no dollar limit for business interruption coverage, which is limited only
by a maximum of twelve months plus thirty days. Policy at LA V 0028 &
0029. From this provision, and the fact that the Policy was designed to
pay Lava for certain expenses and lost income during the period it could
not operate (up to a maximum of 13 months), Lava extrapolates that
'lbJoth parties understood ... that Lava's lost income would be greater if
(1) business interruption coverage were denied or delayed; or (2) of the
Period of Restoration were miscalculated or abbreviated by Hartford's own
wrongdoing; and (3) that Hartford would be responsible for paying the
costs of its delay or wrongdoing." Lava Br. at 18. Lava's conclusion,
however, does not follow from the cited Policy provisions. Indeed, it is
undermined by the fact that the Policy contemplates substantial delay in
payment, during which time both the insured and the insurer presumably
are assessing the losses, the insured is submitting its claim, and any
differences between the insured and insurer are resolved. See Policy at
LA V 0035-0038 (providing, inter alia, that the insurer will pay for a covered
loss within 30 days of receiving the Signed statement of loss only if (1) the
insured has complied with all of the terms of the Policy and (2) the insured
and the insurer have agreed upon the amount of the loss or an appraisal
award has been made). Thus, the Policy contemplates that a period of at
least 90 days may pass before Hartford indicates its intentions with
respect to a claim, and contemplates payment within 90 days (or less) of a
covered loss only if the insured has complied with all the terms of the
Policy and the insured and insurer have reached an agreement as to the
amount of the loss or "an appraisal award has been made." Id. The
Policy sets forth an explicit dispute resolution mechanism, to be
conducted by an appraiser, that either party may invoke in the event of
any disagreement as to the amount of loss. Id. at LAV 0036. (There is no
evidence in the record before me on this motion that Lava ever sought, or
obtained, an appraisal award, or indeed made any claim other than that
made in January 2002. See Pis. 56.1 Response 1f 21.) In short, contrary
to Lava's position that the Policy language would lead Hartford to
understand that any delay in payment or disagreement with respect to the
claim would render it liable for the consequential damages sought, the
Policy explicitly recognizes that delay (including potential delay of more
than three months) is foreseeable.
Although the Policy language may have a direct bearing on
whether damages sought were within the contemplation of the parties, it is
not necessarily controlling on the issue. Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire
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Insurance Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y.2004). I have
considered the Policy exclusions and payment provisions cited by Lava in
support of its contention that liability for consequential damages are
contemplated by the Policy, as well as the entirety of the Policy, and
conclude they, either alone or in conjunction with other evidence, do not
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties
contemplated consequential damages of the kind and character sought.
The loss of business income that arises from a covered loss such
as the destruction of the World Trade Center was, indeed, contemplated
by the parties. That was the purpose of the contract of insurance. But,
with the benefit of the full summary judgment record before me, I
conclude that the consequential damages that this plaintiff seeks were not
contemplated as a foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's
duty to pay under the Policy. The parties knew that Hartford would be
liable for the sums paid and they knew that if those sums were not paid,
Hartford would be liable for simple interest at 9% per annum from the date
of the breach. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5001 & 5004 (McKinney's 1992 &
2005 Supp.); Feb. 16, 2005 Tr. at 18. In response to Hartford's motion,
Lava has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether anything
further was contemplated.
365 F.Supp.2d 434, 445-448. (italics added) This appraisal dispute resolution
provision was important to the court in this second Lava Trading decision. Counsel for
Hartford in the present case noted Lava Trading involved a dispute resolution
mechanism, to be conducted by an appraiser, which either the insured or the insurer
could invoke in the event of any disagreement as to the amount of loss. Reply in
Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Damages, p. 9. Hold Brothers also seems
to have involved an appraisal provision (357 F.Supp.2d 651,655, footnote 23), but that
fact does not enter into the court's decision in Hold Brothers in finding the
consequential damage exclusion to be ambiguous.
As mentioned above, Hold Brothers cites the first Lava Trading decision: Lava
Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y.2004). The
analysis in that case of the consequential damages exclusion is as follows:
Consequential Damages Claim
Although the New York Court of Appeals has not addressed the
specific issue of the availability of consequential damages in a case
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND OROER RE: HARTFORO'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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alleging a breach of an insurance policy, the leading New York case on
the availability of consequential damages generally in a breach of contract
action is Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1,
537 N.E.2d 176 (1989). In Kenford, the Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is
well established that in actions for breach of contract, the nonbreaching
party may recover ... such unusual or extraordinary damages [as] have
been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable
result of a breach at the time or prior to contracting." Kenford, 73 N.Y.2d
at 319,540 N.Y.S.2d 1,537 N.E.2d 176. In order to determine what
damages are reasonably contemplated by the parties, "the nature,
purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known by the parties
should be considered ... as well as 'what liability the defendant fairly may
be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the
plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the contract was
made.''' Id. (citations omitted). In the absence of an express contractual
provision with respect to the consequential damages sought, "the
commonsense rule to apply is to consider what the parties would have
concluded had they considered the subject." Id. at 320, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1,
537 N.E.2d 176 (citation omitted; emphasis in the original).
Thus, in Kenford, which did not involve an alleged breach of an
insurance policy, the Court looked to whether there was a "provision in the
contract" or "any evidence in the record to demonstrate that the parties, at
any relevant time, reasonably contemplated or would have contemplated
that the [defendant] was undertaking a contractual responsibility" for the
consequential damages sought by the plaintiff in that case (Le.,
compensation for the lack of appreciation in the value of plaintiffs land in
the event a stadium was not built). Ken ford, 73 N.Y.2d at 320, 540
N.Y.S.2d 1, 537 N.E.2d 176. The Court of Appeals found that
consequential damages were unavailable in that case because "the
[defendant] never contemplated at the time of the contract's execution
that it assumed legal responsibility for these damages upon a breach of
the contract." Id.
Other courts have recognized that consequential damages may be
available for breach of an insurance contract, see, e.g., Landoif
Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., 1991 WL
33412, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.1991), but, as with any breach of contract, " 'to
recover damages beyond those flowing naturally from the breach, "such ...
damages must have been brought within the contemplation of the parties
as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting." , "
Streamline Capital, L.L. C. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WL
22004888, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.25, 2003) (quoting Continental Information
Systems Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co., 2003 WL 145561, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan.17, 2003); (other citations omitted)). "[U]nless a plaintiff
alleges that the specific injury was of a type contemplated by the parties
at the time of contracting, a claim for consequential damages should be
dismissed." Streamline, 2003 WL 22004888, at *5 (citing Brody Truck
Rental, Inc. v. Country Wide Insurance Co., 277 A.D.2d 125,126,717
st
N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1 Dep't 2000), appeal dismissed, 96 N.Y.2d 854, 729
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N.Y.S.2d 669, 754 N.E.2d 772 (2001), and Martin v. Metropolitan Property
& Casualty Insurance Co., 238 AD.2d 389,390,656 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319
(2d Dep't 1997)).
Plaintiff relies on Sabbeth Industries Ltd. v. Pennsylvania
Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 238 AD.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475
(3d Dep't 1997) in support of its claim for consequential damages for
defendant's breach of the Business Insurance Policy at issue in this case.
In Sabbeth, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed that part of
the trial court's ruling that denied the plaintiff leave to amend its complaint
to include a claim for consequential damages, concluding that in light of
the "specific protection [business interruption] coverage provides ...
consequential damages were reasonably foreseeable and within the
contemplation of the parties." 238 AD.2d at 769, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 477. I
need not decide on this motion whether the Third Department's view that
the very nature of a business interruption policy can support a claim for
consequential damages would be adopted by the New York Court of
Appeals. Here, in contrast to the allegations in the Streamline case,
plaintiff has alleged that consequential damages were in fact within the
contemplation of the parties (Complaint 1118), which allegation I accept for
the purposes of this motion. Thus, this case is very different from
Streamline in this respect.
It is true that Lava's Policy does not contain a specific provision or
language permitting the recovery of consequential damages. I do not
read the Appellate Division cases cited in defendant's papers, which
appear to apply the rule as set forth in Kenford, as setting forth any such
requirement. See, e.g., Brody Truck Rental, 277 AD.2d at 126, 717
N.Y.S.2d 43 (granting insurer's summary judgment motion where liability
policy at issue "contains no provision or language indicating that recovery
of consequential damages was within the contemplation of the parties ...
and no factual issue has been otherwise raised as to whether the parties
intended that [the insured] would be able to recover damages due to lost
business and/or profits") (citations omitted; emphasis added); Martin, 238
AD.2d at 390, 656 N.Y.S.2d 318 (granting motion to dismiss claim for
consequential damages arising out of breach of "loss of use" provision of
property insurance policy where "it was neither foreseeable nor within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract-that failure to pay
loss of use benefits would result in foreclosure and the consequential
damages flowing therefrom. Nor does the contract of insurance contain
any language which permits recovery for consequential damages.")
(emphasis added). Sabbeth is a later Third Department decision than
Sweazey v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co., 169 AD.2d 43, 45, 571
N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't 1991), and I must assume that Sabbeth
better reflects how the Third Department would rule on the issue.
Similarly, Martin is a later Second Department decision than High Fashion
Hair Cutters v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 145 AD.2d 465, 535
N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1988), and is presumably an accurate statement
of that Court's view. Without further guidance from the New York Court of
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Appeals or the Appellate Divisions, I would apply Kenford to contracts of
insurance such as that at issue in this case.
The Policy at issue in this case does expressly exclude "any other
consequential loss" from its Business Income and Extra Expense
coverage. See Policy at LAV 00034. Not surprisingly, the parties have
differing views as to the significance of this provision. Lava argues that
the policy excludes only "certain consequential losses". However, the
unambiguous language excludes "any other consequential loss"
(emphasis added). Lava also argues that the term "consequential loss" is
not coextensive with "consequential damages", or at the very least, is
ambiguous. To suggest that the terms, themselves, have different
meanings is to stretch the meaning of "loss" and "damages" beyond their
natural meaning. Indeed, courts routinely make no distinction between
the two. See Mu Chapter of the Sigma Pi Fraternity of the United States,
Inc. v. Northeast Construction Services Inc., 273 A.D.2d 579, 581,709
rd
N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (3 Dep't 2000) (finding "consequential damages ...
precluded under the terms of the contract" where construction contract
provided that "[o]wner waives all rights of action against the [c]ontractor
for loss of use of the [o]wner's property, including consequential losses
due to fire ... however caused.") (alterations in original), appeal denied
sub nom., CNA Insurance Companies v. Northeast Construction Services,
95 N.Y.2d 768, 744 N.E.2d 141,721 N.Y.S.2d 605 (2000) (Table); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Time Corp., 704 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.1983)
(where policy provided for recovery of "all direct and consequential loss"
from property damage, insured could recover loss profits resulting from
physical injury to property); EeDC Environmental, L.C. v. New York
Marine and General Insurance Co., 1999 WL 777883 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.29,
1999) (policy covering "any consequential loss or damage" from accidents
covers consequential damages including loss profits).
However, a policy exclusion speaks only to what constitutes a
covered loss under a policy of insurance, and not to what remedies are
available for breach of a policy. The scope of a policy's coverage and the
damages that are recoverable if the insurer breaches the policy are, of
course, distinct concepts. Payment to an insured for a covered and nonexcluded loss is performance under the contract of insurance. Breach of
the contract of insurance is an entirely different matter governed by the
present day successors to Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 E.R.
145 (1854) such as the Kenford case discussed above. See Pape v.
Home Insurance Co., 139 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.1943); Acquista v. New York
st
Life Insurance Co., 285 A.D.2d 73, 81,730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (1 Dep't
2001) (" 'Although the policy limits define the amount for which the insurer
may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do not define the
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach.' ") (quoting and adopting
the reasoning of Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985»; accord Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118
N.H. 607, 611,392 A.2d 576 (1978) (collecting cases for the proposition
that "[t]he policy limits restrict the amount the insurer may have to pay in
the performance of the contract, not the damages that are recoverable for
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its breach"). The policy language may have a direct bearing, but will not
always be controlling, on the damages that were within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of a contract.
Thus, even if a policy exclusion such as that excluding "any other
consequential losses" in this case does not speak to what damages may
be recovered, the existence of such a provision in the Policy in this case
may be relevant to the inquiry of whether consequential damages are
available. As noted, whether consequential damages are available in a
given case depends, in part, on the intent of the parties, that is, whether
such damages were reasonably foreseeable and in the contemplation of
the parties at the time of contracting. Defendant argues that even if this
exclusion does not in itself preclude recovery of consequential damages,
it reflects the parties' intention that consequential damages were not
contemplated. The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division appears
to agree with this position. See J.R. Adirondack Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 292 A.D.2d 771,739 N.Y.S.2d 795 (4 th
Dept' 2002) (exclusion for "any other consequential loss" in insurance
policy precludes claim for consequential damages for breach of that
policy); Crawford Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens
th
Mutual Insurance Co., 244 A.D.2d 881,688 N.Y.S.2d 122 (4 Dep't 1997)
(same). Of course, the opposite conclusion can also be drawn: that by
specifically addressing consequential losses and then expressly excluding
them from policy coverage, consequential damages were a type of injury
that the parties recognized might arise. Or, it may be that the policy
provision does not speak at all to what damages might arise by virtue of
the insurer's breach of the Policy.
Assume a hypothetical policy allowed recovery for consequential
losses up to $50,000. Would that mean that the parties contemplated
that, in the event of a breach, there could be consequential damage but
that they would be unlikely to exceed $50,000, or would that indicate
precisely the opposite, i.e., that consequential damages exceeding
$50,000 would be likely but that, in agreeing upon a premium in exchange
for policy coverage, the parties were excluding them from policy
coverage? Or would some other interpretation be the most plausible?
Just as the policy language would be inconclusive in the foregoing
example, so, too, do I conclude, in the context of this motion to dismiss,
that the consequential loss exclusion at issue in this case is inconclusive.
The ultimate question remains: what damages were in the
reasonable contemplation of the parties in the event of breach by the
insurer at the time they entered into the contract of insurance? In this
case, Lava has alleged that U[t]he parties understood '" that a breach by
Hartford of its obligation to pay business income and/or extra expense
losses under the Business Insurance Policy would likely cause Lava to
suffer further loss of income and/or extra expense." Complaint 1{18.
While it remains to be proven whether this is indeed true, and whether the
parties contemplated that the type of consequential damages alleged to
be available here would be the likely result of a breach by Hartford, as well
as whether Lava even suffered any losses attributable to Hartford's
alleged breach, for the purposes of this motion pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6),
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I must take plaintiff's allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in plaintiff's favor. In the absence of Policy language (which is
incorporated into the Complaint) that negates, as a matter of law, that
consequential damages were contemplated, the allegation suffices for
purposes of this motion to dismiss. Therefore, I decline to dismiss
plaintiff's claim for consequential damages at this stage of the litigation.

326 F.Supp.2d 434, 439-443. In the later (2005) Lava Trading decision, it is written:
In a March 18,2004 Memorandum and Order, 326 F.Supp.2d 434
(S.D.N.Y.2004), I granted in part and denied in part Hartford's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., holding that Lava had
adequately pled a claim for consequential damages. As I made clear, "it
remains to be proven ... whether the parties contemplated that the type of
consequential damages alleged to be available here would be the likely
result of a breach by Hartford, as well as whether Lava even suffered any
losses attributable to Hartford's alleged breach .... " 326 F.Supp.2d at 443.
Hartford now moves for partial summary judgment dismissing Lava's claim
for consequential damages. It also seeks a ruling, pursuant to Rule 56(d),
Fed.R.Civ.P., that the "period of restoration" provided for in the Policy
ended on April 30, 2002 and that certain business income losses are not
covered because they are excluded as consequential losses or are
speculative. For the reasons set forth herein, Hartford's motion for
summary judgment dismissing Lava's claim for consequential damages is
granted.
365 F.Supp.2d 434, 436.
The other cases cited in Bi-Economy (10 N.Y.3d 187, 188) are not on point.
Sabbeth Industries Limited v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company,

238 A.D.2d 767, 656 N.Y.S.2d 475, (N.Y.A.D. 1997), would at first glance seem to allow
consequential damages when only breach of the insurance contract is alleged (ie., no bad
faith claim is alleged). However, a close reading of that case shows that there was no
exclusion clause against consequential damages such as is present in the instant case.
Kenford Co., Inc. v. County of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 540 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1989), did not

concern an insurance contract and did not concern an exclusionary clause on
consequential damages. Carney v. Memorial Hasp. and Nursing Home of Greene
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County, 101 A.D.2d 990,477 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y.A.D.,1984), adds nothing as it did not
concern an insurance policy, but merely stands for the proposition that punitive
damages will not be allowed under New York case law in a breach of contract case.
In the present case, Hartford also cites to Blis Day Spa, LLC v. The Hartford Ins.
Group, 427 F.Supp.2d 621 (W.D.N.C. 2006). Blis Day Spa, similar to Streamline,
concerns the same insurance company as the present case, Hartford. Blis Day Spa
concerns identical policy language to that of the present case. The exclusion of
consequential damage clause is identical to that of the present case. Blis Day Spa also
concerned an appraisal provision, similar to that found in the present case, and that
appraisal provision was important in the Federal District Court's reasoning as shown
below. Blis Day Spa interprets North Carolina state case law on contracts which is
similar, if not identical, to Idaho case law on contracts. In Blis Day Spa, the trial court,
similar to the present case, found the insured's bad faith claim to be without merit,
holding: "... the Court finds Plaintiffs have fail to demonstrate that Hartford's refusal to
pay the claim was not because of a legitimate, "honest disagreement" as to the validity
of the claim or innocent mistake." 427 F.Supp.2d 621,633. The Federal District Judge
in Blis Day Spa held:
In its motion for summary judgment Defendant asserts that not only
is there no provision in the Business Policy making Hartford liable for
consequential damages, but the policy specifically excludes from business
interruption coverage "any other consequentialloss."FN7
(FN7)
.4. Business Income and Extra Expense Exclusions. We will
not pay for:
a. Any Extra Expense, or increase of Business Income loss,
caused by or resulting from:
.
(1) Delay in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the property or
resuming "operations," due to interference at the location of the
rebuilding, repair or replacement by strikers or other persons; or
(2) Suspension, lapse or cancellation of any license, lease
or contract. But if the suspension, lapse or cancellation is directly
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caused by the suspension of "operations", we will cover such loss
that affects your Business Income during the "period of restoration".
b. Any other consequential loss.
Hartford also contends that Heil's estimates of consequential damages
are too speculative. In light of Defendant's initial showing, the burden
shifts to Plaintiffs to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for triaL" Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(e). Having examined the
record, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to offer sufficient
evidence, in the contract or otherwise, that at the time of contracting that
the parties contemplated, or that Hartford reasonably warranted,
Defendant would be liable for the consequential damages of the kind and
character sought here in the event of a breach of the Business Policy.
The Court first notes that Plaintiffs offer no evidence, or even
allege, that the parties contemplated at the time of contracting recovery of
consequential damages of the type sought in the' instant case.
Second, the Court does not find any specific provision or language
in the Business Policy itself that would lead either the insured or the
insurer to understand that in the event that the parties had a reasonable
dispute over business expenses Hartford would be liable for loss of future
business growth. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Business policy
provisions specifically excluding from business interruption coverage
consequential losses have no bearing on the availability of consequential
damages from an alleged breach. Rather, it appears Plaintiffs tacitly
accept that the lost profits that they incurred because of Hartford's failure
to pay all dispute amounts under the Business Policy are unambiguously
consequential lasses within the meaning of the policy. Thus, the Court
finds nothing in the Business Policy language would lead Hartford to
understand that any delay in payment or disagreement with respect to the
claim would render it liable for the consequential damages sought in the
instant case.
Third, the Court also finds no evidence from which the parties could
presume special. Plaintiffs do not even allege that the parties
contemplated at the time of contracting that Plaintiffs would incur
additional harm from loss of business in the event Hartford failed to pay
disputed sums under the Business Policy. Furthermore, any argument
that such consequential damages that result from delay in disputed
payments are foreseeable is further forestalled by the appraisal
provision,FN8
(FNB.)
The Appraisal of Property Loss provision provides: "If we or
you disagree on the value of the property or the amount of loss,
either may make a written demand for an appraisal of the loss ... A
decision agreed to by any two [of the appraisers and/or umpire] will
be binding."
the purpose of which is to avoid precisely the sort of damage caused by a
lengthy delay in payment as exists in the instant case.
Finally, because courts are instructed to examine "the nature of the
contract itself," the absence of a provision in the contract providing for
such damages is not necessarily controlling on the issue of whether
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damages sought were within the contemplation of the parties. To this end,
Plaintiffs contend that "the purpose of the policy is to put the parties in the
position they would have been in had no fire occurred. Had the defendant
honored its contractual obligations the plaintiffs would have had the cash
necessary to continue moving forward with its business operations." The
Court finds the Plaintiffs' lone argument is unpersuasive as it rests not on
the basis of anything Hartford may be presumed to have known at the
time of contracting, but rather merely on the type of insurance that
Plaintiffs purchased. As noted in Lava Trading Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co.,
[t]he evidence ... simply illustrates the rather unremarkable
proposition that business interruption insurance is meant to insure
against loss of business income and other expenses, and that if a
company does not have such insurance, they stand the risk of
financial consequences if they are not otherwise prepared. It is a
significant leap of reasoning to conclude from this that Hartford
understood that it would be liable for the consequential damages
sought here, or was warranting ... that it would be so liable.
Id. 365 F.Supp.2d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y.2005).
Having considered the entirety of the Business Policy, the Court
concludes that the parties knew that Hartford disclaimed business
interruption coverage for consequential losses, and that in the event of a
disagreement, either party could seek appraisal. Because the
consequential damages that plaintiffs seek were not contemplated as a
foreseeable consequence of a breach of Hartford's duty to pay under the
Business Policy, the Court need not consider whether Heil's estimates are
as a matter of law too speculative.

427 F.Supp.2d 621, 638-640. This Court finds this reasoning to be sound. Similar to the
court's finding in Blis Day Spa: "Plaintiffs offer no evidence, or even allege, that the
parties contemplated at the time of contracting recovery of consequential damages of
the type sought in the instant case" (427 F.Supp.2d 621,639), this Court has examined
the Complaint and the Amended Complaint in the present case, and Lakeland has not
alleged that Lakeland and Hartford contemplated consequential damages at the time
their insurance contract was entered into. Just as in Blis Day Spa: " ... the Court does
not find any specific provision or language in the Business Policy itself that would lead
either the insured or the insurer to understand that in the event that the parties had a
reasonable dispute over business expenses Hartford would be liable for loss of future
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business growth." Id. In the present case, loss of profits beyond the "period of
restoration" would be the claimed non-covered loss, instead of lost future business
growth.
This Court is persuaded by Bfis Day Spa, Streamline, and Lava Trading, and finds,
due to the unambiguous language of the exclusionary clause regarding consequential
damages, and due to the arbitration provision, consequential damages in the present
case must be excluded. Hartford's Motion in Limine Re: (Consequential) Damages is
granted.

B. HARTFORD'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DAN HARPER.
On February 8,2010, Hartford filed Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan
Harper and Memorandum in Support. In that twenty-eight page memorandum, Hartford
claims Lakeland's expert, Dan Harper, should be limited in his testimony in several areas.
Lakeland filed a five-page response brief on February 16, 2010.
First, Hartford claims regarding the issue of "reasonableness of the adjuster's
actions", that such issue is a) no longer relevant and b) Harper agreed in his deposition
that he cannot testify as to reasonableness. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert
Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 1-5,8-11. This Court agrees on both
grounds. The "reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is largely irrelevant, given that
there is no bad faith cause of action, given the fact that there will be no punitive damage
claim, and given that all that remains is whether Hartford breached its contract with
Lakeland (which in turn revolves around the determination of the applicable period of
restoration). If there is any relevance, Harper himself has admitted he cannot testify as to
reasonableness. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re:
Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A, p. 18, L. 5 - p. 19, L. 7; p.
136, L1. 13-23. Harper is not a claims adjuster and is not an insurance professional.
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Harper has agreed to limit his opinions to three of his reports. Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in
Support, Exhibit A, p. 75, L1. 15-18. Lakeland does not contest Harper's inability to testify
about reasonableness of Hartford's actions. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in
Limine Concerning Dan Harper, pp. 1-2. Instead, Lakeland focuses on the relevance of
"reasonableness", claiming "it was not reasonable or necessary to withhold payment
under the schedules to properly determine the final amount of the claim." Id., p. 2. While
the "final amount of the claim" is what is at dispute, "reasonableness" of Hartford's actions
is no longer relevant. Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony on the
"reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is granted.
Second, Hartford claims that any opinions of Harper as to any claim valuation
beyond January 28, 2009, is irrelevant as such would be beyond the one year limitation
(from the date of the roof collapse) on the policy. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re:
Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 11-13. Lakeland simply responds
with a "foreseeability" argument. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine
Concerning Dan Harper, p. 2. Foreseeability is discussed above regarding consequential
damages, and the contractual exclusion of consequential damages, and thus, is not a
valid argument. Due to the Court's decision above regarding consequential damages,
Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony as to any claim valuation beyond
January, 28, 2009, is granted, as such opinion testimony is not relevant.
Third, Harford claims Harper cannot testify about "unreimbursed inventory losses",
because Harper has not explained his opinion and because he simply reiterates Frtiz'
testimony. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in
Support, pp. 13-14. Those are not sufficient grounds to grant Hartford's Motion in Limine.
Admissibility of this testimony will depend on what foundation can be laid at trial.
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Hartford's Motion in Limine to keep Harper from testifying about "unreimbursed inventory
losses" is denied.
Fourth, Hartford claims Harper cannot testify about the amount of damages if the
"period of restoration" had been later than October 31,2008, because he has not given
an opinion on that matter. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and
Memorandum in Support, pp. 15-16. Indeed, Harper admits he has not been asked to
calculate those damages. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine
Re: Expert Dan Harper and Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A, p. 84, L. 7 - p. 85, L. 8.
Because Lakeland has not disclosed such opinion by Harper as to the amount of
damages if the "period of restoration" had been later than October 31,2008, Hartford's
Motion in Limine precluding Harper from testifying about such is granted.
Fifth, Hartford claims Harper's first and second reports fail to satisfy the
requirements of I.R.E. 702 and Daubert. Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan
Harper and Memorandum in Support, pp. 17-28. Hartford claims Harper cannot rendered
an opinion about the ability of Lakeland to reopen as Harper has not formed any opinion
as to what would be required to open the store. Id., pp. 17-18. Harford also claims
Harper's opinion ignores the actual facts of this case. Id., pp. 18-19. Even if Hartford's
claims are true, Lakeland must be given the opportunity to develop Harper's foundation at
trial. Hartford claims Harper will testify about "continuing normal operating expenses
incurred, including payroll", even though such is precluded under the policy. Id., pp. 1920. Specifically, Hartford objects to rental fees paid and attorney fees paid. Id. However,
Hartford failed to set forth which portions of the policy prohibit such. Hartford claims
Harper is errant in suggesting the Fritzes were making no draws from insurance
proceeds. Id., p. 21. This Court finds Harper should be allowed to explain such. Hartford
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claims other math errors and foundation problems for Harper's opinions. Id., pp. 22-28.
Hartford will certainly be allowed to inquire about these matters at trial, but this Court
cannot at this time prohibit Harper's testimony on these matters. Hartford's Motion in
Limine under I.R.E. 702 and Daubert must be denied at this point.
III. ORDER.
IT IS HERBY ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine Re: (Consequential)

Damages is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony

on the "reasonableness of the adjuster's actions" is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED due to the Court's decision above regarding

consequential damages, Hartford's Motion in Limine as to Harper's testimony as to any
claim valuation beyond January, 28, 2009, is GRANTED, as such opinion testimony is not
relevant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Motion in Limine to keep Harper from testifying about

"unreimbursed inventory losses" is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because Lakeland has not disclosed such

opinion by Harper as to the amount of damages if the "period of restoration" had been
later than October 31,2008, Hartford's Motion in Limine precluding Harper from testifying
about such is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hartford's Motion in Limine under I.R.E. 702 and
Daubert must be at this point be DENIED.
th

Entered this 8 day of March, 2010.
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ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S
RECONSIDER [filed March 8, 201d]

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendant.

BASED UPON plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider filed March 8, 2010, and argument
thereon at the hearing of March 9, 2010,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider this Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine, filed March

J, 2010, is
I

hereby GRANTED IN PART, for those reasons as stated by the Court at the hearing otMarch 9,
I

I

2010. Specifically, the Court will allow plaintiffs expert, Dan Harper, to testify regarding
"
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER [file.d March 8, 2.010J - ]

---

999f)

U '>I.I..I.I.LV

.LV.

vo rAA. .:.vo

'>Vi.>

0

----------1

~VV"j;f VV-.t

plaintiffs damages in this action total no more than $19,052, which amount will be su ~ect to

I
cross-examination by defendant at the time of triaL

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that

an other aspects of plaintiffs Motion to Reoonsider
I

are DENIED, and all prior decisions of the Court, including those relating to bah faith,
consequential damages, and the scope of Mr. Harper's testimony at the time of trial (JcePt as
described above), remain unchanged.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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)
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I, Arthur M. Bistline, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that:
1)

Attached as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition
transcript of Melanie Copley.

2)

Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition
transcript of Michelle Reynolds.

3)

Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition
transcript of Julia Kale.

4)

Dan Harper is a resident of the State of Washington and this Court cannot compel his
attendance at this trial.
.
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All statements of counsel set forth in the Memorandum in Support of this Motion to
Continue are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge an~ the entire contents 0 that
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MS. DUKE:

1

2
3

4

Object to the form.

think

I

that assumes facts not in evidence.
BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Okay.

Let me just rephrase it.

At some

5

point after I

6

Sedgwick and/or Hartford that no business income

7

payment had been made since -- welf'

8

other than up through the month of June?

filed suit, did you inform anybody at

MS. DUKE:

9

And again,

for anything

I'm going to need

10

you to narrow the time frame because you may be

11

invading the attorney-client privilege at some

12

point,

13

BY MR. BISTLINE;

14

Q.

obviously_

Let's just say right after the suit was

15

filed, before you talked to an attorney, did you

16

inform anybody at The Hartford, other than your

17

lawyer, that no business income payment had been

18

made for July, August or September?

19

A.

Personally, no.

20

Q.

And why hadn't a payment been made for

21

those months?

22

A.

23

information.

24

Q.

Lack of documentation and financial

And what documentation was missing?
MS.

25

DUKE:

Objection.

Foundation.

You
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1

if you reference the claim notes,

it looks like

2

based on this report they authorized another $73,000

3

in business income, which would be the difference

4

between 123,951 minus the 50 that has already been

5

advanced.

Does that sound correct?

6

A.

I have a question as to who authorized.

7

Q.

Well,

it's in your claim notes that as

8

soon as they received the second schedule I believe

9

they would send a request for payment for that

10

$73,000.

11

A.

All right.

12

Q.

And I guess my question is this.

As of

13

the end of May when you had these new updated

14

schedules,

15

anything to put together an estimate of the next few

16

months of business income loss?

17

A.

it's your testimony you didn't have

And I would tell you that based on my

18

review of the file,

I still think that there was

19

missing financial information that did not allow us

20

to do an actual loss projection.

21

Q.

Okay.

What was missing?

22

A.

For specific missing information you'd
I will tell you

23

have to go back and talk to MD&D.

24

that we typically ask for the last either two or

25

three years financial information, which would
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1

to the policy?

A.

2

It just indicated to me that they had just

3

crunched some more numbers.

4

necessarily tell me that there was sufficient

5

evidence or sufficient documentation to say this was

6

an accurate figure.

7

Q.

Okay.

This in itself does not

Now, on this documentation issue,

8

what

9

notes where you talk about documentation being

10

lacking occurs at page 131 in the claim notes.

the only place I could find in the claim

11

12
13

A.

Let me get there.

Q.

And do you see that where you're saying

Okay.

I'm on that

page.

14

you don't have enough information to make a further

15

advancement.

16

A.

17

At the top of the page,

There's a note from May 9th.

Q.

That's it.

19

A.

Okay.
MS. DUKE:

20

22
23
24

25

Is that the

one you're referring to?

18

21

I believe.

I'm sorry.

So what's the question?

BY MR. BISTLINE:
The question is what information did you

Q.

think you were missing at that point?

A.

I'd have to look at that entire file to

tell you specifically.

I mean,

it's indicated in
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1

the note that we're looking for the insured's cost

2

to replace the damaged stock, that had not been

3

received in the file, and to get back with our

4

accountants regarding where they stood on their

5

status with their numbers.

6

Q.

Okay.

So I guess at that point you have

7

to assume for me that this is true, that the first

8

schedules actually told you how to calculate

9

business income other than payroll.
But at that pOint you didn't realize that

10

11

MD&D had already provided you with the information

12

to calculate the business income claim through the

13

entire year of 2008?
MS. DUKE:

14

Okay.

Misstates the evidence.

15

Misstates the documents.

16

go ahead and answer if you can.

17

A.

Okay.

18

sorry.

19

BY MR. BISTLINE:

20

Q.

Foundation.

You can

Can you repeat the question?

I'll try it a different way.

I'm

The first

21

set of schedules, Exhibit 3, those schedules contain

22

the revenue that was generated by Lakeland in the

23

year 2007 and 2000 -- or -- yes, 2006, 7.

24

basically '07 into '08, because we had the collapse

25

in early '08.

Well,
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I'm asking you, did you understand that

1

2

you can take those figures on page 3 of that

3

schedule and you could multiply them times the

4

projected increase in sales, which'is that 11

5

percent figure,

6

percent figure, did you understand, that's how you

7

could calculate the business income for any month in

8

the year 2000
MS. DUKE:

9

10

and then multiply that times that 18

A.

Same objections.

The projected numbers are just that,

11

they're just projections.

12

information that was needed by the accountants to

13

verify those numbers, that's what they would have

14

been requesting.

15

If there was additional

Projected numbers can fluctuate based upon

16

seasonal influxes, economic influxes.

17

it's not -- it would not be accurate to use one set

18

of numbers across the board.

19

BY MR. BISTLINE:

20

Q.

And who told you that?

21

A.

It wouldn't.
retail,

We can't

I mean, sales in a hardware

22

store,

fluctuate with the economy, fluctuate

23

with the customer base,

24

issues.

25

would not necessarily be what you would do in July.

fluctuate with seasonal

It just would not -- what you do in January

Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm, RPR www.huseby.com
HUSEBY,

INC. - 1230 W. Morehead Street, M40a, Charlotte, .NOrt:h Carolina 28208

(800) 333-2082

Lakeland True Value Hardware, LL.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co.

Julia Kale

CV-OB-7069

March 1, 2010
Page 73

1

to you that you were behind,

2

term, by about $73,951?
MS. DUKE:

3

A.

4

for lack of a better

Same objections.

It provided the documentation to show

5

additional payment warranted that we did not

6

previously have.

7

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

8

9

And who told you that it -- that you

had -- I mean, who told you you didn't have the

10

information to generate this schedule prior to this

11

time?
MS. DUKE:

12
13

14
15

Object to the form.

She didn't

generate the schedule.

BY MR. BISTLINE:
Q.

Did -- at some point you received a

16

schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that point.

17

Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we

18

cannot generate this schedule because we don't have

19

the information we need?

20

A.

Amy at Matson & Driscoll· had continuously

21

advised that we were missing documentation needed to

22

have another schedule.

23

Q.

Did she ever indicate to you that the

24

missing documentation somehow impeded her ability to

25

properly evaluate the claim?

Reported By: Beverly J. Gramm; RPR
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
ISB: 5216

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

Case No: CV -08-7069

FFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
) 55.

County of Spokane

)

I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that:
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington;
2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained;
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.;
4. ] understand the Lakeland True Value trial, which was scheduled to start March 22,2010, has
now been rescheduled for April 19,20] O. (have had a long planned vacation for two weeks
starting April] 7 through May I. As such I will not be able to testify during that time period;

5. I also have trials starting the weeks of May 3rd and May 17th. While I would prefer not to
schedule trial testimony on two cases in the same week I am willing to do so, given I will be

AFFlDA VIT OF DAN HARPER
- I

----------------------------- --_._-

22:10

i
i

I

in town, and in order to facilitate the COLlrt if these would be acceptable alternate dates.
have

110

other plans to be out of town prior to November of this YFal' and can accommodate

any altel'Oative dates the court chooses.

DATED this

K

day of March, 2010.

SUBSCRTBED AND SWORN to bdore me this -1'7~dav
- of ,March, 2010.

.

_~ ,., - /;.ulQ~;L.NOTARY P . LIC in arid for Washington
Residing at: ...)pOk..l.u1£
Commission Expires: 01;;2,3/~OII

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Jq ~ay

1 hereby certify that on the
of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed (0 the
following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall. Farley, Oberrccht & Blanton, P.A.
PO Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271

[ ]
[ ]
[)

Hand-deliv,ered
Regular mail
Certified mail

M

Facs.imile .

[ ]

Email

FAX: (208) 395-8585

BY:

~
.

~~I

~

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
19B: 5216
I

Attorney for Plaintiff

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICJL
DISTRICT
I
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
I

!
i

i

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

ase No.: CV-08-7069
LAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE
RIAL

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,

Defendant.

Plaintiff moves this Court for a continuance on the grounds that Plaintiff's expert witness

is unavailable for trial on the present date set. This motion is supported by the Affidavits of
Arlhur M. Bistline, Daniel Harper, CPA and the memorandum in support.

DATED this 19th , day of March, 2010.

~---ARTHUR M. BISTLINE

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE

- 1

----------- ---
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i

&~ay

I hereby certify that on the
of March, 2010, I served a!true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

PLAINTiFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 395-8585
Email

1

-2

- - . - - - - . - - -----STATE 0::: !cif~rlU
COUNTv Cr' K(Y

Fl~

Keely E. Duke
ISB #6044; ked@hal1farley.com

Bryan A. Nickels
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395·8500
Fa.csimile:
(208) 395·8585
W;\3\3-472.9\Continue Trial-Memo in Opp.doc

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE rWmWARE,
L.L.C.,
,
Plaintiff.
vs.

Case No. CV·08-7069
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM: IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO CONTINUE TRIAL

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSuRANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
Defendmit.
,
COMES NOW, defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), by and
I

through its tmdersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits its opposition to plaintiff's Motion
i
to Continue ("plaintiff's Motiqn"), filed March 19, 2010. 1 For the reasons stated herein, the
I

1 Plaintiff has failed to me an accordant Motion to Shorten Time, leaving defendant only 2 business dah to respond
in advance of the hearing noticed for March 24, 2010. Plaintiff has not explained why its motion was not filed
immediately after the March 9, 2010 hearing resetting the trial date in this matter.

,

I

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO'
/"nN'TIN1TF.

TRTAI.. - 1

,

I

Apri119. 2010 trial date should ~ot be vacated based simply on the unavailability of plaintiff's
1

expert for live testimony at the tUne of tria1.
ARGUME~
I

Plaintiff's argument is siinPly that, as its expert Dan Ha:rper is una.vailable durin'g the two
I

I

tria) weeks in this matter, plaintif.f' cannot pu.t Mr. Hazper on to offer rebuttal testimony rollowing
i

i

testimony by Hartford's acooun#ng witnesses. However, as discussed below. the trial! date was
!

I

I

agreed-to by plaintiff's counsel~ plaintiff still retains the right to secure a trial depo$ition, the
,

I

,

I

olaimed needed scope of rebutt~ testimony is otherwise inadmissible. and plaintiff alteady had

.
I

,

;

the opportunity (through deposipon) to ascertain the infonnation now claimed to be n~ded. For
,

these reasons. as discussed belo~, plaintiffs Motion should be denied.
I

A.

Plaintiff bad the opportunity to request a different trial date to acco'mmodate
its expert.
I
I

Trial in this matter was: previously set to commence on March 22, 2010. However, at
,

I

hearing on March 9, 2010, the :court and the panies agreed that the maner could bel, reset to a

.

:

I

:

two-week setting commencing ~April 19, 2010. At that hctlring, plaintiff's counsel could have

:

i

proposed an alternative date ba~cd upon the availability of its expert witness, Mr. Halper. but it
I
'
I
did not. Further, Plaintiff's co~sel could have even agreed to a 4-day trial during ~e original
,

I

:

I

_

trial week of March 22, 2010, but
it cUd not. Based upon the mutually agreed-to setting
of the
I
'

I
:
April 19, 2010 mal date, defendant's counsel Ms. Duke has already had to reschedule mUltiple

I

;

,

I

depositions. and a trial resetting of this matter would be extremely difficult, most notably in light
I

I

i

:

of two multiple-week jUl)' triais
in federal court defendant's counsel Ms. Duke has! scheduled
I
.
I
i
this summer.

,
i

i

i

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
CONTINUE TRIAL - 2

............

??'~e'"
)

--_.-,,,
I

;

Thus. plaintiff should noi now be permitted to continue a trial date it previously agreed
I
i

I
I

to, which defendant's counsel hr relied upon for scheduling purposes, and Plaintiff~ Motion

i

should be denied.
B.

PlaintiffhAS the ipportunity to cODduct a trial deposition of its expe..;t.

Appropriately, plaintiff rlcognizes that it can conduct a trial deposition of its

I '

ex~ert. 2. See
I

Plaintitrs Memorandum in Suppon of Motion to Continue, filed March 19, 2010" at p. 2.
I

,

I

I

Plaintiff has not, howeva, coordinated a. trial deposition of Mr. Harper. Instead, plaintiff argues
that it would be an abuse of dislretion for this Court to not allow live rebuttal testimohy by Mr.
Harper, citing to Pauley v. slon River Lumber Co .. 74 Idaho 483. 264 P.2d

i

46~ (1953).
!

However, Pauley offers little guidance. in that neither it, nor the prior Idaho decisions upon

I
!
which it is based. relate to e1pert witnesses, but instead, relate only to parties ~dJor fact

witnesses. See Pauley, 74 Idah.~ at 485 (owner of tractor at center of dispute); Huber IV. Mother

I

I

a hospital,

Aurelia. 13 Idaho 276. 89 P. 942 (1907)(supervising architect during construction at
I

to

testify, in part, that no exteJions were granted to contractors); Rankin v.

Ca1dWen~ 15 Idaho

625, 99 P. 108, 109 (1908)(clmer at a bank in dispute over possession of rings); Storer v.

I

:

ReHfeld, 17 Idaho 113, 105 P'i 55, 56 (1909)(deit:nc1ant); Corey v. Blackwell Lumb;er Co., 27

Idaho 460, 149 P.S10, 511

(l~1S)(bankrupt

individual; action brought by his trustee); Berlin

I

:

Machine Words v. DehJbom Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 566, 186 P. 513, 513 (1919)(company-

coaj Joint Stock Land Bank v. Security PxQducts Co.. 56 tdaho 436.
55 P 2d 716, 719 (1936)(motor in promissory note dispute). Moreover, Paule¥ ~as decided
party's manager); Pacific

57 years ago. and its cited decisions stretch back to 103 years ago. Thus, any rationale in Pauley

1

"";den~

~.

1 Plaintiff n_ 1hat M,. HMpor ;, w..h"'stan
al<hough tb;, i. lugdy • aon-,equitur.
fia,per ;,
not, e.g., an out.o.f-state fact witnes~ beyond the Court's subpoena power; rather, Mr. Harper is pl~tiff's own
retained expert. Sunplyas a matter of course, no subpoena should be necess8r)' to compel a party's own expert to
attend 8 trial.
'

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDr IN oPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO'
CONTINUE TRIAL - 3
~
I

I

;

--------.---

favoring live testimony by fact witnesses should be tempered in light of the ease of sedlIing and
\

i

presenting trial depositions in this day and age; this is even more true of expens. who ate neither
parties nor first-hand fact witnesses.
I

1

Thus, plaintiff s Motion should be denied, and pla:iD.tiff should be directed - should it 80
,
,

I

desire - to conduct a trial deposition of its expert to preserve whatever testimony it may seek to
present at the time of trial by Mr. Harper. Plaintiff's stated concem about rebuttal ~stimony.
,I

however, rings hollow,

fI.5

discussed below, and plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid a trial

deposition simply on a claim of-need to present rebuttal testimony.3

C.

Plaintiff's proposed scop@ of rebuttal testimony
inadmissible testimony.

contemplates only

Plaintiff's argument that it needs Mr. Harper to present rebuttal testinlony only
I

i

contemplates rebuttal testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible at the trial of this matter,
based upon the stated scope of anticipated rebuttal testimony.
iI

First, plaintiff incorrectly attempts to recharacterize this case as a bad

faith action:

"Hartford withheld payments it was required to make pursuant to the policy. Iialrtford has
premised its defense to this conduct on the fact that its accountants did not have thb required
!
I

information to calculate the payments and have deferred to the accountant to explain what
I

information was missing to the jury a.t tria1.)' (plaintiff's Memo at 5.) However, thai is not the

issue for trial in this matter. lqstead, the dispute in this action is limited to

"plaintiff~

claim for

I

breach of contract as relatin2 to Hartford's determination of the dates of the ~Period of

I
Restoration' at issue in this ma1;ter." (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel'and Order
"

;

,I

3 Indeea, all trial preservation depoQitions eould be defeated simply on the claim that the witnesses heeded to be

live to potentially present rebuttal "testimony. However, trial depositions are a wen-established 'tool for the
presentation of testimony by unavailable witnesses, and plaintiff's attempt to avoid doing one for Mr. ~arper should
be rejected by the Court.
i

!
DEFENDANT'S MEMO~:UM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO'
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,

,I,

I

------------_.---i
I

GTanting Defendant's Sununary 'Judgment in Part and Denying Summary Judgment in I'art, filed
:

1

November 23. 2009 ("MSJ OrCler"), at 2.) Thus, evaluation of plaintiff's claimed ,need for
,

,
I

rebuttal testimony should be frained in the light of the actual issue for trial, and not :plaintiff' 5
,

I

multiple attempts to re-inject bad faith Htigation into the trial of this action.
i

Second, plaintiff apparently again seeks to have Mr. Harper testify on the handling of the
,"

!,

claim and the terms of the Policy: "Lakc:land has the right to continue this trial
i'

t6 have its
I

I

i

,

I

accountant available to rebut thb Hartford's expert testimony in this regard." (plaintiff's Memo
:
i
a.t S.) Howover, plaintiff fails to explain how the claimed rebuttal testimony needed by plaintiff
I

- a critique of the document requests by Hartford's accountants and timing of paYments by
,

,
of Mr; Harper's
i

Hartford - would even be admissible. in light of the Court's prior limiting

I

1

:

testimony. As previously argUed by Hartford in its prior Motion in Limine Re: Dan Harper, Mr.
I

Harper is neither a claims adjuSter nor an insurance professional, but, rather, is a CPA: As such,
I

Mr. Harper agreed in his deposition that he lacks the knowledge, training, and expe~e to offer
,

i

any opinions as to the reasonab~eness of Hartford' s adjustment of the claim or any inteipretations
,

I

I

i

of the sUbject Policy provisi04s at issue in this litigation. Specifically, Mr. Harper ~estificd it
I
:
was beyond his ability to ren~er any such opinions and that he would not be rend~ring such
'I
I
,

opinions at trial:

:
:

I

I
I

I

!

i

'I!

!

18

Q What about a Jlaim related to claims handling
6 practices, are you sd!mebody that has handled those types of
7 cases?
I,

5

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

A No. I don't thi.#k my opinions are on a -- that would
come more from anil~ance expert or adjuster expert.
Q Sure. And tb.~tls what I wanted to get to is there's
no doubt, at least ~m what I can tell in looking at your
cwriculwn vitae yop're certainly well qualified as a CPA
and a forensic acco!imtant. But as I understand it, your
role as an expert iS'not as a claims handling expert,
correct?
:i
::
,
"

IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO'
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16

25

That's correct. :
Q You would lea, e that to claims-handling folks to
address?
.I
A Yes.
j
Q Okay. And yo would do that because you don't have
the education, trainJg and experience that would be
necessary to render those opinions, correct? You like to
stick with what yout:ow.
A Sure, that's far'
Q And based on ~ I would ass~: tbtn that you have

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

not served as an exP~rt for any client, whether it's
Lakeland or any oth,1 client that you and your company ha"e
assisted since 1993,:1 'th respect to providing an opinion as
to whether a claim's appropriately adjusted and handled.
is that fair?
1
A Yes, we woul ' 't have opinions as to the adjusters'
actions or inactions,!!

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

A

(Affidavit of Counsel in Supp:

of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: Expert Dan Harper and

Memorandum in Support, fileJ February 8, 2010, ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. A, 11. 18:5.t9:7.) Mr.
"

Harper went on to state:
136
Q In providing : ese opinions, though, you certainly
14 acknowledge that ~ u do not feel comfonable testifying as
15 to what the insuredJl~ obligations arc under the insurance
16 policy, correct? ~'
13

Yes, that's pr: ably getting more into the policy

17

A

19

Q And you cert~n1y, again, in the policy

18 interpretation arend

20 interpretation aren,tyou certainly do not feel you're
21 qualified to repder' y opinions as to whether the Fritzs
22 actually complied /I,' th the terms of the insurance policy?
23 A I would agre , that that's beyond my scope.

(Id.• ll. 136:13-23.)
:

Instead, Mr. Harper cl,.'

.
;
ed that the scope of his opinion was far narrower ana would be

limited to only what documeni.1 were provided and what infonnation they contabled: '
!

:'

DEFENDANT'S MEMO~.n.IJ"~
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not going to render any opinions
nteI'Dre1taficm of the policy?

21
22

23
you're not going to render an
UJ"'PT"',...,. or not the 7B-page report complied

24

.......'"OT"'....

25

145
1 with the terms of
2 A No, not with
3 the jury what it
4 Q What the

5

policy, correct?
terms of the policy. I might tell
of and how it might be used.
I consisted of?

A Yes.

6 Q Okay. Are
7 to whether an

going to be rendering any opinions as
is limited to the coverage afforded to
8 the insured under
policy?
9 A I don't have
opinions about coverage.
10 Q Are you
to render any opinions regarding an
11 insured's duty to
regarding an investigation and
12 settlement for all
made WIder the policy?
13 A I'd defer to
insurance expert.
14 Q Okay. Axe
going to render any opinions as to
15 whether or not the
has a duty to provide
16 documentation to
its claims? J think that's
17 one you're
to the insurance expert, as we
18 discussed.
19

A My opinion

20 what

be limited to what was provided and
conveyed.
not doing that in terms of

21 Q Correct. But I
22 whether it
with the policy or not?
23 A No, just
the content and how it could
24 be used.

25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12

Q Are you

to be rendering any opinions as to
146
a duty to mitigate their loss when
with their insurance policy or under

whether an insured
they're making a
their insurance
A No, I'll leave
to the insllI'ance expert.
Q Areyou
to render any opinions as to whether an
insured has a duty take reasonable steps to protect the
covered property
further damage?
A Wouldn't .
with that but I would leave that

Q

147
. And based on that, it's not that
I

DEFENDANT'S .LY..LI:,J....a,J~~lt.Tr.TT....r IN oPPOSmON TO PLAlNTIFF'S MOTION TO!
CONTINUE TRIAL - 7
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..

13 you're saying the pO~Cy covers these things, it's just this
14 is the damage, you
sort out what the policy covers and
15 what it doesn't. is th~t fair?

4yS

16 A This is the economic result of the collapse and the
17 court can decide wdo's responsible for it.
(Id at 144:21-146:9; 147:12-'lemphases added).

:

The Court subsequently banted Hartford's motion in limine on this point, stating: "While

~s what is at dispute, 'reasonableness' of Hartford's actions is no

the 'final amount of the claim'

longer relevant" (MemOrandl Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in
March 8,2010, at p. 30.)

Li~e, filed

ThUS'fJ<intifI'S attempts to again bave Mr. Ha1per speak to 1) whether

,or not the document SUbmiSSior complied with the terms of the Policy. and/or 2) w~ether the
actions of Hartford (either in L g of payments or its document requests) were reasonable,
should be rejected by this C!urt. as 'they are patently beyond the scope of

Mr.! Harper's

Indee~. in reconsideration of its almost wholesale eXCJUSi~n of Mr.
Harper's anticipated testimonyj, the Court only allowed Mr. Harper to speak to a v~y narrow
admissible testimony.

subject: "the Court will alloi. plaintiff's expert, Dan Halper, to testify reganling ,Plaimiff's
damages in this action total

examination by defendant at

Ao more

than $19,052, which amount will be subject to cross-

11' time of trial." (See Order Re: PWntiff'. Motion to ~.eOnsider,

filed March 13,2010, at 1-2.) ,
,~

.l

Thus, with respect to .,1a.intiff's Motion at bar, the identified rebuttal testimony would

,
I

'

.

":

I

~templates

otherwise inadmissible, as it

testimony beyond the scope permitted by th;is Court in

I:

its prior orders. As such testi ony would be inadmissible, plaintiff has failed to
I

de~onstrate a

need for the rebuttal testimony 'J Plaintifrs Motion should be denied.
!:

,i

i

MEMOlUM

:

;

DEFENDANTtS
CONTINUE TRIAL - 8
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i

I

,1

i

111,

i

----_.----,

Kohler ofMD&D

D.

artford's:

9.ccountant~).
j

Finally, the thrust of p ' . tiff's Motion· that plaintiff needs
,
I

t~

Mr. Harper

present

I

,
>
accountants are the crux of its entire defense an.d those

rebuttal testimony as "Hartfor

'

,
accountants have never explain d what information they were missing" - is d.isingenu~U!l, as it

r

;

disregards that plaintiff had an ' .portunity to elicit that very infoImation during the depbeition of
,I
Amy Kohler of MD&D (Hartfa !d'S accountants), taken September 21, 2009. Indeed, t1aintiff's
1

counsel invested only an hour

I:

included, as two deposition c

I'

:

d twenty-one minutes in the deposition of Ms. K.ohler,iand even

;

"bits, letters from Ms. Kohler to Mr. Fritz (one of plaintiff's

,:

1

'aintif£'s attorney, for a time) requesting specific docbments in

owners) and Mr. Van Valin

support of the claim. (See Tr '!:criPt of the Deposition of Amy Kohler, September 21, k009, and

I:ached hereto as Exhibit A). Notably, this deposition ~as taken

Deposition Exhibits 2 and 5..

I'

:

~ Hartford filed its Motion ,'r Summary Judgment, which placed into the record c]~s notes

I;

wruch included emails fTom M Kohler regarding needed documentation; for examPle)

Mr. Bistline,
ents you e-.mailed today. We received the following: ~

Thank you for the doc

L

1. Lakeland True Value's ank statement for June 2008
2. . The Summary and De :il reports from the QuickBooks bank reconciliation !for

!i

June 2008

.

3. The Demand letter fro ,iTrue Value Company

.It

~or

II'

,

The provided docume
are not the same as the documents provided for
periods. There are a c uple of additional pieces of infonnation that we will n¢ed
to update our schedule ~ as we stated in our document request sent to you on JWy
28, 2008" The insured I I familiar with the documents that he has been sending us
each month since Feb ~ 2008: we need the same document types reflecting' all

July 2008 activity:

I:

'

I:

(1) check register de . iout of QuickBooks for the

cash account
(2) a note from Mr. F "tz detailing any payroll disbursements for July that have
not yet been made that e intends to make
'
I

·Ii

DEFENDANT'S MEMO_l........ UM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
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I,

I

r
I

...

:

i

'

bank account through the end of July Ito

(3) a print-out from th True VBlue
support the previous tw I items

II

:

.

In our letter dated July' 8, 2008, we al~o requested lease payment documentation

for the JAR and Great
earliest convenience.

I

erican Leasmg
leases. Please provide this also at your
I

I
I

I

'

,

I

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have

i

any questions.
Amy Kohler, CPA

Senior Accountant
akobler@mdd.net

i,
I

,
'

I

(Affidavit of Melanie Copley. filed August 20. 2009. at Exh. C, at HOOSl-52 (July 30, 2008
I

"

I

,

email fromMs.KohlertopI·tiff.scouns~l.Mr. Bistline»). Thus, plaintiff's ass~rtion that
i

c'those accountants have never, xplamed wba~ information they were missing" rings hi:lllow, and
,

I

plaintiff has failed to explain hy live rebuttlu testimony should be permitted to address those
'

I
I

'
'

'0i secure such information and have Mr.'

issues, where plaintiff had

opportunity

address it in his initial testimo

(or, as it wou)d be here, in bis trial deposition).

Harper

I

I

~ppo~ty

Thus, plaintiff has al cady had an

to inquire

I1S

to "what

~onnation

I

[Hartford's acoountants] were

,

issing" during the deposition of Ms. Kobler. Plaintiff 'should not

i~

be entitled to vaoate a trial s· ,I ply because failed to elicit the information it
, I

needek during a
i

I

I

deposition, and now wishes to keep its expert on standby to present rebuttal testimony on such

i

J

I

unexplored subjects.

i

I
Accordingly, plaintiff Motion should be denied.

I

CONCLUSION

I

:

I
I

:!

I

I

Accordingly, for the re ons stated above, plaintiffs Motion to Continue Trial. should be
denied.
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.BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday. September 21,
2009, at 9:02 a.m., at 19125 North Cr~ekParkway,
Suite 208, the deposition of AMY KdFILER was taken
before Eva P. Jankovits, a Certified. Cpurt Reporter
and Notary Public. The proceedings took place:
I

I

AMY KOlll..ER.
being first duly;swom to tell the
truth, the whole truth
nothing
but the truth, tes~fied
follows:
'
as

and

12;
EXAMINATION
13'
BY MR. BISTLINE:
!I
I
14; Q. Okay. Please state your name for the record.

l5:. A. Amy Kohler.

:

16: Q. And where are you presently employed?
17:' A. LeMaster Daniels.
:

16' Q. And is that here in Bothell, Washing'ton?
19' A. 1t's in Bellewe.
.
Q. Bellevue. And where were you c::mJloyed before that?
21 A. Here at Matson, Driscol & Damico. :
22· Q. And where did you attend your Ulldergraduate work?
23: A. I di.d my undergraduate work in accounting at City
24
University in Bellevue.
25 Q. And did you attend any sort of postgraduate work?

20;:

i

,

Central Court Reporting

2 (Pages 2 to 5)
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KQ~ler,

Page 8

Page 6
12
3
4
5
6
7

8
.9

10
1l.

12
1.3

14
15
1.6
17

18
1.9

20
21-

22
23
24
2.5

A. No.
Q. And are you a CPA?
A. Yes, 1 am.
Q. And when did you attain your CPA?
A. I knew you were going to ask me that. 1 believe it
was 2006. J don't remember exactly.
Q. And did you start working for this firm?
A. Matson?
Q. Yes .
A. No, I was working for a different finn at that time.
Q. Who did you start working with right after you had
your CPA?
A. Werner, O'Meara & Company.
Q. And when did you start working for Matson?
A. It was October 2007, I believe.
Q. Okay. And do you recall working for Sedgewick Claim
Management regarding a loss suffered by Lakeland l'rue
Value Hardware in Rathdrum, Idaho?
A... Yes, I do.
Q. I bet you do. And how would you describe your scope
of work on that - I guess projeot is how I'll refer
to it. What did you view your role as?
A. My role was to calcula.te their business income loss
due to being out of business because ofthe loss that
they sustajned.

,

!

moment.
2 Q. So there's other offices ofMD&O?

1

,

A. Y~,
,
Q. About how many are there?
:
lvfR. NICKELS: I'm going to object to the extent
it calls for information beyond her pers6nal knowledge
6
as she's not appearing as Q represcntativ~ for MD&!>.
7
With that qualification, you can answer:
8
3

4
5

'
.9 A. I'm not sure.
10 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) A lot?
11 A. A lot.
~
12 Q. Okay. Good enough. And would Mr.:DeLangis also have,
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

been reviewing these schedules?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the first time you had ~ contact
I

regarding this project?

'

A. I believe that it was in PebTUlllY of2008.
Q. Do you recall how you first gained lcnpwledge of this

project?

:

20 A. We would have .- Patrick and I would: have discussed jt
21
wben we received Ii call nom the adjuster.
22 Q. Was that adjuster a lady named Julia Kale?
23 A. That's right,
:

24 Q. And did you receive the initial call from Ms. Kale?
25 A. Did I personally?

1

Page 9

Page 7
1

2
3
4
5

..,6
e
Sl

10
1~

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Q. And did your scope of work change at any point during
YOUT analysis of the project?
A. No, I don't believe it did.
Q. Have you performed that kind of work before., business
income ana1ysis loss?
A. While I was at Matson or before Malson?
Q. At allY time.
A. J did while I was at Matson.
Q. Only at Matson you did?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. About how many other times did you do that'? If
it's too numerous to even count...
A. Yeah. I'm not sure if 1 could count
Q. Okay. Who was your immediate supervisor at the time
you were working on this project?
A. Patrick DeLangis.
Q. And he is a partner in the flrm?
A. He wasn't at the time.
Q. And is he still employed with MD&D?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were the other employees at MD&D who woul
have had some contact with this project?
A. Our schedules would have been reviewed by a partner.
I'm trying to remember his name. He's in the L.A.
office, I believe. His name is escaping me at the

--

~/21/2009

1
:2

Q. Yes.
A. No.

Q. Do you know who did?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. And did you and Mr. DeLangis have a conversation wit
6
Ms. Kale after you UIlderstood that she was seekins
7
your services?
I
3

4
5

8
9

i

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember approximately when that was?
10 A. Again, I'd have to say February 2008, but 1 don't
11
remember exactly.
I
12 Q. During that conversation, did - did'Ms. Kale
13
indicate .- welt, what did she tell you the first time
14
you spoke with her about the claim? :
15 A. Ob, probably lots of things. Can you be more
16
specific?
'
17 Q. Well, did she -- I guess did she indi~te at all that
18
she had any specific concerns about pus claim?
1.9 A. I don't remember at that time Julia giving us any
20
indication of specifio ooncerns.
:
21 Q. And when I say specific concerns, in any insurance
22
loss, there's always the concern that ~23 A. Sure, yeah. I'm assuming that you'te asking for
2-4
anything above and beyond what would be a typical 25 Q. Yes. I'm looking for - you know, i know you probably

3

I

(P9-ges 6
I
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Page 10
::L

2
3
4

disoussed financial~ of what you would need to get the
_~

A. That's right

Q. _ project done.

4

5

A. Yes.
E Q. But you didn't say anything about, for example, they
7

a
9
~O

11
3..2
:1-3

lA

15
~6

:1.'7
::L6
~9

20
21

22
23

24
2S

1

2
3
5

Q. And 1noticed on the document, if you look at the fax
ID, it indicates that it's Page 3 of 13 pe,ges?
A. Okay.
!
Q. And do you 1000.11 if this document was sent with othel'
information, as it indicates?
:

6 A. 1 believe it was, yes.
'
had just upped their claim limits before the loss?
7 Q. And what other information was included?
AnYthing to that effect?
B A. I think there were some QuickBooksifinancial
A. Not that Tcan remember.
9
statements. My memory is that there were profit and
Q. Olcay. During that :first conversation, did you
lO
loss statcmen'Q, a!I it s1l1tc3. I'm not etk-e what e1ge
indicate to Ms. Kale what you would need to perform l.l.
wag there.
!
thiz lost business income caloulation?
12 Q. And do you have any understanding;as to why what wa
A. We discussed with her what we would ask for from th~13
attached to that Exhibit 1 was not included in the
insured to do our calculations.
14
MD&D file?
I
Q. And what would that have been?
15 A. Why·.
~
A. We would have asked for profit and loss information 116
MR.. NICKELS; Objection; OCtile for speculation.
sales lnfonnation going back two yean prior to the
:1. 7 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) You can answer ~ow.
loss on (L monthly basis. We would have - because of 1B A. Can you repeat the question?
I
the continuing paYTOn piece of the policy. we would
19 Q. Let me rephrase. I'm going to repr~ent to you that
have asked for documentation of the payroll incurred. :2 0
with this document, I did not receive anything other
We probably would have asked for balance sheets.
21
than it. There was no attachments ol'lanythlng else
2z
that he's referencing in the text.
;
Those would be the basic things. There might have
been additional things we would ask for C3 well.
~3 A. Okay.
Q. Okay.
24 Q. And do you have allY reason to know why it wouldn't b .
A. And things that we would ask for after we received
25
in the MD&D file?
'
Page 13

P"-go 1:1.

1
those items if that wasn't enough infonnation.
2 Q. Do you recall the frrst time that thal infonnation Wl2Z
4

received in your office - excuse me. Let me
rephrase •• that type of information, profit and loss

5

~~~~

3

6 A. I believe that we received some of that information
7

a
.9

:1.0
11
:1.2
13
14
::I. 5
16

17
1e

19
20
2:1.
2~

23
24

25

Page 12

I

1

A. The only··

2
3
4
5

MR. NICKBLS: Same obje()tio~.
A. - reason that I can think of is that it was
duplicates of something we had later.
,
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) When you receh'~d those P&Ls from
that •• that apparently were attached, did you begin
generating the schedules at that POUlt, or Tguess
your flOIlly:;is nt that point?
I
A. Our analysis would generally be done with monthly
P&Ls. I can't remember exactly w~at came with this
attachment If they weren't monthly P&Ls, then we

6

I

not long after our conversation with Julia. I believe
7
that Julia forwarded us sOtTIe information that she: had. e
We received pieces of what we needed over this CQU1'se 9
of February and March, 1 believe. and into April and 10
May.
11
MR. BISTLINE: Okay. Can I have an exhibit
12
would have gone back and requested again monthly
sticker?
13
'
Proflt and loss statements.
(pLAINTIFP'S EXt-UBIT NO. 1 WAS
14 Q. Oby.
,i
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATTON.)
15 A. So 1 don't know for sure if we we¢ able to begin at
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hand you what's been 16
this point.
:
j
marked now as Exhibit 1 to this deposition. It's got
17
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO.2 WAS
a Bates stamp on it also of MOD 279. And I'll
18
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
represent to you that this was taken from a collection 19 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And I'm going to hand you whtlt's
of attachme111S trom opposing counsel they &ent me:; 'Wh ,til 0
marked Q:l Exhibit 2. It's MDD BQ.tO$ Stamp 274. And
they said was the MD&D file, and that's where I got
21
it appears to be a letter from you tolMr. Fritz dated
this. And T'II ask you to have a Jook at that.
22
the 21st of February, 2008. Do yo* recall that
A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay.
23
letter?
:
I
Q. And does that document Jook familiar to you?
24 A.Ido.
A. Yes, it does.
25 Q. Okay. And, in essence, thtl.t letter; is requesting the

4 (pagJs
10 to 13)
I
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Page 14
same information that you just told me you would need
in order to evaluate the claim?

1.
::2

3
4
5
6

7

a
9
10
J.1
1.2
1.3
~4

J.5
:1-6

17
1.8

1..9

20
21
22
23
2425

A. (Wi1ness nods head affIrmatively.)
Q. Is that correct?
MR. NICKELS: Objection to the extent that
mischa:racterizcs her prior testimony, but you can
answer.
A. Yes. this would have been some of the information th
we needed. This would be the information that we
would need to calculate the business income piece, not
the continuing payroll piece.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And did you view those things as
90rt of separate issues?
A. To the extent that we generally will •• we generally
calculated those using different documents, yes.
Q. And iJ1 that letter, jt says you may have additional
document requests but that the lntbrmation in there
should allow you to analyze the bwiness interruption
claim.
Was there anything besides the business
interruption claim that you were supposed to evaluate?
A. No.
Q. Then what would have been the purpose of the
AC1clltionaJ. infonnl1tion that you may need to - besides
what was in that request?

1

2
3
4
5

6

7
t B

9
10
11
1:2

13
14

lS
16
:1.7

19
19

20
in

n
23
24

25

Q. What would be the point in requesting a balance shee
along with the profit and loss statem~ts7
A. We would have requested the balanpc sheets just to
glance over to sec if there WBS anything that we
needed to consider. We wouldn't necessarily use that
in our calculation on a routine basis, -but it was just
another piece of their fmancial infonpation to ensure
i
we had considered everythjng.
Q. Did anything on the balance sheet ihdiciUe to you that
there was somcthins that should be included in the
business interruption claim from the!balance sheets?
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
A. Not that I can remember.
I
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And Ms. Kale's bates also indicate
that on March 10th, she had a conversation with witl'l your - with you llbol.)t the proircss of these
schedules. And you indicated you h;ad some preliminllJ V
schedules worked up but that your .~ a senior needed
to review them; does that sound acc~ate?
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
A. J can't remember, but. ..
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) It makcs sen!ic? :
A. It makes sense.
Q. Oleay.
!
A. Ye~.
i
I

i

Page lS
~

2
:3
4

5
6
7
8
!7
~o

11
12
~3

14

A. There would have been payroll information that we
1
would require on an ongoing basis. And. upon receivin ~ 2
3
these: documen~ from the insured, if our analysis
indicated that we needed additional information. then
4
5
we were leaving it open for that
6
Q. And l'n represent to you that there's a claim note in
7
Ms. Kale's notes, claim notes, I guess, that indicates
e
that she spoke with you on 2129 of '08, and mat you
said you had not received anything fyom the insurec at 9
that point. Does that sound accurate?
10
11
MR. NTCKELS: Objection; foundation.
12
A. 1 would have to assume that it was.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) But at some point did you receive 13
14
the information required to evaluate the business

:1.5
interruption claim?
:1.6 A. That is correet

17 Q. And do you recall receivina in early March, around

18
19
20
2J.

22
23
24

25

March 5th, a large collection of profit and losses and
balance sheets from the Fritz's - or Lakeland's
accountant in Montana?
A. Ida.
Q. And 1 think what we'll do is wait tilt the end and
then I'll have you look through what 1 have at that
point.
A. That sounds good.

Page 16

I

Page 17 '

I
I

Q. And then there's a claim note on March 14th of '08,
wbere Ms. Kale hn3 indicated she's speaking with a
pa.trick, and that they had come up w,ith some schedules
for advancement purposes. What does "for advancemen .

purposes" mean?
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; foun~alion.
A. That was the term Julia used to refe;'r to making a
:
payment to the insured.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay.
:
A. In that same claim note, it says that!Mr. DeLangis
advised that they were missing documentation which
would be the expense for the rental Space and whether
the insured has paid his entire payroll. That was on
M~b 14th.

I

Does that sound - was there othe:r information

15

lei
that you were missing at that point, ~ your
17
I
recollection?
16
lVfR. NICKELS; Same objection:
19 A. I don't remember whether there was additional
!_1".

20

•

'
,

iI

.......

uu.ormo.tlon Ilt Ula.t pOInt.

(pLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO~ 3 WAS
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
23 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hanCl you what's marked
24
as Exhibit 3. I'll have you take a quick look at
21

I

22

2!

~~

:

5 (pag~s 14 to 17)
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2

3
4:

5
f)

.,
8
9
3. 0

11
3.2
3. J

~4

l. 5
~6

]. 7
l. e
::L. 9

20
2.1
22
23
24

.25

9/2~/2009

:
1 A. - description.
Q.
Was
there
anything
about
the
inforn'lation
in your
Q. And what do those appear to be?
2
possession that led you to believe that anything thAt
A. These appear to be schedules that MD&D would havf 3
was going on at the present was really going to
prepared.
4
drastically affect your calculations? :
Q. And those scbecluJes in4icate they were up through
5
MR. NICKELS: Objection; forml
June 30th of2008, correct?
6
A. That's what it says, yes.
? Q. (By Mr. Bistline) For example, I would say if they - "
if you found out that three-quarters ~f the inventory
Q. In early March .- would the schedule have looked
8
was actually oKay. but _. and they !'lad rented a whole
different in early March?
9
'nother building and opened tIIlothe.r ~ort of serial
A. Well-·
lO
hardware store not as good as the one they had, to me
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation. Answer to ~1
that
would be something that would drastically affect
the extent you CIll1.
12
their
lost business income because tOey were making a
A. Ves. We pTobably wouldn't have included informatio~13
lot
more
money then rather than just: sitting on their
beyond early March, if that was the point at which we 14
hands
waiting
for the building to rebuild. Do you
were preparing schedules.
15
understand my question?
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So when you prepared the schedule J.S
in early March, iTom what 1 understand, that would
J. , A. I believe I do.
have been based on the profit and losses that you were. 1 B Q. Okay.
MR. NICKELS: Objection to the extent it wasn't
provided for - on March 5th. and from that. you woul~ 19
a question.
:
estimate the lost business income from the claim note. 20
It sounds like four months out is what you figured on ~1 A. When you say "present, at what pciint in time are you
referring to?
1
the lost business income.
z~
Would anything you received after March 5th to
2~ Q. (By Mr. Bistline) As the claim progressed, let's say
JUDe 30th changed the basic projection of lost
24
mid-April, did you have any information that would
business income?
25
lead you to believe that your schedules were going to
1\. (W'itl'less peruses doeument.) Okay.

II

Pa.sc J.9

1
2

MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
1
A. WJthout seeins those March schedules, it's going to be 2

:;
4

hard for me to answer your questions oomparing the
March schedules to the June schedules. But in

5

general, as I'm looking at this, what we would

6

calculate - pieces of what we calculated here
6
probablY would have been the same in March, and othe" 7

7
8
9
l. 0
~J.

12
1.3
14
:1.5
~S

pieces were ongoing items.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) While we're on that subject, I only
had that set of schedules.
A. Okay.
Q. And it sounds like there are a lot of other sets of
schedules.
A. I don't know about that.
Q. Okay.
A. I WOUldn't say a lot.

17 Q. We'll get to that.

3
4
5

20
23

with a projection of lost bUSiness income; bu:se:d on
historical data, and then as the clailn progresses,
utilize current infonnation to slightly adjust the

business income claim.
A. I would agree with that ••
25 Q. Okay.

24

base, but there were indications that there were
things going on that we needed to be1continually
checking on. So we WOUldn't know Wlthout checking an
getting information on a current basl$ continually

e

whother there would be anything sub'atantial that would
change how we would come up with'our calculations.
10 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. In that c~ note I just
9

11:

referenced, it's a conversation between Ms. Kale and
Patrick, he has the question of whether the insured is
paying his entire payroll. That question to me:
indicatos that your fum didn't kDow ~ well, let me

l.$

rephrase that.

16

What did you think they were dOfug with the
payroll? Did you have any understanding as to whether
payroll was only actual payroll incwred or whether
the payroll was supposed to be paid tn its entirety -

11
12

13

11

18 A. Yeah.
16
19 Q. SO if 1 understand what you're saying is, you come up 19
2:L.
2:2

be pretty tar off base?
I
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
A. We wouldn't have known whether they would be far ofi

:

MR.. NICKELS: Objection; fol.1n(llltion.
21 Q. (By Mr. Bistline continuing) - whether or not the
!
people had earned it, I guess?
22
23 A. My understanding was that we were calculating
schedules showing actual pa)'roU in~ulTed.
24
25 Q. And WIllS there any diSCUSSlon with Ms. Kale about
20

""""_
, . . . _._u'....

_IIf~ft· ..

6

Central Court Reporting

(Pag~s

18 to 21)

i

800-442-DEPO,
4782eeae-5bd1-406a·b31e-379D01UnJaC;)

i

---

??~)I

,
I

L~eland

True value v.

H~rtford

yire

Amy

r.ncurano~

I

Page Z2
l.
:2

3

4
5

1

earn that payroll?
MR. NICKELS: Objection; calls for speculation,

3

rom.

2

4

A. I don't specifically remember a conversation like
that, but it would h2l.ve - it would make sense that
those would be details that we would have ironed out

6
7

1

whether or not the employees of Lakeland actually had
to work to

a
with Julia in the course of a conversation with her.
9 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) When you first received the
~0
March - early March information I'll call it, on the
1:1..
balance sbeet, there were items for liabilities for

5
Ii

7

8
9

10
~l

~2
:1.3

True Value Hardware EUld for Wells Fargo.
Did you at all wonder what those wore associated

].4

with?

13
14

~5

MR. NICKELS; Objection; foundation.
In general, it's not something that we would·· that
we would consider in our calculation. So I think

15
16
17

1. 6 A.

~7
3. 8
beyond jU3t bC3ic tUlderstanding of it, we wouldn't
:1. 9
have dug any further with it
20 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Did you have any

J..2

~S

19
20

~1

understanding as to how Lakeland True Value Hardwal 1:21
22
purchased their inventory, whether it be with cash or :2 2
23
credit?
23
24: A. 1 would think there was a basic utldel·standing.
24
2 S Q. And what was that understanding?

KO~ler, 9/2l/200~

to True Value, doesn't that leave 30,000 in cash?

MR. NlCKELS: Same objectio~. 1 think we're

compound now.

25

:

Page 23
1.

2
3
4

1

A. I would say mostly what we were understanding was th t 1
they were purchasing their inventory from True Value,
2
and tha.t thoy had an ongoing relationship with them.
Q. And did you undeT$tand there was a debt service

4

5

Sl
10

17

tbi3 i:s,suc ofwhctber OT not t!1is liability to True
Value was in fact Q continuing operating expense. And
- and J will try to do this slowly so it doesn't
completely confuse everybody, but here's how I'd look
at that, is if, on a balance sheet·· OT on a profit
and loss, 1 have revenue, and the neXI item is cost of
gOQd:s sold, and then you have some expenee and you
have net income.
And say revenue is $60,000, which means

18

there's - assuming $60,000 in cash was paid by

19

customers, but then you have cost of goods sold at
$35,000. Now, that $35,000 figure, IfI undCI1ltand
it, llil not l10tually cash out the door; is that

9
1. 0
1~
~2

13

14
1.5
1.(;

20
21.

22
23
24
25

correct?

6
7

e
11
12

13

A. It's not •• I mean, you can't really say that that's
CJtactly how that numb or would wo;k out. 1 think I'm
utlderstanding yow- theory behind what you're saying,

but you wouldn't necessarily be able to say that that
total number that's on the cost of gobds sold line is
cash available.
I
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Agreed. But YO),n- net income :tigur
teAlly doesn't bear a rclation to - I mean. it bears
a 1'elation to your available cash but!theytre
different things. correct?
i
A. They may well be ••
!
MR. NICKELS: Objection; fonP, calls for
speculation.
:

14 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So you hadn't -: you hadn't
l.5
considered how the Lakeland True Value Hardware w
16
going to service their •• what I refer,to as a trade
17
payable to True Value?
i

18
MR. NICKELS: Objection; argUmentative.
19 A. GeneraJly, that kind of a payment iwould come out of
20
21

22

MR. NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
A. On an accrual basis profit and loss statement, yes.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) So, yes. So if! have a cost of

Pagt?- 25

I

:3

associated with those purchases?
6 A. I t:l:J.ink only tangentially. I mean, I don't think it
7
was of ma.jor - it wasn't a part of our calculation.
e Q. And you and I at one point went baCK and forth about
5

page 24

I
goods of3S,OOO doesn't mean 1 wrote a check for
35,000 that month?
A. Potentially, no.
Q. Okay. So even though my net inco~e wouldn't, say,
show $2,500, my actual cash, in our ~cenario, would
have been $37,500, less perhaps som'e payment to Tru~
Value; does that sound accurate? 1
MR. NICKELS: Objection; foun~ation A. Yeah, I'm not following you.
I
MR. NICKELS; - calls fOT speculation.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Well, if! start with $60,000 in
cash. and you look at my profit and toss, it says, you
know, you end up with 2,500, say, at the end of the
day, net income, but on a cash basis,lthat $35,000
didn't actually go anywhere. So eveh though it shows
I only had 2,500 in income to work With, I ~tua.l1y
had tl. whole lot more oash because Qf that accounting
- the way the accounting principles in-eat cost of
goods sold on an accrual basis; does! that make sense?
MR. NlCKELS: Same objection.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) If! can sell S35,pOO worth of
inventory but only have to pay five:: grand on 4 paymen

23

the bottom line number. So what we were repTesentinB
as the lost income. that would have'been the finances, '

the cash, however you want to look at it, that a
business would pay its liabilities m.tt of. So to that
extent, that's what we were calCulating as lost.

24
2S Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Those 3~hedules that are

7 (Pages 22 to 25)
I
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:L
::l
3

4

.s
6
7

1

MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hand you Exhibit 4.
Vou can ha.ve a look at that

5

e A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay.
the MD&D file.
l.. 2 Q. What is that? Do you know what that is?
::1..3 A. I believe that it was represented to US that it
14
related to amounts due to True Value by Lakeland Trm
15
VW~.
l. 6 Q. Okay. And that - do you recall receiving that
~i
information?
3. 8 A. I don't rocull receiving it.
:1.9 Q. Okay. Do yourecaU considering. at that point.
20
amounts due to True Value'?
21
MR.. NICKELS: Objection; form.
:2 2 A. Items set up as liabilities on the balance sheet would
23
not have been items we would have considered in cur
Qa.loulation -

Q.

6

7
8

~1

24
25

loss. We W9uld need to include any dctual revenue.
Q.
(By Mr. Bistline) What's Item 2? Afctual payroll
2
paid?
i
3
:
4 A. That's right.

Exhibit 3, to your knowlede;e, were those ever providec
to a gentleman named Chris Olenister?
A. I don't know what was provided to Chris Glenister.
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4 WAS

9 Q. And do you recognize that docwnent?
l. 0 A. {recognize that this was in our file. This was in

Ok~.

9
10
11
12

13

14
15
1£5
17

18

19
20
21
22
:2 3
24

25

Q. Okay.
.
A. To the extent that you consider that

part

of the ••
yes, then we would need actual payroll expense
information.
:
The rest of this, I believe, applies 10
understanding the e1l.pcn!lcs on the pront and loss
statement. So, yes, that would be ro~tine information
we would want to have to make sure10ur calculations
were incorporating e\lerything that sl10uld be
incorporated. And current expenses,: additional
expenses to mitigate their loss, rent ~ the current
location·· I'm sorry, that's sales, ongoing sales.
That's all information we routinely urould ask for not
as adjustments based on information'that we had
. )y receIve
. d.
preVIous
:I
Q. Okay. Did you ever receive that information that you
were requesting in there in Exhibit 1?
A. I believe we did receive: all of it. :
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT Nds. 6 THROUGH S
WERE MARKED FOR IDEtffiFICATION.)
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) I'm going to hanp you what's been ,
,,

Pago 27
~

1. 4
:1.5
1. 6

A. (Witncss pCrU3es document.) Yee, T do.
Q. And that document seeks additional information. Is

3
4

5
6

7
8
.9
1. 0

1.J.
;L2
~3

1. 7
~8
19

20
21.

any of that information necessary to calcu1ate the
projected loss of business income, or is it all
related to adjustments of the projection based on
what's actually going on at the time?
MR. NICKELS: Objection; speculation.

A. It would be Toutine for us to ask for ongoing profit
23
and Joss statements even through the period of
24
restoration. So, yes, that would be information that
25
we would require to calculate our business income
" . ".
:2:2

Page 29

I

i

A. - beyond that the lost income we were calculating
1
would have serviced any debt on the balance sheet.
2
Q. And did you inform either Mike Frit2 or Kathy Fritz () 3
Julia Kale that you didn't view the True Value as
4
something that - at that point that you •• not you,
5
but would be a conditioning expense of the pOlicy?
6
MR. NICKELS: Objection; form.
7
A. I don't remember a speciflc conversation. It would
e
make: 3ense that we would have had some conversation 9
about this.
10
(pLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. S WAS
11
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
12
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And I'm handing you Exhibit 5. AI cJL3
do you recognize that document?
l ..

2

Page 2B

marked Exhibit <5. Do you recognize f:bat doc;umcnt?
A. (Witnc33 peruses document.) Yes, I ~o.
Q. And that'll a letter from that Chris Glenister where he
oOOmes the amount of their claim, and it references

some attached schedules. And T'm going to hand you
what's marked as Exhibit 7, which is five pages of
schedules, ask you to look at tnose. :

I

A. (Witne99 peruses document.) Okay. :
Q. Do those appear to be what was attached to that letter

if you can recall?

I

have not seen befaTe.

'

A. I don't ~- this additional information ~n this page I
Q. Okay. Tbe fifth page with the table th~t's •• or the
fotlrth page with the table, and then itlalso has a.

handwritten table next to it?

15

I

1 G A. That's right. 1 have never seen that \),efore.

'
17 Q. Ok~.
18 A. Sut the rest of it is familiar. It does ~ppear to be
what we received from Chris Olcmster.
lSI
20 Q. And l'm going to bAud you PJaintifP¥ !i)thibit g and
have you look at that.
I
22 A. (Witness peruses document) Yes. ;

21

I

23 Q. And what is that?
24 A. This appears to be what was In the MD&D 1'lle with some
2S

additional notes.

I
I

8
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i

;;1

3

Q. And Ms. Kale's claim notes indicate that she had sent

4
5

1.5
1. 6
1. 7

you this from Mr. Glenister and asked that you all
evaluate it. And I'm guessing that that - your
handwriting on EAAibit 8 is your evoJuation of his
report - Of not even evaluation, but some
ealc.ulations related to that ••
A. Yes.
Q. •• analysis?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you in m<;t analyzo what he had presented?
A. We ran some calcubitions on what we received from
Chris Glenister.
Q. And what was your opinion ofms report, I guess?
A. That we were coming to similar places, just from
different directions.

J. 9

A. Somewhat. Mostly the same idea., just a few different 19

6
7

e
9
~0
~1.
~:z

J..3
14

J. e Q. Different methodology maybe?

2
3
4

5

6
?
8
9

11
:1.2

13
14
~s

16

:1. 7
1.B

numbers that he would include that we didn't include 20
and vice versa, but our numbers were coming out very 2~
22
close.
22
23 Q. Okay. And part of that in his letter, though,
23
21

rc:ferCrtocs amcthod by which to provide a partial
payment on the business personal property aqpect of

MR. NICKELS: Objection; speCUlation.
A. That wasn't our place Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay.

A. •• so no.
:
Q. If Ms. Kale would have asked you, ~'Should I withhol

this distribution pending receipt oftq'is
infonnation," wlmt would ho.ve been;your response?

~0

20

24
:2 5

know, I don't know it's bad to make a! distribution
pending receipt of this because we c~ adjust It
later?
i

~

Q. And are those notes your handwriting?
A. Yes.

1.

MR. NJCKELS: Objection; specUlation.

A. I •• it wasn't our place to make that call, so 1
probably would have put it back on J.?er.
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And there's numerous references
throughout this case of you tJylng toicomplete your
schedules, and what does that mctU'l? If I say that to
you, "f have to c:omplete my sehedW;e for July. II what
would that mean to you?
,
A. In my memory, the maID piece that we were continually
trying to obtain was related to the payroll
disbursements.
'
Q. 50 from what I unclcTstand before, 'Plough.. you could
have completed your schedule other'than payton, and •
payroll could have been treated sep~telY as far as,
you know, Here's your business income claim and here

24

25

,

Pagc 31

the claim dealing with lost inventory.
Did you do anything with that, evaluate thal at
:3
all. di:st;U:5:5 that with Ms. Kille at all?
4 A. We did not. It was ol.tUide the scope of our work to
5
do anything with the inventory or business personal
6
property piece.
7 Q. Okay. Did you tell Ms. Kale that his calculations
B
regarding lost business tncome were kind of what you

I

1.

1

2

2
3

.9
1. 0

just told me, very 3imilar ••
A. Reasonable, yes.

11 Q. Okay. Regarding this - 1 guess this additional
information that you were requesting during the period
13
of loss, at any point did you tell Ms. Kale or advise
14
berthat she shOUld not make an advance under the
:1.5
policy until tha.t infonnlltion was reoeived?
1. 6
MR. NICKELS; Objection; form, foundation.

12

4
5
6
7

page 32

I

Page 33

the payroU pan of it, two separate ite~s?
MR. NICKELS: Objeotion; fOllTl, foundation, and
speculation.
'
A. I suppose it could have been done that way. That

wasn't the way we were asked to do it.

Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. And who asked - when you
say "it wasn't the way we were asked'to do it," who
e
told you how to do it?
I
9 A. In our conveTsations with Julia., we would have ta1ked
10
over how she would want to see schedules, what
information she needed to have.
'
11

l2 Q. There's a claim note from Ms. Kale 'that •• it's an
13
14

1.$

16

e--mail she wrote me. And she says that you all had
not rcocivod any ~djtionBl doc:ume~tation for June OT
July and has been requested muhiple times.

Do you recall requesting addition~

1 7 A. No, we would not have said that.
17
documentation for June or July multiple times?
1. 8 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Okay. Were you aware that she wa 1 a A. I remember multiple e-mails going pack and forth wher
19
requiring that you be provided that information before 1.9
we would attach our previous document requests. I
20
she WOUlCl make an a.dvance to the insured?
20
believe thero wore dooument requests iG$lued in June
2:1. A. I think I We3 aware that she was communicating that t ~21
Ql1d I believe again in July requesting the lnformation
:2 ::;t
the insured, yes.
:2 :2
that we were still missing.
'
23

24
25

Q. And did you have an opinion about that position whet 23 Q. And were those·· JUSt to the best of your
recollection, were those attachments: ofprlor
she - when you knew of it? I mean, I guess by
24
oouespondenc;c, were those c·mailed to me?
opinion, did you say·· did you think f don't - you
25

9 (pag~s 30 to 33)
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Page 34
i

:1..

:2

3
4

5
6
7

e
9

l- 0
:1.1
.1.2
J.. 3
l.4
1. 5

:1.6
:1. ?
1. B
l. ~
:2 0

21

22
2:3
24

25

A. Not concern so much, just that would b~ one of those
instances where we would adjust what w~ were asking
for.
Going forward, we would want to h~vc cl()(lJ'
3

A. 1 believe so.
1
Q. SO do you have any independent recollection of sendi g2

these requests to a gentleman named Tim Van Valin
besides the letter we've already admitted?
A. Yeah. In my memory, that's the only letter that I
sent to roo Van Valin. 1 do not rcmQmber whether he
might htlyo been oo'd on some of those e-mails.
Q. The e-tnails, who were those sent to?
A. I believe you and 1 were communicating via e-mail·Q. Okay.
A. - related to documents that we were needing.
Q. on July 30th, you sent me an e-mail whioh says that
"Thank you for the documents I sent." and you indicate
tha.t I sent you bank statements, a summary detail
report, and a demand letter from True VBlue. And I
believe this is the first time that you had started
requesting bank statements.
Was there anything that prompted MD&D to start
requesting aotual - andJor you requesting actual bank
statements?
. MR. NICKELS; Objection; foundation.
A. I don't remember iflhat is the fll'st time that we
requested bank statements. 1know that for a period
of time that we:: were rccoiving routinely, from the
insured, their check registers out of their

dOCumentation of what did happen in. tb~ event that it
was going to be different from what had previously

4

5
6

occurred.

I

7

Q. And did you do a final calculation ofth~ business

e

income loss in this case?
;
A. As in tenns ofwbat would na.ve been c~led our final

;1
),,0

,
1 J, Q. Yeah.
1.2 A . •• MD&D's final ca1culations?
13 Q. Yeah. Let me rephrase it first. At som~ point, did
somebody from Hartford Sedgewick say, We're viewing
14
this claim as ending on this date; calculate the loss
lS

!

up to that date?
l6
17 A. Not while I waG working on it.

i
I

MIt. BISn.1NE: All right. Could vi,e go off the
record for a second. Bryan?
MR. NICKELS; Sure.

u
19
20

(RECESS TAKEN FROM 9:51 A.M. TO 9;58 A.lW.)
(pLA.lN1'IFF'S Ex.HII3IT NOS 9 TIiROUOH 11
WERE MA.:R:KBD FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

21
22
23
::! 4

IJ/J

25

/111

I

I

Page 35

QuickBooks. and we were relying on that. And then
there came a point in time -.
3
(Cell phone interruption.)
4:
MR. BISTL1NE: Oh,I'm sorry.
5 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) Anyway. go ahead. I'm sorry. YOt
6
said you were relying on the QuickBooks cash or the
7
Qu,ickBoo.ks check register.
8 A. Right. And then we received confllctlng lllformation
5)
from the insured initially thil.t a ocrtain pn)'
1
2

l. 0
l. ~
~2
~:3

14
15
~G

1. i
~

e

J. 9
:2 0
21

period - paychecks for a certain pay period were

I

1
2
~

EXAMlNATION (Continuing)
BY MR. BISTLINE:
:
Q. I'm going to hand you Plaintiff's E~bit 9. If you

4
5
6
?

canjust kind of quickly look -- that's a letter. If

you could _. requesting infonnation'·- kind oflook

down through the iru:ormation requested.
A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay.
8 Q. And did you have eny input on th~ oompilation oftha:
.9
list; do you recall?
I
10 A. This, no. I did 110t.

disbursed at a particular time. and then found out
11
later that that was not the case. And that was when
12
we decided that receiving - it was also the point at
13
which the insured was indicating that they were baying 14
cash flow issues with paying piI.)'l'olL And so we
~5
dcoided we needed to also obtain bank statements
16
documenting actual disbursements when they bappenej .1 ?
Q. And do you recall receiving a correspondence from
1a
Lakeland True Value, either through me or whoever
19
their agent, that infonnet! you tllat the checkS were
20
being written and being held beofluse they didn't have :n

the oash to pay them?
22
23 A. Yes, I did.
23
24
MR, NICKELS: Objection; foundation.
24
25 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And did that cause you any concen ?2 5
22

l?a.ge 37

I

Q. And I'm going to hand you Plaintiffs Exhibit II, have
you take a quick look at that.
!
A. (Witness peruses document.) Okay.
Q. Do you know what th&lt is?
:
A. I believe that these are departme:n~ sales reports.
And MD&D received copies of these from Mike Fritz.
believe it came out of his point of sale system.
Q. And did you use those for anything; do you recall?
A. J believe it was one ofthe types of docume::ntation of
hi$ l5al~S that we revtewed and analyze<i in our
calculations to determine which w~s going to be the
best piece of infonnation for the calculation.
Q. Okay. And,lastly, you already h~ve in front of you
Exhibit J0, which is an affidavit fr6m a gentleman
narnet! Dan Harpc::r?
I

10
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:l.

2

A. Yc::s.
Q. Have you ever seen that before?

:3

Yes. I have.

4

A.
Q.
S A.
6 Q.

Have you reviewed it before today?

Yes, I did.

1. 0
11.
1.2

Okay. And he has IDS opinions in thcre. Do you have
any disagreements with - I don't know if
disagreements' the right word. but I guess do have any
professional differences in how he performed that
evaluation in that affidavit?
Iv1R. NICKELS: Objection. Ms. Kohler has not
been designated as an expert by us, (lnd so ahe'll not

J.:3
~ 4.

at present - we haven't requested her to offer any
opinions with respect to Mr. Harper's affidavit.

7

e
9

9/21/2009

. Value.
2 Q. Was there anything that you can 1:hU1k of that you
recall seeing that is not in those PDPs'f
3
4 A. The only thing that I didn't see in th~ POFs were our
schedules that I can recall.
:
5
, Q. And these schedules would have be~n •• there would
have been a monthly schedule that was created,
7
1

correct?
i
8
,
9 A. Not necessarily.
1 0 Q. Not necessarily, okay. And now just some general
stuff. At any point in your convers:ations with Ms.
~1
J.2
Kale, did you ever develop the opinion from speaking
13
with her that she, Tguess, thought the Lakeland True
14
Value people were being less than fdrthright in their
presentation of information to evalutle this claim?
15
16
MR. NlCKELS; Obje::ction; speculation to the
1. 7
extent it calls for Ms. Kale's beliefs. :
le A. I can't say that I ··1 can't say what ~he was

1. 5 A. This is one way of doing it. That's what I would say,
is mat I don't disagree with his method of coming up
'16
1. 7
wIth his calculation.
1. e Q. (By Mr. Bistline::) And part of his oaloulatlon was to
J. 9
service the trade payables; is that correct?
19
~.
I
2. 0 A. He includes •• it does appear he inc1 udes that in his
20 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) But you never got that impression?
~ 1.
calculation.
21
1 mean. if 1 walked up and said, "These idiots have
22 Q. And that would be one place where you might agree Wi ~ 2
just submitted au this junk, and I tbiDk it's really
23
••
23
fl bunoh of nonsense, can you look it through?" that's
:2 4 A. Yes. Tnat was not how WI; would do it. That wu not
;24
what I mean by did she ever·· did ypU ever sense
a5
how we did it 1n this case for Lakeland True Value.
2S
that, that she thought something wrui not right about

Page 41
1.

Q. Okay. And I think: what I'm going to have you do now

2

is •• and we'll go off the recorcl wl'lile we do It. J
have four PDPs, and I'm just going to reduce them doWll
80 thllt - you know, pretty mucb a page each on the
~c:reen and just have you flip down through them.
These four PDFs are MD&D's file as provided to
me from opposing counsel. And what I'm after is just
tor you to look through it and basieally JUSt give me
your opinion, if you think tbcro's some things that

3
4

5

6
7
8
9
~o
~~

1.2
13
14
15
1.6
~..,

18
19
20
21..

22
.23

24

25

are not in there that .hould be in there or some items
of infonnation that may be missing from it. And you

may not have any knowledge at all of it. Just I

1
2
3
4

tblS?

MR. NICKELS: Same objection.
A. No, I wouldn't say that there was a sense from her

that sbe thought the infonnation we wer~ getting from
5
the insured was incorrect.
i
6 Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And at no point did !l.nybocly ask: you
7
to do any sort offorenslc analysis to dct~rmine if
e
tho information beins provided wQS in fact accurate?
g
:MR. NICKELS: Objection: fonn. .
10
11
12
13
14

A. No.
:
Q. (By Mr. .Bistline) When did you leave:the employ of

MD&D?

I

I

A. I believe mat it was Ol;tobcr of200&. '
Q. And did you have II.lly discussion~ about who would be
l.S
tak:itlg over your functions on this case bnce
you left?
A. I think so.
I
MR. BISTLINE: Okay. We. can So off the record
16 A. The only conversation I had was that Patrick would be
17
1alcing over the work from me.
i
for a second.
18 Q. And since you left MD&D, did anybody itom MD&D conta
(pause in the proceedings.)
you regarding qUC5tion:s or conccms they ha4 about rbe
Q. (By Mr. Bistline) And you just reviewed fout PDPs 00
prior sohedules: or oth~ information )IOU had
my computer, and they were Bates sl.amped MDD 1 throu,!: 20
Page 552. And did you reoognize thOBe: document!i you
21
developed?
I
reviewed?
22 A. No.
i
23
MR. BlSTLINE: Well, unless Bryan can think ot
A Yes .
24
something I left out, I don't think I hil.v~ any other
Q. And what were those?
questions.
I
A. Those were from our file, MD&D's file on Lakeland True 25

wanted to have you flip through it if that - you
understand what I'm a.fier?

II
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page 42
:l.

:2

3
4

5
6

-;
S
9
1. 0

:1.1
::L 2

quick to Exhibit No. 5.

:1.5 A. S?
1.6

I

l
MR. NICI<BLS; 1just have a couple Quick
2
fonow-up questions.
3
EXAMINAnON
q
BY MR. NICKELS:
S
Q. In de\'eloping your schedules, did you have any role i
6
the determination of what the period of restoration
7
would be?
6
A. No. That would have come from the adjuster, from
9
Julia Kale.
Q. And any calculations or projections you would have 10
11
made would have been dependent on that period of
12
restoration?

l. :3 A. That is correct.
~4 Q. I want to refer you real

Q. Yes.

1. 7 A. You're looking at 6.
l. e Q. Why don't 1 put 6 over here.
::L 9 A. Okay.
20 Q. I'm looking at No.5.
21 A. Okay. I'm with you now.

Q. - you haven't yet developed an opiniop as to whether

or not his calculations for lost prOfits and
continUing expenses are correct, h~""c y~u?
A No, I h~ve not.
I
Q. And you're not aware a.t present wbat documents

Mr. Harper would have used in determining those
numbers?
A. That is correct.
i
Q. Okay. And With respect to continuing' payroll, you
don't have 1Ul opinion, a.5 you sit here ~day,
whether or not those numbers are correct?

A. No. I do not.

20

21

24

had rec:eived all of the information requested on this,

25

22
:23

2

but in your later testimony, you identified additional 1
information that did you not receive during the course 2

3

~~~~

-4

So it's my understanding then that with respect

to Exhibit S, you didn't actually receive all of the
items requested in here; is that correct?
7 A. Okay. To clarify, we didn't receive all of these
e items over the entire span of the .9 Q. Okay.
S

6

A. Yes.
:11 Q. All riebt. And the items that you didn't receive,
12
those would be identified in your testimony, in your
23
correspondence to the various representatives for
~4
Lakeland?
:1.0

MR. NICKELS: Okay.

:

(OFF-THE·RECORD DISCUSSION
HELD.)
I
THE COURT REPORTE.R: Did you want to put on the
record when you're going to be sending these?

MR. N1CKELS: Are we still on the record at all?

i

!

MR. NICKELS: Okay.

MR. BISTLINE: And I'll cc you the e-mail.
MR. NICKELS; Okay.
:
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NQ. 12 WAS

9

45

MR. BISTLINE: Yeab. I think we just maybe just
will .say that I'm goiDg to e-mail her'tbose four PDPs.

3

MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
(DEPOSTTION CONCLUDED AT 10:23 A.M.,
(SIGNATURE RESERVED.~
I

10

I
,

11
12

13
14

16

17
Harper's affidavit?
19 A. Yes.

17
16

19 Q. And as you're sitti~g here today, Hartford has not
2 a
asked you to render an opinion on Mr. Harpc:r's

19

affidavit and schedule; is that c01'reet?
2 2 A. That's correct.

21

21

Page

4
S
6
7
e

A. That is correct, yes.
],6 Q. Okay. All right. With Tespect to Exhibit 10, Mr.

:1.5

to

:

Page 43

1

IU1

13 Q. Okay. And 1 guess generally with respect to Schedule
14
1 then, at least as you sit bere today, you haven't
lS
yet developed an opinion as to whether or not these
1G
figures arc corrc~?
:
l' A. That is correct.
.
19
MR. NICKELS: Okay. (think that's all I have.
19
MR. BISTUNE: I don't have any ~Uow.up.

22 Q. When you were testifying .- just for purposes of
23
clarification of your testimony, when you initially
24
testified a.bout this dooument, you indicated tbat you
25

9/21/2009

15

20

22

23 Q. Okay. So at this point, looking at Schedule 1 of his 23
24
affidavit, which is attached towards the back 24
25 A. Yes.
25
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CHANOt;:S IN fORM ANtl S'UBS1'ANCE REQUESTED BE MADE
fNTIiE fOREGOJNC OIW.. EXAMINATION TRANSCRIPT:
(NOTE: If no chanecs desired, plense sign and date where
indicated below.)

4

s

Hartfo~d

PAGe

CORRECTlON AND REASON

LINE

~

7

o
9
].0

1.1.

1.2
1.3

1.4
1.S
J.G
].7

1. AAfYKOHLlSR., hereby d~oIlS1'C u.odQr ponalty of p¢JjIlf}'
1.9 that 1 have read tho foregoing deposilion and that !he
testilnollY contain cd tl1erein is a true and correct
J.9 b'3tI8cript of my ~imO(\Y, noting the corrections above.
20
AMY K01"II.ER

Date
22

23 See: Wash. Reports 34A, Rule 30(e)
USCA 28, Rule 30(e)
24

PLEASE ReTURN TO; Central Coun Reponing,
)400 112th Ave SE, SUitc 100, BeUewc, WA 98004 EPJ

25

CERTIF leA TE

1

2

::. STATE OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
COUNTY OF KING )
This is to certifY tllatI, Eva P. Jankovits,
6
Certified Court Reporter and Notary PubJic in and for the
7 State of Washington, reponed the within and fOTQlgOing
a deposition; said deposition being taken before me as a
9 Notary Public on the date herein Set forth; that the
4
5

1.0 witness was first by me duly swom; that said examination

11 waS taken by me in shorthand and thereafter under my
12 supervision transcribed. and that same is a full. true
13 and correct record of the testimoJlY of said Witnc33.
1.4 inoluding all questions, answers and objections. if any.
15 of counsel.
16
I further certify that Tam not a relative or
17 employee or attorney or counsel of £IIl)' oftbe parties,
1 a nor am I financially interested in the outcome of the
19
:2 0

cause.

2:1

sce.lthis

,
I

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have set my hand and affiXed m
day of

,2010.

I

!

22

I

23

EVA P. JANKOVITS, CCR
ceRNO.19)5

25

!

,:

Notary Public in and for the State
of Washington

i
I

I

,
!
I

I
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MikeFli12
lakdami'l'ruc Value ft.c:uVware

P.O. :Box 160
R.elhdrum,lD 83858
It£: CIaimj/.A818400416-0001-02; DateoILoss: Jarmm:y22.200i

As 'W8 disCUS9ed in ourJ)bone call yesterday, we are wrlting wi1h,a.Jist of docurDCDls we will JJCed til ~
business intcaup1i01l1QS!l you hIIve SOS1niaed whenyour roof.coJlapscd. PlCBSe provide me tbDowmg;
,

the

1. MoadlJ.1 alQl ~"d c:mt Clf'3l1t~ infonaMioA by depllJ1mol;ll for IACt IlmoRlbs, iDeJw!irle !MIIAI)' 2.008 (or. a. many
months AS-YOU WI pull OlSt of yom: point-of'-sale system),
!

,

2". MDD1hly aatea lllr_Micm frDm T,.. VaNe ~1I11e and 3 clage$t surrotmdina True VaJue Sl'OteS ror JlUlumy

2.001 dwouahFebnllllylOOa,

i

,

I

i
I
I

!

I wiD JCqu.c:st \be following ~ £:om your accousdaDI, JeftOtBdtm. as )'Vtl ft!!I:QIIIIP.IlemIea!
4. Monlbly l'Io11t It. Loss SUumt:Jlti JIIDIUII'J' 200S Ihrough february Z003 (oIdl6 each mODtb thcm:aftz:r: thlIl you. aTe
closai dollln, ., they antJ'l'flPllJ\2l).
5.

Y~~Dd BalanGe ShCCIS for

I

2005,2006 IUId 2007.

Wbile we may have additiDnal documeat reqaes\S we SDticipat.e 111= ~ will allow us to analyze any
potential busiDess iDtetmption lass:s. We apprecill1e yoar assisIanc:e in IlUs IllIdr.e:. and please let uskDow if You
have auy questicms.
I

Siocerely.

AmylCohlcr CPA

a1roblcr@mdd fie!

CC; Julia Kate, Jd O'Briml

AIbrD ....... CIII/kIIe.~.1IaIls .DIItait.llu!rGll. ~.I\IIIIZIIl.""" OH.. t - . ..... AIIjsPoI·14i<IoD .~" .........
N~YClt.. OI~.~.I'tIiaddpW..~.fIIQI:Jd, Mi.llalllald,fllt.a....,..SIIIPaIIdIIII. SCtIIII:.sllppala.'IWtrco.VWmI!s .. ",~JX;
I

II

MDD000274

,J
L

,
I

i

I

lC19OONEB~m£tIT
stJmlO1O

BU..L£WE:. WA.~

"l!LG:U.4'S.~a: PAX CC.~3JlQn

.

w..I1IIIUt

'J '

Morch 28, 2008

Tim Van Valin
P.O. Box 1228
Ratbdnun, m 83858
1m: lakeland true Va1l.1e·Hardware,. Claim #A818400416!.oOOl-02; Date· of to,s: lanuary 28,2006

l?eurMr. Van Vellil,

,
I

We are writing to you on behalfoEyour c1ieut, MhFrltt Iud Lakeland Tmc'VWeIDrdwate. As we e:pt8.med ill
our doo;unentrequest to Mr. pritz d1Ittd Febrwuy 21. 2008, W~ ~ ongoing dotmnents over the course Oftha
period the bWliness is closed to complete final celClllallons ofthct busiaeas intCllUption loss. Pleas~ provide'the
n,UDwmg information:
.
.
i

,

I

1. Monthly Profit. &; Loss Stmcm= iDr Iaatlary 2008·M.ardJ 2CJ()8 (and fOj each month thsreafterlhstthe
business is closed)
:
.
I
2. The adIlal payroll expenses paid (Le. wages. taxeS, ben~) overthe period the business is cJ06ed ;
3. Any additional ex.penses paid related to the tempaM location. (apart from. the rent already documCDted.)
and how tbe loc::ation is beiDgused.
:
4. Please advise whether- Mr. Fritz 1m t:Oatinued to·pay offiCe .pmCllt leases and gtIliI'anteed Paym,But9
dmmg the loss period and t£plain what these. eosrB'are for
:
s. Please iDdtea1& '(!Vila the company a.nticip&lIlS retIlrIli1Ig to opara1:iOG5
i
6, Please advjse ifany sales 8.t'e currently tIIldDg p)sc~ aut of& &emporuy location.
.:
I
I

.

WlliJe we may ha.w addrtiooal dOCllIlleat request!: we anticipate ~es8 records will allow U3 to·atWyze any :
potential business imenuption losses. We appreciate yoor assistance in this matter, and p)ea~ let us know if you
lmve B1l¥ quesQons,

.

:

Sineercty.

Amy Kohler CPA
akobler@mdd.nst

CC: Julia Kalil

'.
"

.

,

Loe 'd

22(;0

STAT~ OF :U/l}jU ',. }
COUdT'{
i ~ i'\!
FILED

SS

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plaintiff

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIJL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT~' OF KOOTENAI

I
I

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

ase No.: CV-08-7069
OTION TO RECONSIDER (AMENDED)

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11, Plaintiff moves this Court for an Order reconsidering its prior
order dismissing Plaintiffs bad faith claims in this matter, and its order limiting the testimony
pertaining to damages to the period ending January 281h, 2009. This motion is based on the
supporting memorandum and every affidavit in the file, and all memorandum filed by Plaintiff in
support of any motions before this Court. Oral argument is requested hereon.
DATED this 6th , day of April, 2010.

ARTHUR M. BISTLiNlf"=

PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO RECONSIDER

-1

??faJ.
--)

,

II
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I
I

I hereby certify that on the _ day of February, 20 to, I served ~ true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the followi~g;

Keely E. Duke
US Mail
_ _ Ovemight M~il
Bryan A. Nickels
Hand Delivered
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A.
P.O. Box 1271
~ Facsimile (208) 395-8585
Boise, ID 8370l
Email

i

I
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO RECONSIDER

I
i

·2

-----"--- -

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISS: 5216

l\-l>rt~A \.~
DEPD·~

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClft\L DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF KOOTENAI
I

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

ase No.: CV-08-7069
laintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion
o Reconsider Dismissal of Plaintiff's Bad Faith
Jaims.
.

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

Hartford delayed payment because of information that had not been provided to their
accountants - not because of " ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim
demands ... " and it was error for this Court to dismiss Lakeland's bad faith delay claim
on thm;e grounds.
The following is not in dispute J 1) Hartford paid more than half of the totaJ value of this
claim after the period of restoration had ended; 2) Hartford did not make any payment
whatsoever for lost business income during the months of July. August. September or October
2008; 3) Hartford made one payment in November 2008; 4) Hartford did not make another
payment until March 2009; 5) Hartford did not pay for the damaged inventory until June 2009,

I All from the Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support ofHllrtford's Motion for Summary Judgment (Copley
affidavit) at Paragraph 2.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Suppon of Mation to Reconsider
Dismissul of Plaintiff's Bad failh Claims

-----

- I

-----------------------------------------------------__ It.
??f···

I

I

more than a year and 16 months after the collapse. The delay in making
these payments causes
I
severe financial hardship to Lakeland and prevented the timely operiing of the store. 2
Lakeland must prove that Hartford's delay in making the required business income
payments and inventory loss payments was not objectively reasonable.) On summary judgment,
Hartford offered no evidence justifying its decision to delay payments to Lakeland. Although
presented facts surrounding the communications between Lakeland's agents and Hartford's
agents, Hartford never argued that this communication issue was the cause of this delay_ There
is not now and has never been any explanation from Hartford for this delay. It is not in the
record. Hartford on more than one occasion has been invited to cite to the record to show any
explanation for this delay and Hartford has never once responded because the point was simply
not raised on summary judgment.
This Court found the delay claim was addressed - that Hartford did explain why it
refused to pay -- but this finding has no support in the record. The objection to the consideration
of that claim is renewed here and not waived. Hartford did not raise the delay claim, so
Lakeland was under no duty to present any evidence to defend it. In any event, Lakeland did,
" ... prove coverage to the point that, based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer
intentionally and unreasonably withheld the insured's benefits." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, 137 Idaho 173,178,45 P.2d 829,834 (2002).
The policy in this case provides, "We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your "operations" during the period of restoration." 4

2 Bates Stamped Affdiavit of Dan Harper filed February 101h, 2010 (Harper Bates Affidavit), at bates 23; Affidavit
of Mike Fritz in Opposition to Summary Judgment filed paragraphs 10, and 13 through 22.
J As this Court bas recognized, negligence is sufficient to support bad faith. "In Selkirk Seed Co. v. State ins. Fund,
the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that an action against one's own insurer (first party bad faith), independent of
breach ofcomracr, is limited to intentional or negligent denial or delay of payment." Roylance v. John Alden Life
Ins. Co. 2008 WL 4202018, 4 (Idaho Dist.2008)

4

Copley affidvail at Exhibit A H405.

Plainlifrs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider
Dismissal ofPlalntltrs Bad Fal[/] Claims

- - _... _ - - _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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I

(emphasis supplied). The policy does not specify when these payments must be made. "When
I
I

no time of performance is expressed in a contract, which was so in t~is case, it will be implied
that the contract must be performed within a reasonable time. Bot! v.. Idaho State Bldg. Authority,
122 Idaho 471,477,835 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1992) citing Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567
P.2d 1284 (1977) and McFarlandv. Joint School Disl. No. 365, 108 Idaho 519, 700 P.2d 141
(Ct.App.1985).
As this Court pointed out, the payments should have been made when Hartford had
sufficient information before it to make a payment, i.e., when Lakeland had proven its claim to
the point that it would be unreasonable for Hartford to withhold payment. Robinson, supra.
Hartford had the information it needed to calculate the payments in early March 2008, calculated
those payments and then refused to make them. The only explanation as to why the payments
were not made was because the accountants did not have enough information. Not because of the
inconsistent claim demands as this Court has found.
Lakeland provided sufficient information for Hartford's accountants to calculate the
payment due for each month of lost business income and Hartford's accountants calculated due
for the lost business income in mid-March 2008. 5 The accounting finn hired QY Hartford's
adjuster received the required financial information from Lakeland in early March 2008
including profit and loss statements. 6 In mid-March, the accountant developed schedules from
which to make advances to Lakeland and called to discuss those with Kale, the adjuster. Those
schedules were for making advances over the next four months. The schedules estimated payroll
expense $18,622 but the accountant was very clear that the numbers did not include amounts for
payroll other than for Mike and Kathy Fritz. Kale called Mike Fritz and was told they were
paying the entire payroll. not just their own.' There is no evidence that Kale ever communicated

S CopeJy

affidavit al Exhibit CHI 7.
.
Affidavit of Dan Harper filed in opposition to Hartford's Summary Judgment Motion at paragraph 5.
7 Copley affidavit at Exhibit C H 17.
,

6

Plainliff's Memorandum in Support of Molion 10 Reconsider
Dismissal orPlainlitrs Ball Faith Claims

-_._---_ .. _ - - - - -

-3

....•. ~~

J.)

i

I

this fact to the accountants or in any way directed that they recomp~ted their schedules based on
this information. As a result, the accountants' schedules underestimated Lakeland's payroll
I

expense by approximately 330%. The total payroll expense from the four months of the prior
year was $61,503 8 , which is roughly 330% higher than the Hartford's payroll estimate used to
pay Lakeland during the months of February through May 2008.
Notwithstanding the fact that the adjuster had sufficient information from this first set of
schedules to make an advance through the end of May 2008, no advance was made. This
resulted in the under funding of the claim for the months of February, April, and the first 23 days
of May 2008 and caused cash flow stress on Lakeland. 9
In May 2008, Hartford received an updated set of schedules (the second set of schedules)
from the accountants. The second set of schedules revealed that Lakeland's claim had been
under funded by over $73,000 and a payment for that amount was mailed May 23 rd , 2008. The
second set of schedules also reflects a funding requirement for June of $30,000 but this amount
was not mailed until mid-July. 10 On July 16"\ 2008, Kale the adjusLer Lold Lakeland that she was
now able to issue the loss of income for June, 11 however, she had sufficient information to make
that payment since May 20 th , 2008. 12 Thereafter, Hartford/Kale did not make any business
income payments until November 2008, even though they had all the information they need to
calculate those payments. This resulted in a deficiency in payments of $111 ,000 for those
months. 13
It is not in dispute that Lakeland proved its claim to the point that it was unreasonable for

Hartford to delay payments. Hartford's accountants received Lakeland's financial infonnation

Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 7
Harper Bates Affidavit at bates 23.
10 Harper Bates Affidavit at 23.
II Copley Affidavit at Exhibit C II146.
12 Harper Bates Affdidavit at 23.

8

9

13

Id.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider
Dismissal uf PlllilllilT's Bat! failh Claims
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I

and calculated the payments. Hartford withheld the payments and tHis Court has excused
Hartford because "This Court bas found tbat when Lakeland stJted the ball rolling by

making its claim, Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent andichanging claim demands
upon Hartford.,,14 This a fmding of fact which has no support in the record, but more
importantly, the" ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford" is
not why the adjusters withheld payment according to their own testimony.
Hartford withheld payment and Hartford's justification for doing so is that the
accountants did not have all the information those accountants required.

By Mr. Bistline to Ms. Reynolds, the supervising adjuster:

Q:

Let'sjus say right after the suit was filed, before you talked to an attorney,
did you inform anybody at the Hartford, other than your lawyer, that no
business income payment had been made for July August or September?

A:

Personally, no.

Q:

And why hadn't a payment been made for those months?

A:

Lack of documentation and financial infonnation. 15

At no point did the adjusters testify that the "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demand's
from Lakeland was the reason that payment was withheld. This Court's finding of fact that
Lakeland's "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demands justified Hartford's delay in
making payment is not only not supported in this record, it is contrary to the only evidence in the
record on that subject.
On summary judgment, Hartford at no point raised or argued why it had withheld the
periodic payments due under this policy and it was and is error to consider the delay claim on

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine at 4.
.
Deposition ofReynoJds at 29:20 attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in support of motion for a
continuance filed 3/19/10.
14

15

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Mation 10 Reconsider
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summary judgment.

In order to explain this delay, something had Jo
be in the record from
I
I

Hartford's accountants because the accountants are the ones who, according to Hartford, did not
have enough infonnation to calculate these payments. 16 There is no~hing in this record from any
of Hartford's accountants, therefore. there is nothing in the record to explain the delay.
However, Lakeland did prove coverage to the point that it was unreasonable for Hartford
to withhold payments under the policy. Lakeland provided the required financial infonnation,
the accountants calculated the lost business income (albeit incorrectly at first because ofthe
negligence of the adjuster) and then Hartford withheld regular payment of the amount calculated
for lost business income. Hartford did this because of as-of-yet w1identified missing infonnation
- not because of inconsistent claim demands. It is for the jury to decide if this "missing
information" justified Hartford withholding payment and causing Lakeland, its owners and
employees severe financial distress.
Lakeland should he allowed to present evidence of damages incurred after January 28 th , 2009,
because the policy pays lost business income during the period of restoration and that the legnth
of that period is a question of fact.
The policy here provides that it will pay lost business income during the period of
restoration.

17

The period of restoration is not limited to any specific time, but is detennined

based on the existence of a set of facts pertaining to the reasonable ~o time repair, replacement or
rebuild the property at the damaged store or when the insured opens a new store elsewhere. 18 A
different section of the policy provides that Hartford will only pay lost business income for 12
months. 19

16

These are two different limitations on the time frame during which lost business

See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Continuance at pages 3 and 4 wherein the adjuster state

that the accountants are the ones who were claiming to be missing information.
17

Copley affidvait at Exhibit A H405 paragraph 0, (1)

IS

Copley affidavit at Exhibit A H419 paragraph G, 12.

19

Copley affidvait at H405 paragraph

0,

(3).

Plaintill's Memorandum in Support of Motion 10 Reconsider
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income will be paid and this renders the insurance contract subject ito conflicting interpretations
which must be resolved in favor of Lakeland.
In Farmers Ins. Co. oj Idaho v. Talbot. 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1999) the
Idaho Supreme Court considered a policy containing inconsistent limitations on the coverage
provided. Farmers argued that one part of the policy can grant coverage and another part can
clearly limit that coverage. The Court responded,

The Dear Policyholder" language attempts to limit Talbot's UIM
coverage in one manner, while the limitation of liability clause
attempts to limit Talbot's UIM coverage in a different manner.
Because the provisions attempt to limit Talbot's VIM coverage

in two different ways, ambiguity exists. Because ambiguity
exists, the traditional rule of construction applies- i.e.! the
insurance contract must be construed strongly against the
insurer.
133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P.2d 1043,
1050 (1999) (emphasis supplied)
In this case, coverage for lost business income is granted in one place and then limited in two
different ways - one by a time of 12 months and a second that is related to when the business
could reasonably resume operations.
Given the two different limitations on business income coverage, the policy is ambiguous
as to the limitation and, as matter of law, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured.

Farmers Ins. Co. ojIdaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P .2d ] 043, 1044 (1999) Therefor,
the Hartford should be required to provide coverage during the "period of restoration" whatever
the jury determines that date to be based on the definition of that term in the policy. Hartford
utilized the limitation in the "period of restoration" and cannot complain about being held to it.

Plainliff's Memorandum in Support of Motion 10 Reconsider
Dismissal ufPlllimilTs Bini Failh Claims
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This O>urt should and allow Dan Harper to testifY to all

roBoL v.ithin his area of
I

i

expertise and for which he is competent and not limit his testimony t? damages incurred before
I

the expiration of 12 months.

DATED this 6!b, day of April, 2010.

ARTHUR M. BISTUNE

CER'OFICATE OF SERVICE

a

1 hereby certifY that on the _ day of February, 2010, 1 served true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, Farley, Oberrccht & Blanton, P.i\.
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, lD 83701

X

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (2mh 395-8585
Email

.

I'lninlill' sM~lllorontlum ill Support of Motion f(l
[)isrl\i~",,1

ROCi)lL~idcT
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FiLEr'
ARTtnJR M. BISTLlNE
BISTLINE LA W, PLLC

?Olr rpf:( -6 Prj 4: '5

-e J

1423 N Government Way

ClEFii< [JiSl fil~T COURT

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

IJ\

'rI

(208) 665· 7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)

ISB: 5216

Attorney tor Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICI L DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN }\NO FOR THE COUNT' OF KOOTENAI

"'ase No.: CV -08-7069 .

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,

L. L.c.,
Plnintifl:

:replaCl;:5 motion filed 3-8- J0)

VS.

1HE HARTFORD FIRE TNSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation"

Defendant.

----------

I"

--------------~

Plaintiff moves this Court lor an Order consolidating this

case~nto

Kootenai County Case

CVIO-774. pending in front ofthe Honorable Lansing Haynes. This Motion is based on Ute.
P. 42(a), and the Amended Memorandum in support ofthi5 motion and the Affidavit Dan Harper
filed this date, as wen as the aftjdavit of Arthur Bistline March 5

lh
,

2010, and all other affidavits

and memorandum in the record in thjs case. Oral argumenl is reqlle~ted.
DATED this 6 111 d.-ty of ApriJ, 20'10.

?-'---~ARTHUR M. BIST.LINE

PLAINTIff'S AMENUHU MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE -)

----.--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I V~C":\
,
I hereby certify that on thel.Q\_ dday of~20JO, I served a:true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels

us Mail

__ Overnight Mail
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. ---JIand Delivered
P.O. Box 1271
~acsimile (208) 395-8585
Boise,ID 83701
Email

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 2

STAIr OF

I[~\rlf)

CO~jj,!!'(

}ss

FlLEfr
I

"r'ni~:",~
" ",I, I,:
II ,-:~!
''
,

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d'A1ene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
ISB: 5216

/ I; i

r
-I")

,

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

ase No; CV-08-7069
FFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER IN SUPPORT
F MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Plaintiff,
VS.

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a COJUlccticut Corporation,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Kootenai

I, Dan Harper, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state tbat:
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and a resident of Spokane County, Washington;

2. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter and am
competent to testify as to the matters herein contained;
3. I am employed at Harper, Inc.;
4. Attached is a true and correct copy of my ana1ysis of True Value Hardware's

EmpJoyees' claims.
DATED this

5±b-day of March, 2010.

AFFIDA VJT OF DAN HARPER
- 1

-_ ....
99'1''-

~~

DANHARPER

HARPER, INC.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

5:0- day- of!March, 2010.

NOTARY
BUC to and for Washmgton
Residing at: ~Dtv.N... ,:
Commission Expires: (0/20/2.01 (
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER
-2

I
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!

I hereby certify that on the
day ofMktr, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated beJo~, and addressed to the
following:
Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nickels
HaJl, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A.
PO Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271

[]

[J

R
[]

Hand-del ivertld
Regular mail
Certified mail
Facsimile
Email

FAX: (208) 395·8585

B~~b~
Sherry Steven

AFFIDAVIT OF DAN HARPER
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March 5, 2010
INCORPORATED
1'\lIemic Acc[lulllan!\
\i~\luatjuH ."d\'is(fr~ \~

"k~lifyillg

Mr. Arthur Bistline
Bistline Law
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d Alene, IV 838J4

Erlln(lmic E.<pen ...

Re: LaJ,eiand v Hartford

Dear Mr. Bistline:
1 have reviewed the documents and con'espondel1ce produced in tbis case as it relates to
the on-going Lake1and True Value staffpayroH, which excludes tl~e Fritz's wages/draws.
Based on this review of the records 1 have reached the foHowing opinions.

Opinion l-Har((ord was Timely Pr01,ided the Necessary Information to Reasonably
Estimate and Fund the Staff Payroll on a ConJ(!mporaneolis Basis. :
Harford had received the monthly Lakeland statements of income iby fax dated March 5,
2008. These statements listed the actual monthly staff payroll and :payroll taxes for 2007
(MDD000428-MDD000449) (Exhibit A). In my opinion the same month prior year
actual staff payroll expense provided a reasonable basis fOJ Hartford to fund these costs
on a contemporaneolls basis. Any over or short funding, when compared to the
subsequent actual, could have been adjusted for in the next month. :

Opinion 2-The Actual Amounts Paid to the Store Staff were )\iaterially Less than the
Prior Year Due to Hartford's Lack of Timely Funding.
Hartford had been informed by Mr. Fritz on March 13, 2008 that he was planning on
continuing the entire payroll during the period of restoration (HOOO 17) (Exhibit B).
Hartford had been timely provided the infoffilation they needed to not only estimate and
fund the staff payroJ] currently but also flmd the monthly lost store income. I
Hartford's delinquent funding of t1u:: continuing staff payroH and monthly lost store
income caused Mr. Fritz to make financial cuts or reductions to {hc normal continuing
staiT wages (Exhjbit C).

I

E-mail from Ms. Kale indicating....she
had received rhe MOD
report
of loss (HODOO
18).
. -.•... -......•.•.•......• " ... " .•.. , ... ,....
. . . . '....
_ .... ,"'" .. -.
!

I'

SjJllkfllll'. 11';1 992IJ/
-Inllii: Ittlrpr rinr(il' (t;:ol1eJllt?rl. ('nl/!
wc/Jsilc: W),'II'.rCli/I('.tfJt:r1. ('1)111

5i}')' 7-17. 5850, IA X SM. 7-17. 585')

."."",(a
--)

Mr. Arthur Bistline
Re: Lakeland v Hartford
March 5, 2010

Page 2
i

The employees that would have otherwise received their nonnal v(,ages were damaged to
!
the extent they were not able to fmd a replacement job.
I have computed the difference between what the Lakeland employees were actually paid
in 2008 and 2009 and what they likely would have been paid if the store had remained
fully open and each bad remained employed at the store during those time frames. These
amounts total $121,173.24 (Exhibit D).

Very truly yours,
HARPER INCORPORATED

~-~\~

Daniel 1. Harper, CPAIABV, ASA. MBA
djh/sjh

s:

Bistline re slaffpayroll damages 3-S·IO.d.doc
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Hartford Payment of Nonnal Continuing Staff Payroll Costs

I

Per Insurance Policy··Continulng Nonnal Payroll Exp~nsell WiD Be Reimbursed

!

Actual Staff Payroll from 2007

II

Jan

$

11.812

Feb

$

13.566

(

March

$

13.:l47

i

April

$

18.896

MaV

$

15.880

June

$

15.877

i

I
.. ------- .._- .-._--

I
Hartford Received this Normal PayroJllnrormation
by Fax on March 5, 2008
~
. _. _ _ _ : ______________..

July

S

15.518

August

S

17.042

Sept

$

15.152

October

S

22.337

i

NovemtJer

$

14 .084

Il

~

December

S

12.658

i

S
n

----------'~

,.•

I:

. --r
~".

.-

~

t

-

-

.

l

~

.

l

L . ______"_~_=~"__"________~
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Mike at insd he advjsed tbey are
continuing paying the entire payroll durin9
tim~ of construction.
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Hartford Payroll Payments Were Delinquent in all but 2 Months after the Roof
Collapse From Feb 2008 to Oct 2008

$100 ,000
$90,000
$80,000

f--- -..~~~-~ :------:~:=---~:,---=' --~=~:=~~~'~='~-Yf=~~~"~-~51

$70,000
$60,000
.•. .. __ ..

$50,000
..

$40,000
., ..

$30,000
$20,000

.----..-.. ---------. - '- --..------.

---~.-

, . ... ~~

-- $10;000

----- .....

$-

Jan

Feb

Mar

--_. __ .:,. ..

' "

... --: .....

. _._-_.. .......

_-_......- .. __
-

" ...

I

... .

,- ~

---... --------------- -- .--------

- ---~r_.

------,-~ ..

~

_
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,

Ap

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

:-Payroll Cost -Hartford Payrrents for Payroll ·
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Hartford Computed Combined Lost Income and Payroll Costs
Compared to Actual Hartford Payments Reveal a $80,000 Deficiency
Preventing the Store from Opening In October 2008

$300,000

[~ --..,.-.---.-

.. .. ·......- ....... ·-..- ..

..

..

.. ....... c-·--l

-·~-:-~~ ~
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!

;
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;/"l i
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H

••

•

••
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.. )

$150,000

•

,
"Q

1
i

. $100,000

I

1

----_.--_._.__..
$50,000
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Jan
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May
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__._......!

Sept
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: -Lakeland Lost Profits and Payroll Costs -Hartford Insurance Payments .
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Employee Name
James Ahlman
Carolyn Beard
Jason Jacobs
Pam McMaster
Jerry Moreau

2007
$21,090.75
$30,511.93
$12,901.51
. $26,646.90
$13,271.25

2008
$12,516.00
$16,327.00
$10,102.38
$13,21B.76
$7,565.25

Shortage
2008
-$8,574.75
-$14,184.93
-$2,799.13
-$13,428.14
-$5,706.00
-$44,692.95

2009
$6,912.63
$6,672.83
$8,743.34
$S,61~.25

Shortage
2009
-$14,178.12
-$23,839.10
-$12,901.51
-$17,903.56
-$7,658.00
-$76,480.29 -$121,173.24

.:!:'.I}SS
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1423 N Government Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICfAL DISTRlCT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTr OF KOOTENAI

LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE,
L.L.C.,

ase No.: CV-08-7069
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

Plaintiff,

o CONSOLIDATE

vs.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation,
Defendant.

FACTS
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, operated a hardware store and the roof coUapsed.
Lakeland had an insurance policy with Hartford which promised to pay continuing operating
expenses incurred during the cessation of operations, including payroll. Lakeland filed suit in
this case for breach of the insurance contract. The employees of Lakeland filed suit in Kootenai
County Case CV 10-774 based on the same transaction and occurrence because they did not
receive the payroll they would have had the store been operating. l

I

Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at I.

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOnON TO CONSOLIDATE

22U:I

ARGUMENT
"It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials as far ~s possible. When claims
arise out of the same accident and one trial is sufficient to determine all the facts, separate trials
would be a waste of time and expense." Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 597, 768 P.2d 1321,
1330 (1989) citing Nelson v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 60 Idaho 443,92 P.2d 790 (1939). The
basis for the suit in Kootenai County Case CV 10-774 is that the employees of Lakeland were
entitled to be paid what they would have earned if the store had not been destroyed during the
period of time the store was not operating. The issue in that case is the same as this - whether
Hartford reasonably performed its duties under the insurance contract. The only additional item
of proof that is required on the issue is a simple calculation of the difference between what each
employee was paid in 2008 and 2009 and the estimated amount each would have been paid jf the
store was fully operational.

A. The adjusters handling this loss have admitted the employees of Lakeland were
entitled to full payroll during the time the store was not open. The employees
are third party beneficiaries of the contract and entitled to enforce it in a
direction acton.
The policy in question provides for the payment of continuing operating expenses,
including payroll, during the period ofrestoration. 2 This provision provides a direct benefit to
lhe employees of Lakeland - that being that those employees are paid what they would have

Affidavit of Melany Copley In Support of Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgm~nt (Copley affidavit) at H419,
,
Paragraph 0, (J) and 0, (4)

2

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

-2

i

been paid ifthe store had been fully operational. 3 The adjuster handling the claim as well as her

!

supervisor have admitted that this was the proper interpretation of thd policy language. 4
I

In order for a party to be a "third party beneficiary". the parties to the contract must so
intend, and that intention is a question of fact to be determined by the' facts and circumstances.

Downing v. Travelers ins. Co. 107 Idaho 511, 525, 691 P.2d 375, 389 (1984) "That intent must
appear from the contract itself or be shown by necessary implication." Id.

In Williston on Contracts (Third Edition) § 369 the rule is stated:
In practically every jurisdiction, a beneficiary to whom the insurer
has promised the insured that the insurance money shaH be paid is
given a right to enforce the policy, and generally by a direct action.
This result has been reached injurisdictions adhering to the strict
doctrine of privity of contract by statute; but in most SUites without
the aid of a statute.
Ordinarily, a beneficiary of such an insurance contract'may
maintain an action thereon, though not named therein, when it
appears by fair and reasonablc intcndment that his rights and
interests were in the contemplation of the parties. and were being
provided for at the time of making the contract.
Id
A provision in a contract which provides that employees will be paid the full amount they

would have earned if the store would have been operating clearly was, intended to benefit the
employees. "A third party may only enforce a contract "if he can show he is a member of a
limited class for whose benefit it was made." Sharp v. WH Moore. Inc. 118 Idaho 297, 305.
796 P.2d 506,514 (1990) citing Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co .. 92 Idaho at 532,446
P.2d at 901; Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464, 583 P.2d 997, 999

Furthermore, Hartford's argument that Mike and Kathy should not have been paying themselves from the
insurance proceeds, which this Court touched on in dismissing their bad faith c1ajm~, is not even supported by
Hartford's own agent's testimony. On this point also see below where the adjuster knew all along thc income
payments were intended to cover the Fritz's draws/payroll from the company.
4 Affidavit of Julia Kale attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 38: 15 to 39: 1.
J

PLArNTrFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
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(J 978). The policy sets forth it will pay "payroll" during the period

~f

restoration, and the

I

adjusters admit that the employees arc a member of a class of indjvi~uals who are entitled to

receive payment under the policy and are third party beneficiary of the contract. At a minimum

it is II question of fact.
If HarUord is responsible 10 pay lost business income up until the point the store opened
in August 0£2009, then Hartf()rd is responsible to pay the full payroll the employees would have

eamed as that is a component o1'l.ost business income according to the policy. The difference
between what the employees eamed in 2008 and 2009 and what they would have earned is in

excess of$l2],000.5
CONCLUSION
The issues in this case and CVlO-774 arise out of the same occurrence and are identical
in aJJ respects. Not consolidating these cases would result in two trials with identical issues

which woul.d be a waste of time and which could result in inconsistent determinations on the
same issues, which is also to be avoided if possible. Culnelics Corp. v. Volkswagen vfAmerica.

inc. 531F.2d 674, 690 (C.A.Cal. ] 976t also see I.RC.P. 19(a)( 1) \\!hich requires the joinder of
a party who could be subject to inconsistcnl liabilities.
The only additional evidence the consolidation would require would be the diflcrcncc
between what was paid to the employees and what should have been -during the years 2008 and
2009. That is a simple ca1cu'lation and will not delay tills trial
1h

DATED this 6 day

or April. 2010.

ARTHURM. BrSTLlNE

~ Atlidavi( Danl'[aper filed herewith III page 2 ofthe attachment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!
i

!

I hereby certifY that on the _ day of February, 2010, I served ~ true and correct copy of the
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

US Mail

Keely E. Duke

Bryan A. Nickels
Hall, FarJey, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A.

P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701

_ _ Overnight Mail
~and Delivered
~ ~acsimile (208) 395-8585

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Email

-5
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ST~~LOF)['J\iiCJ;
C01Ji'11

F
ILEO
Keely B. DuJce

Y I)F 1<:uurEN~;

!

1

SS
~~r}

f

~H 2: 07

2aw APR 14

.

,.\

,

ISB #6044; bd@hallfarley.com

CLERt< DISTRict COURT

Bryan A. Nickels

~~~-

ISB #6432; ban@hilllfarley.com
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRBCHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
post Office Box 1271

Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) J95 8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
v

W:\3\3-47Z.9\MSJ-tiAR110RD\Rc:consJoeratlon 411'1 Opp.aoc

Attorneys for Defendant

IN nlE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
.;
F.

TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE.
L.L.C.,

Case No, CV.08.7069
,
I

Plain~

HARTFORD'S OPPOSITION TO;
PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH MOTION

VS.

FOR RECONSIDERATION

:

THE HARTFORD FIRE lNSURANCE
COMPA.l\N, a Connecticut cOIporation,

Defendant.

.,.

,
COMES NOW the defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (,·Hartford"), b~ and
through its counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Obcrrceht

&,' Blanton.

P.A., and hereby

SUbm~ its
i

opposition to Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 6. 2010 ("p1airftifrs
I

Fourth Motion"). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's Fomth Motion should be denied. ,'

BACKGROUND
I

Without any newly discovery facts, but rather simply anotbc:r rchuh of puJtiff's
!
Wlfounded arguments, Plaintiff's Fourth Moliol' agam seeks l'econsideration of this COurt's

HARTJI'ORJ)'S OPPOSJTlqN TO rLA.lN'l'IFF'S FOURTH MOTJON FOR RECONSIDERATION· 1
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!
I

)

dismissal of plaintiff's bad faith claims that were dismissed by this Court's Order Granting

i
,I

•

Defendant's Motion to COmp~l and Order GnU1~~~~ Defendant's s~ary Judgment in Part

d

!

Denying Summary Judgment Jll Part (,"MSJ Ord r ).

,

PIaintitf previously filed a Motion for Reconsideration, on Decembet 15. 2009. w$ch

ar~ed three points: :first, that the Court faile~ to

this Court demied. In that motion, pl.a.intiff

c~
at issue was fairly debatable; and third, its UPdJed damages calculation outlined extracon~l
consider

its claim as a delay-ill-payment claim; lsecond, that the Court erred in finding the

damages in support a bad faith claim. These

ar~ents were rejected by the Court at llearin~ on
I

!

.January 13, 2010, when the Court affirmed its dr'smissat of plaintiff's bad faith claims.

i

Plaintiff thereafter filed a Second Motio for Reconsideration on February 4,2010, .Juch
1) argued that the

tied.

Court emd in finding re bad faith claim fulrly debatable; 2)

ina.dmissible opinions by its expert, Dan Halper; 3) argued that Hanford was oblignted. to tttfct a.

I

"but for''' test on its summary judgmmt claim; and 4) arguing that the Fritz's draws consti~ed
·'pa.yroll."

This Court, again, denied the

10

tion for reconsideration in its Order Dcrlying
I

I
i

Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration, led February 26, 2010,

/

Thereafter, following this Court's'Memorandum Decision and Order ~: Hartfbrd's
Motions in Limine, filed March 8, 2010, Plaintiff sought a third motion to rocon3ider, L an

~ourt
grantoiI the motion in part based upon new dirosures by Mr. Harper, the Court still limi~ Mr.

anempt to salvage the

U:iQ

of it3

~ert Dan karper, at the' time of trial.

Although the

Harpe~'S te~timony and affinned its prior NlinfS, including those on bad faith:

,

;

4tat

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
plaintiff's Motion to R.econsider this ~
Court's Memorandum Decision and q:>rder Re: Hartford's Motion.s in Limine,
ftled March 8, 2010, 1s bereby GRANTED IN PART, fOT those Teasons as stated
by the Coun at the hearing of Marob ,2010. Specifically, the Court will allow
plaintiff's expert, Dan Harpel', to te 'fy regarding plaintiff's damages in this
I
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!
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i
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I

I
I

I

, '..
~.
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..... n_· ...

action total no more than $19.052. w ich amount will be subject to crossexanrination by defendant at the time oftHa!.

IT IS FURTHER ORDeRED th all other aspects of plaintiff's Motion to
Reconsider are DENIED, and aD prior ec1sloDs of the Court, including those
relating to bad faitb, consequential d mages, and the scope of Mr. Harper's
testimony at tbe time ottrial (oxeept a deseribed ahove), remain uDchanged.
,

I

,

i

Order Rc: Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (fil . March 8.2010). at pp. }.2 (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, plaintiff again seeks recoJideration on the Court's prior ru1in.gs, advanbing

arguments that have either already been addresLd by the Court or are otherwise mcrltless,

~d,

as such, none support reconsidera:tion of the

:

•

cot's

Plaintiff's "delay" argument - Plain

MS] Order: ,

first indicates that it is "renewing" is objection

regarding the Court'.liruHng re4 e "delay," Th".,

this argument has previ+SIy

been raised - and rejected - by the (Court. In summary, plaintiff claims that the ~ourt
failed to address its claim as a "delay" in payment claim, which

I

ar~ent
I
I

mischaracterlzes Idaho law on the 5ubj~ct of "delay" as a. bflSis for bad faith,~ and
I:
i
.ilSuvtes the e'Yideftcc in tho rooord Thie argument aha ignores the other e)~entR
:

i

:::::::o~,:::;~t::::;::e:~::;~::1:
I

also predicated on the unfounded ( d previously argUed) contention that the phliCY

•

::..,

-

!

requires advance and/or C3timat¥d plymcDts prior to proof. .

...
.,

.~

. .'

Plaintiff's ambigui;!y argyment is lllLtleS$ - Plaintiff also argues - apparently fJr the
tirst time in a ''recoruUderation'' m+oD - that the "Period of Restoration" as

o~

in the Policy is ambiguous as to] gth of time. However, the plain language

of the
.
I

,

Policy caps that coverage at

onths, and

Pl~tiff cites no authority

,

tb
i

the

contrary.
',.
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i
I

I
I

I
For these reasons, and as discussed'

more detail below, plaintiff's Fourth Motion

should be denied in all respects.
ARG

A.

NT

Standard for Motions for Reeo ideratioh.
Rule 11(11)(2)(B) Of the Idaho R.ules ofCi il Proce~ provi<ies inperti:nentpart:

14.

A motion for reconsideration of fillY int locutory 'orders of the trial lAJurt may be I
made at any time before the entry of fin judgment but not later than fourteen (14)
days Bfier the entry of final judgment.
I,
I
When considering a motion for reconsider .on, the Court may take into account any new or
!

I .

i

additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur d' Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Baxilc of
North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 824, 800 P.2d 1 26, 1038'(1990). See also NOreen, 135

,I

Id~o

,

.

at

I

819, 25 P.3d at 132. In submitting a motion ~ r reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)($) of
I

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the movi g party has the bu;rden of bringing to the cOurt's
i
attention through affidavit, depositions or
sions, new facts'bearing OIl the corrcottless of an
interlocutory order. Devil Creek Ranoh, Inc.

JI

Cedar Mesa.

Re~ervoir & Canal Co., 126 I~O

118 Idaho at 824, 800 P.2d at

202, 205, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994); Coeur 'Ale

the 1ri~

1038 ('''The burden is on the moving party to bring
facts.") Where a moving party does not
of law

or fact in the initial decision."

court's attention to the! new
I

presIt any new facts, it must still demonstrate ttchrors
,

I

Johns:n v. T..ambro

143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d

106 (Ct.

!

::

App.2006).

B.

The COun !hould disregard re:fqcnees

.'

inadmissible evidence.

,
i

As pJaintiff's Motion seeks reeonsid

•~

subj eet to the eVidentiary requirements app

~
.•

non of this Court's
MSJ Order, it would still
be
"
,
.

I
I

l

enant to 'a sumn:~ judgment opposition. : "[A]
'I

i

party against whom a summary judgment is s ght emmot merely rest on his pleadings but, :When
faced with affidavits or depOSitions suppa . g the: motion, must oome forward by
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I

r··
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_.

~

I'

... _ • • • J .

_._

. . . . . ._

••

"

. . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ _ ....... _ _ _ _ _

•• _ _ _ _ _

"

•••

_

•••• _

•••

.- . I'~I

::;1'
"

---

?·~()I

----'---=- -._-:.

...

.."

.. _..

,.

..

. affidavit, deposition, admissions or other do

'enLation

estaor h the existence of matepal

to

I ary judgment.,':II~lG' Nelson, A.lA. v. stber.

issues of fact which preclude the issuance of s

.111

I

."

'

118 Idaho 409) 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990). "To withstand a ~~ tion for summary jud~nt,
the

[non-mo~g party's] case must be anch0r9 I something mor~1

olid than speculation; a ~ere

scintilla of evidcncc is not enough to create a enuine issue." ld~ H[TJhere is no issue for inal
u:nl... there ;. .wrlclent evidence favoring til non-moving

for that party." ld. (emphasis added). "Summ,

judgment

~ for a Jury to IeIUm • ~CI

shot

be granted If lbe

eVide~ in

opposition to the motion 'is mere1y colorabJe' or 'is not Significltly probative.'" Id. "When

~

I a
1lDl"F'

--d'
f
..
'/11'.
. d
COTlSl·d....-l..·d
~wg 0Vl once JlI"'cn~
lUOupport 0 o. OPPOSluon '" a "'ton ..... summary jU
oourt

can ouly consider material which w

Montgommy. 147 Idaho 1.

~ 205 P.3d 650~ _

d be admiSSi1 at trial."

Montgomed v.

:cc~fr I·U·B Engineers. Inc.•!146

(2009).

J~111 contract and bad faith claim
i

Idaho at 318 (summary Judgment granted to rurer on breach
"

w~ere insured failed to present "admissible eVi,o.QPce in the f~Or4

,

,II

r

i.~ this

support such Ii claim

I

case.") Under Idaho law, damages must be pI ven with a "reaSfable certainty," which oourts

, 'II

i

have determined to mean that the existence' f damages musi/

taken out of the reahh of

j

Idaho 844. 172 P3d 1119

; ",.

speouIation. Trilogy NetwoIk Systems. Irui v. JobnsoJl.' J

i

;.

(2007)(emphasis added).

,

i

:

:I,ijl.

art

Despite this, however, plaintiff cites to two glaringly inalUn.isaible portions of teswnony

u..........!:'er In
. support 0 f'1, S M'
'ff .
th Affid!' 0 f
,uom Mr. F'
ntt and M r ..........
onon. F'"
~~t, ~~rmtl CItes to e

.c..

Mike Fritz (at n2) for the proposition

th~

the delay

Plaintiff's Memo at 2. However, as Hartfo'd has

'~cau8~s

previO~lr' ~oted.1 Mr, Fritz's amda~t is
,

i

replete with inadmissible damage claims, iden:' iOB both undo'
personal
I

to

~

severe financial hardshlp."
:

cnt.cxJ damages. end d~ages

I ) second. pI'amu'ff ! Cltes
maTY 1Udgme~t, ~J~~ October 28, 2009, at pp. 12.1~5.
i

· (.InO1Uu..u'6.
..1:_", 40r exam , 1e, omonon
. a}: d·ISl / ess.
Mr. Fntz

Amended RepJy in Support ofRanford's MOt1Oll for

.
HARrFORD'S O~smON TO PLAlN11FF'S

". . .

' !

FURTH MOTI?'N ,~'R RECONSmERA ~ION •

i

"

I

:,[111

r[
,I"

i

,

,

..

.............

.'

,

rcpcotedly to the bates-stamped Affidavit of D

~upport of Motion to Reconsider,

Harper in

,

1

'

;

t

•

I

filed February 10.2010 (at n. 9, 10, & 12), whi hare actually citations to Mr. Harper's JanUary
I

!

I

25~ 2010 report (bates page 23), for the propo lion that Ha#ord had "suffioient infQ11nati.?n."
i
I
Again. as has previously been ruled by this Co' "while the :lfin~l amount of the claim' is *hat
I

,

I

,

'ons is no! longer relevant" (Memorandum

is at disputo, 'reasonableness' of Hartford's

1

Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine,

~led March

I

8, 2010, at p.

~o.)

he cannot testify

as to

i

I

Moreover, [iJf there is any relevance, Harp' himself
;easonableness.'; (Id) Indeed, Mr. Harper

has! admitted

agr~d in his d~j~ition that he laaks the lmOWIJdee,

T

:.

I

lIa1ning, and cmpaiise to o£fc:r any opinions as' 0 the reason~leQess of Hartford's adjustment of
I
I
. '
,
the olaim or any intetpretations of the subj t Policy prorisions at issue in this litigation.
i

J

J redder any such opinions and that

SpecmcaJly, Mr. Harper testified it was beyon bis ability

i

i
be would not be rendering such opinions at t r i · !I

i

J:!

18
5 Q 'W'hat about a claim related to laims handl' ~ :
6 praotiQes, are you somebody that h handled thosie types of
!
7 cases?
8 A No, I don't think my opinions e on a ~- thaf: would

come more from an insurance exp or adjuster ~pert.
Q Sure. And thars what I want to get to is there's
no doubt, at least from what I can t' 11 in looking at your
curriculum vitae you're certainly w. 11 qualified ~ a ~PA
and a. forensic accountant. But as I understand it.,l. your
14 role as an expert is not ~ a claims
dling expe~ .
9
10
11
12
13

15 COIl'cct?
16 A That's oorrect.
17 Q You would leave that to cla;
18 address?

.19
20
21
22
23
24

25

~

;I

-handling fopes to
:
A Yes.
:
Q Okay. And you would do . because you don't have
the education., training and experie ce that woul~ be
necessary to render those opinions' correct? You like to
stick with what you know.
A

Sure, that's felt.

Q

And based on that., I would

HARTFORD~S OPPOSJTION TO f"l.AlNTIFF'S

l'umo then j

if·

i'"

i

YO,U have

!

UnTa MOTI6N
II'OR RECONSIDERA TION .6
I
I

;

'I' .

M.

I

!

j
!
"

19

.,'"
.i

1 not sen/ed as an expert for any client' whether It s:

2
3
4
5

Lakeland or any other client that yoti and your company have
assisted since 1993, with respect to providing an ORr'iini~Jl alS
to whether a claim was appropriately adjusted and nndled,

is that fair?
!
, "
l
6 A Yes, we wouldn't ha.ve opinion as to the adj: tetS'
7 actions or :inactions.
;
I

:

I

I

'imIne Re: Expert Dan Harper; and

(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant s Motion in
"

I

Memorandum in Support, filed February 8,20,0, ("Counse1iAtt;").
Exh. A.11. 18:5-19:7.) ,!Mr.
.
1

I

H&per went on to state:
, 136
"
13 Q In providing these opinions, 'oush.. you ~Y
14 acknowledge that you do not feel C,I mfortable ~esftiYing as
15 to what the insured's obligations
Wlder the i
ce

16 poliey. correet?
:, 'I
17 • A Yes, ,that's probably getting 16 into the p' lic}fI
18 mterpretation arena.
:'
19 Q And you certainly, again, in e po!tcy
20 interpretation arena you certainly ~ Dot fecI you~o ::
21 qualified to nmdcr any opiniomt Q.s;~o whether th' Frl~
22 actually complied with the teJ:1llS ofthe insuranc 'poUcy?
23 A I would agree that that's be)'o,~ my scope. : ,1
I

;

(Jd.1t 136:13-23.)

,,1

,

1
1

!

I

Instead, Mr. Harper clarified that the s ope of his op .oD was far narrower and would be
I

'I

1

a:tion they contained:

limited to only what documents were provided and what inti '

: 144
I::
21 Q Certainly you're not goms to : der any op" .o~
22 regarding interpretation of the poll y?
':

23

A No, I'm not.
'
u
24 Q Okay. And therefore, you'rel f going to r: nd~r an
25 opinion as to Whether or not the 7 ..page report " plied
I

~

:'

145
1 with the terms of the policy, cor.rc::d ?
2 A No, not with the tenns of the !policy, 1 mi t
3 the jury what it consisted of and h it might be I

.1

wi!

.J
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~i

i

V
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•

•

•

•

.----

..--:---.

4

Q

S

A

,

!.,.

What the report consisted of?
Yes.

:

...

.. ....

I

6 Q Okay. AIe you going to be rendering allY opiJlio~ as
7 to whether an insured is limited to the coverage aff~rdCr' to

8 the insured under the policy?
i
~
A I donlt have any opinions about coverage.
10 Q Are you go1Dg to render any opinions regar . g
9

'

,
i'

f.t

11 lDsured's duty to QOoperate regarding an invcstisa on ~
12 settletnQIlt for ell claims made under the policy?, I: I
13 A I'd defer to the insurance expert.
';

14

15
16
17
18
1.9

Q Okay. Are you !Ioing to render any opinionS as to
whether or not the insured has a duty to provide I ~
documentation to substantiate its claims? I think
one youlre referring to the insurance expe:rt, as we
discussed.
' I:
A My opinion would be limited to what waa , r ,"ded and

i

at's

20 what infOrDlatioD it conveyed.
21 Q Correot. But you're not doing that in tenns 'f
22 whother it eomplied with the policy or not?

I

i'
'

23 A No, just commullicatine the CODtent and 'ow' t could
24 be used.
' I,
25 Q Are you going to be rendering any opinions t~i
146

:

Ii

1 whether an insured has a duty to mitigate their los wh,'en
2 they're making a. claim with their insurance polioy' or #der
3 their i.n5uranoe polioy?
, ~
4 A No, l'lllea.ve that to the insurance expert. : f,
S Q Are you going to render any opinions as to :,hetfler an
6 insured bas a duty to take reasonable steps to pro t the

7 covered propertY from further damage?
'~
8 A Wouldn't disagree with that but I would lea~ t~t
9 for the insurance expert.
' II
147

c·

i!'

:~

'12 Q Undc~tand. Okay, And based on that, it's, ot
13 you're saying the policy covers these things, it's j, Sf tll,is
14 is the dan,tage, you guys sort out what the policy oVf:S and
15 what it doesn't, is that fajr?
.
I
~J
16 A This is the eeonomic result of the coDaps' aDa the

,::at

17 court ean decide who's responsible for it.

i,,:

j:

(Id at 144:21-146:9; 147:12-17)(empbases added).

'/

I'

I:
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As such, 1his Court should disregard plaintiff' s ~ferences

~dmissible testimony cited in support of its
C. The Court did not err in findin

j~

Follrth Motion.

I
to, and reliance upon,
I
I

!
I

laintiffhad !aile: to establish a bad fai

In granting Hartford's motion:for

summary Judgment,:

inability of plaintiff to prove that its claim was

:

run fairly

focused ~n plaintiff's wholesale inability to support, confirm,;

caun.
1 · II
I

e Court primarily focused

on: the
I

1

ebatable. In particular, the C~urt
I

d value its own claim, a protllern

,

that continues to this day.
I

I
I

Despite this, plaintiff argues that Hanford·offered "n, ovidence jU3tifying its decisidn to

i

I

dc:lay paymen~ to Ltl.keland," and that the Court's MSJ Ord ' is unsupported. Plaintiff's Memo

i

I

.I

,:

at 2. In doing so, plaintiff appears to ariUe that in all circt.10l tances where an insured contends it
I

provided adequate documentation but was not paid at a spee to jts likmg, a bad faith complaint
I

arises. This is an incorrect characterization of Idaho law on
r
I

As

Hartford

has

previously argued; and as this

slteady oxplained tWice,
!

,

!

Lakeland puts the cart before the horse. To support a dai' of bad faith under Idaho

laW, the
!
!

,

insured must show: "(l) that coverage

of

[the] claim was, not fairly debatable; (2) that!: [the

I'dence the insurer had before i~ the

insured] had proven coverage to the point that based on the

1

'

insurer intentionally and unreasonably withheld [tIle ins . d's) benefits; (3) that the

dol~)' in
I

payment was not the result of a gOOg faith mistake; and (4) at the resulting harm was notifully
oompensable by contract damages." Robinson

_.

Automobile Insui-ance

CDnwa~. 137 Idaho 173. 178, 4S P.3d 829, 834 (2002)(C) "ng Simper v. Farm Bureau Jurual
I

:

Insurance Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 471, 474, 974 P.2d 11 0, 1103 (1999); see also
!

1

I

White
v.
,

:,

"

I

I

Unigard Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94,98-100,730 P.2d 1,' 4, J018-20 (1986).

!
,

I
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I

I

'1

I

IiII

I

I

I

!

??()f_ ... e. )

~---:---,--
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'"
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I
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1

il

1

1

t6 address

Again, plaintiff has continuously failed

.j

I

,I

rldgment

bad faith in opposing Hartford's summai'Y

. fourth reoonsideration.

~I

.

I

; otion, on its first motion !for

reconsideration, on its second reconsideration, and! now on

a.

1

e critical elements of the to~ of

' ,I at based on the e .
Plaintiff bad not roven coVent c to the lDt
bad before: 1: Hartford intentionall"1 and unr '1 bI
e d benefits.

~I

Ithe

"':£1:
· tthatbase d on
First, plainw;J,.
cam:tot dernonsttate 1t' had ~oven COV,'r rage to t ehpOll1

ins~e~i1
intentionJ
.1

rt
swmnarYi~Udgment

evidence the insurer had before it, the

'
it had. :llaintiff'S Memo at 2, Here,! the

insurecFs) benefits," despite its bare assertiOl1

correctness of the Court's granting of

and unreasonably Withheld ![the

t'!

Hartford on

.:1;1

Lakela.nd'~ bad taith

I
cJaim is demonstrated by pla:in.tifPg own fail~e to value j"ts own claim.2 and its failure to

.iil

I

1

demonstrate that it had fully documented its c$,im for Bus1 ess Income (or, indeed, Bus~ess
I
i
Personal Property)
~'i
,;
i
!

i

Ii
,I
Plaintiff points to the provision of pr{ r year pro t and loss statcmctlts, "estmlated
I.

./

1

.q

'
1

payroll," and '"lpdated schodulos," mt1king ~e bare oct ention that thiS! was "su:ffi~ient
. iiI.
I'
:
information." Plaintiff's Memo at 3. Plaintiffj'does not e11plain how these provided Hartford
with all needed infonnation, and,

yam.

iii

I

~~ argument;/ appears to be predicated o~ the

, il

.'

i

assumption, as above, that Hartford was obligated to make /' stimated and/or advance payr:bents
:11"
,
under the Policy, and was expected to pay fO~. e.g.,' acm~ expcnSOB nnd paytOll for Ocbber
2008 in March 2008, beforc any such
demonstrates that

TT_~J:': d
r.:""I.n.,or

'l

I.

I

aIDO.

ts

1

'Wel'e •

curred.3

,.

.'"

1

A review of the Ifacts

..

IiI Jncome I,c1aun
. as It
. receive
. d intionn'atlon
!.
p8.1'd the B"usmess
:,

~I

:/

t;

;'
;l

1

I'

' I .

Z See, s.g., Memorandum in support of Hartfon;l's
MS1 Memo"), atpp. 14-Ui.

Moti~
~

!

I

ft)1-

I
'

Summary' 'udgmont, filed August :20. 2009 ("HJrtfOrd

I'

!

3 'The Policy provides, for example, in relevant part. ~t Business Inc me in~ludes: "Conrinumg normal !
operoling expemea incurred, Including payroll." AffidaVit of MelanJ 1 copley. flIed August 20, 2009, I'lt
Exb. A, H 40' (emphasis added).
;i
1
;!
·1

':

,

i;1!

.

"
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,

I

",

,

r

'I

"
"

,I

,
:1

,I

__ tt'.

??o".

I'

:!
,:
",j

• :,'.,

il',

I,

,!

I

,I
11

II
"

Ii

1/
I,

documenting items clnimed under the Business I~ me cover' ge. See generally, Memorand-pm
'I
I
;
"
',.
i
in Support of Hartfard's Motion for Summary Jurent. filed ugust 20,2009, at pp. 11~12. ;

w~t documJ were requested by Hsrtfo~d's
,i:1
I
:
accountants, citing, instead, 4 lines ftom the deJ)4ilsition afM onie Copley. Plaintiff's Memb at
Plaintiff also feigns ignorance of

.I'

I

.

S. Plaintiff, in fact, has prcviou.sly deposed Am~ Kohler (ani

!'
&D accountant) ,in this maher,

which deposition inoluded, as two deposition

exJh"bits. letters/

o~ Ms. Kohler to Mr. Fritz €one

of plaintiff's

Jfr

'I

j!

/

I

o~ers) and Mr. Van Valin (p1"Jt rrs a~oml y, for a time) requesting spe~ifiC
I
I

I

documents in support of the claim. (See Defendant's Memo' dum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
~
Motion to Continue Trial, filed March 22, 2010;: attaching T' anscript of the Deposition of

!iII
Kohlc;r, September 21. 2009, and DePOSi-tiOD EXhibits 1

.

1
1

II

I

'II

I

i

..iI my

Indeed, Hartford's swnrhary

judgment motion did include infonnation regar;mg the kin I of infonnation requested

i

(an~

not

;

provided) by plaintiff, including corrlact with 'Rlaintitl) a' arne~, Mr. Bistline, outlining the

documents needed:

"
It·

,1

'j

,

Ii

I

I

~I

Mr. Bistline,

1

,.

Thank you for the documents you e-:inanl today. W' received the following:

i;

I,

Ii/

'

t. Lakeland True Value's bank statement tOr June 2008·'
2. The Summary and DeWl reports. from l!the QuickB: oks bank reconciliation for
June 2008
III
I
.
3. The Demand letter from True Value Company
:

sJuc:

The provided documents are not the
as the d' cumeuts provided for prior
periods. There are a coupl~ of addition~'!q. pieces of' I1 ormation that we will need
. to update our schedules, as we stated in Pur docume request sent to you on July
28, 200tt The insured is familiar with ~~ documen / that he bas been sending us
each month since February 2008: we ne~lr the same I ocument types reflecting all
July 2008 activity:
:
I

Ii

j,

'i
~,

,

~r.'~
i

(1) check register detail out of QuickDo~ s for the c ! h account
(2) a note from Mr. Fritz detailing, aIly!/payroll dis I rsc:mc:nts for July that have
nOl yet been made that he intends to milli!e
I
1!

'/

I,

I

I ·

I

,

"
,
,
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,~I

.._.... .-.. ,. --. .

~".".-.

...... ..... .... ...... .. .. .....
·-fl·;·
'!I

I
'

I,' .,.

!

..

221)11

,.
;,

I·
r
I,

"

"
,I

I~

l

(3) a print-out from. the True Value bani!: account ': ough the end of July to
support the previous two items

,!

In our letter dated July 28. 2008, we also requested Ie' payment documentation
for the JAR and Oreat American Leasing ~eases. Pleal,e provide 'this also at your
earliest convenience.
:;
'I
i
Thank you for your assistance. Please dO-' not hesita' to contaet us if you have
any questions.

I:

!

Amy Kobler, CPA
Senior Accountant

:/

akohler@mdd.net

'/
,:

.1

,

(Affidavit of Melanie Copley, filed August 20, ;~009, at

C, at ROOSl-52 (July 30, 2008

'I,

i
email from Ms. Kobler to plaintiff's counsel,Mr. Bi:rt1ine» .. ' Other en1ri~s also reflect spe~ific

:/'

i

document requests. (]d. at 1-100054-55, July 31, +008 email om Ms. Kobler to Mr. Bistline, in
relevant part: "It is our 'understa:oding that

;

ODe

I; loyces have quite since our most
i

:br more e

recent schedules were issued for June 30, 2008Jr We will Jed to know who these individUalS
'I
!
are, if it is not clear from the documentation of dis' ursemcmt forthcoming from! Mr.

I

::

fritz:j(H00060-61, August 18, 2008 email

'

I

frO~,I, Ms. KoJ:I:

~art:

to Mr. Bistline. in relevant

I

"Also, please telnember that we are still awaiting the J :y 2008 QuickBooks cash account

I

.11

r

register report. and/or something in writing froIh. Mr. Fritz' dicating the payroll disbursements

for July that he is intending to make as well

ubdate
I't;d September 4, 2009, at Exhibit
;K

asihccOWlt de I:.
!I

our schedules."); see also Affidavit of Arthur Ml;Bistline,

I!

from his bank in order to

I

1

I;

:

(November 20, 2008 lettoT from Mr. Bistline!lto Hartford s counsel, "The above docuthents

II

should satisfy any current and/or previous requdts from yo

,I

Hartford prior to your representation." &

I' office, as well as the office of: The

a~ching We is Fargo account activity be~g
I"

I

i,

i:!

:

,i.

January 1, 2008; business computer a.ccount ,~ctivity it ,'-zing Hartford payment disbulrsaJs;
, I '

I

copy of temporary office lease; and list ofinv~tol')" prior to'
'I

'

I

II

I

:;

J

,'.
II

i
I

l2
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l,-
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Ii:

:I

--.,.,

??OO
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:

i

Mortlover, plmntiff's failure to plovide documentation of its claim or correctly value;its

,

:

claim is even further home out by plaintiff's expert Mr.

Harp~r, who has generated a numbe~ of
I
I

,

additional reports with. cliffering values and methodologies. n~ne of which arc consistent with!the
;
:
,
last. For example, Mr. Harper, in addressing the Bllsiiless Personal Property valuation.
previouSly relied heavily on tho Inventory ValuatioD Report: that was reQ.uested from Lakeland
,

I

d~eate until November 10, 2008. !two

on nUJtlerous oecasiQDS by Hartford that Lakeland failed to

months after Lakeland had filed suit against Hartford. See A~fidavit of Dan Harper in support of
Motion to Reconsider, filed February 4. 2010, at Exh- C (January 15, 201 0 ~ort), "rnb 6.
,

I

Accordingly, Lakeland again cannot contood it had: "proven coverage to the point Ithat
i

based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer
intentionally and unreasonably
,
,
t

•

withheld [the insured's] benefits." Lakeland's bare complaint of delay provides no basis tor a
Ii

,

,bad faith claim, as ''the mere fallure to immedjately settle what later proves to be a valid ~aim
,"
,
does not of itself establish' bad faith. "" See Greene v. Tru~k Ins. Exchan"ge, 114 Idaho 63; 67.
"
,,
68, 7'3 P 274, 278-79 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, plaintiffs ~ontention tha.t "Hartford at no feint
,

i

""

I

,

I

raised or argued why it had withheld the periodic paymentS" ignores both Idaho's bad faith law
and the fucts in the record. and presupposes a "delay" by Hartford, when the record reflectS that
1) Hartford

paid the portions of the claim documented to:'it, and 2) ad<titional claim ambunts

were not "delayed" by Hartford) but were the result of p',iaintifr13 inability/refusal to pr~vide
, ' ,
I
infonnation requested by Hartfcrd. The Court should affirm its prior decision dismi~sing

,.
"

plaintiff's bad faith claim. and deny plaintiff's Fourth Moti,?n.
",

b.

r,:t

flamtiff's claim was fairly debata.ble~

Second, intertwined with the question of whether the insured had proven cOVCItl.ge to the
I
point the insurer intentionally and UDrCMontlbly withhelij benefits. the burden also falls on
j.'

,
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",
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",!

'.

.

,'.'"

.-..

J.
"

I
i

".
I

;

'i

I

plaintiff to ~onstrate that the claim was I!Q1 fairly de~ble. 'Critically, unrecognized! by
plaintiff is the fact that lithe insured has the burden of sh~wing that the claim was not
i:.

f~lY

.

;

debatable." Robinson v, State Farm Mm. Auto. Ins. Co .• 137 Idaho 173, 177.45 P.3d 829,

~33

,

:,

"

:.~

(1999)(emphasis added).

twb prior: occasions, plaintiff is un~ble

Agaul, as the Court has now recogJlized on at least

I,

,

::,
to

'

I

do because of its own. failure to provide requested documepts in support of its cl~ its failure
'J

'

\

I

to value its own claim throughout the course of the claim~\ process and the litigation,
,

I

an4 its
~

1

failure to provide the Court with competent evidence that I1mtford WWj engaging in "dela.y' for

:',

I

'

,

:

I

'

I

delay's sake," For trus reason, Lakeland CllIl1lot demonstrat~: that there is some genuine issJe of
materia! fa.ot that, if proven at trial, would demonstrate thaiihe
'.

c1~m was !!Q! fairly debaulble,

"

'

See, e.8.. Q:reene y, Truck Ins. Exchange. 114 Idaho at 68 (s#mmary judgment granted to indurer

"
I
:
on bad faith claim - "Although the investigation consumed ~erat:months, and might well have
j;

I

I

'

,

of
t2D.y: indication thot the com~any
',:
;
I

been conducted more expeditiously. the record is devoid

,

intended to achieve dolfl)' for dela.y's sake. Rathel, the ,!ecord~includin8 extracts from I the
~'

:

'

..

'

I

:';

:

!

','.

I

•

I'

I

:

:';

1

company's elaim file-demonstrates beyond dispute that lfie company's representatives ~ere

concerned about the unique nature of the claim and about i~he
sp~seness of verifiable facts to
,
,
support Greene's theory that a cougar attack produced. his ~airy ~erd's mastitis .... In our ~C'W
Greene's claim was, and is, "fairly debatable" within the
of WhIte."); S.9~e
v,
, memting
,
,
,

Exchange W. Co., 116 Idaho 251, 775 P.2d 143 (Ct. App. i~989)(su:mmatY judgment
r.

I

grant~d to

t

I

~ature ;of dispute over valuatidn of

insurer on bad faith claim. based on "fairly debatable"
,

"

,

i

insured's claim for an x·ray machine and for business intemlption)~
:
:
I
!
As such, plaintiff's Fourth Motion should be denied..~~
1
i

;"

"
,~

E'

1

,
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•

"

• • • ,'"

••

•

•••••

c.

_

•• 0

. _. . . . . . . . . 0

.......!

•

I

"I
Plaintiff fails to address the rematnmg
aements 0 fb ad" ,ial'th.'

l.,,~ J~ff

f remam
I, und'lscussed by p ...I..u~
...
' 'th c1·
Further, the remaining elements 0f a bad tal
al~

1

first. plaintiff must demonstrate that any improper dela.y

,

as !!.9.i the result of

I

fI.

f~ith
I

gooa

,

I

:

'

mistake, an element of the cla:im of bad faith that has (Still).! never,! been addr~ssed by plain:iff.
1

Second, plaintiIT has not advf,I,l\ced exttaoontractual

damasJ such as would admissible at trHll -

in fact, plaintiff's damages at the time of mal are expressly

Jmited~to $19,052 (subject to crbss-

examination. which may further dramatically reduce that nbber):. Absent sufficient conJary

,
I

proof on these issues. Lakeland cannot survive summary ju

ent; and certainly cannot su.pport

I
a request for reconsideration. R.O, Nelson, A.I.A. v, Steer, I lIS Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117.
.

'

,

!I

118 (1990)("(A] party against whom a summary judgment Ijs sought cannot merely
rest on his
• .
,

I

I

pleadings but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must cbme

withstand a motion fur

I

.

p~lude the is~uancc: of surnmAt')'

I
to establis~ the
I

judgment ..:.. To

~ary judgment, tb~ [non-I1loviAs P~'sJ case must be ancho~cd I
!

something more solid than speCUlation; a mere, scintilla

semDne issue,

,

0,' er documentation

forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or
existence of material issues of fact which

I

lfi
~

:

evidence is not enough to cre~te a

,,' [T)here is no issue for trial ;"'Iess ther !is sumd""t evid""••

favo~ !be

.... Summary judgment shoJd be

non-moving party for a jury to letum a verdict for that p

~ted if the evidence in opposition to the motion 'ia lUcllY
coloroble' 01' 'is not Signifioktly
II
I
i

probative,"')(cmphasis added); Mont8omerx

.

_

~

v. Montgomery.

~

,

,

,.

i

141 Idaho 1. _, 20S P.3d: 650,

(2009)("'When considering evidence presented in SUI'ort Of;OI opposition to a motit for

'summary judgment, a ~urt can only consider material w .ch w,ould be admissible at tdal.);
accord,

J~U-B Engineers, Inc., 146 Idaho at 318 (~umJ,~ juhgment granted to inSUlt on
I

I
I

I

I

:
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.

I

!

i

)

is
'

I
i

I

2:102

...... .... _..... .-

I

breach of contract and bad faith claim where insured failed

I

l'redent "admissible evidencd in

0

the record to support such a claim in this case. '1
,

i

I

Thus, in short, plaintiff's Motion fails to adequately

,

addro~8 the key el~ents of
,

9.

' I

~ad
,
i

faith claim, such as to permit that bad faith clft.~ to 9:ive s~ary judgment. Accordin~lY.

j

this Court should deny plaintiff's Fourth Motion_
"

D.

I

I

:

:

,

i
Plaintiff's second argument on reconsideration! (actkuy) ~pparent1y raised for tho bt

Plaintiff's ambi2Ui1y argument fails in light of the lankge bfthe PoliW-

time) is that the "Period Of Restoration" provision

~ roner! is ombiguow:, and, ~,
the

onibjgui~'1h ~ the "Period of Restora~n"
effecti....cly continues indefinitely beyond the 12-mohth ~aximUm outlined in the Policy i
perhaps even for months, years, or even decades: This ~g
cnt is IJmeritless.
;I
plalnti1l'should be gi_ the benefit of the

,

4

I

1

'

'

As an initial matter, plaintiff's intent in maldU,'g th~ ar~ent is to apparently astf- the
II
I
I
Court - again - for reconsideration of the scOpe of/Mr. lHarper,'s teitimony. See Plaintiff's

tl:fY
tJ all matters within his aria of
T"
expertise and fat' which he is competent and not limitl his Jstimo~y damages incurred ~fore
Memo at 8 ("The Court should 8lld allow Dan Harper! to
I

I

:

to

~jectecl, as tCh a ~otion to reconsider is bC~
the scope previously permitted by the Court. o~ Mardh 9, 101 0, ~e Court entertainod pwJtiff's
the expiration of 12 months."). This should be

I

MOtiOD

I

j

,~.

I

to Reconsider on the subject ofthc sco~e of~. H~er's testimony_ At that hearint the

Court notcd that "I will extend

, , r

DO

deadlines.

I

,

~d thete is ,~ NotiJeI of Hearing a to a moti/on
to
,

reconsideration, but there's no motion, and that is the last thing liwill bear from anyone prior to
,
~
I
!
the trial [.J" Transcript of Mareh 9,2010 hearing, at 11.42:12-16. At the March 24, 201P, the
,
~
:
•I
II
COurt :reemphasized: "[.M]y recollection, Ms. ;Dukc'l is a:~ the time of the hearing on thb last
II
I
;
motion to recon:;idcr there was another motion to r~nsilcr tha~ was in the file but not noticed
I

I

,

:

I I !I
I ' I
I

BAltTFORD'5 OPP03~no~ 1'0 PLAlNTIn"S F,?URTj MO'li'lI' ON

.

-

,

Fr

i

r

R RECO~SJDERATJON • 6

I I
I

iI

I

i

2:10:1

i"

.

I ,

up. and my IUling at the last hearing was anything

that'~ filiff righJ now can be heard, not tkt
~

I

'

day, but can heard between now and trial." Trans'cript 0 MJch 24,12010 hearing, at II. 23:6.~ 1.

The motion present at issue, which was filed on
this Court for an Order reconsidering its prior

~arChIIs, 2 10, in1cates that is that it "moves
I

ord~T dismissi

'

PlaiJti.ffs bad faith claims in bus

~
fd'amages.I Tfl, s. pIam
i tiff·

I
i iI
,
matter." It does not indicate that it is seeking reconsi! eration of ieither the.1imitations of Mr.
'
s testimony,
or the availab'l'
J ItyIscope 0
Harper,

l

. to ar~le a
attempting

I

I

I

'

I

I

'

:

18

motion for reconsideration not on me pn'or to March 9, 2010) despite the fact that the Courtihas

twice indicated it would not entertain any s\lch
,
plaintiff's Fourth Motion on that ground.

rno~on.

As sJcb, the Court should reject
,I
I

I

,
~

!
i

I
!

l

I

Even were the Court to entertWn plaintiffis Motion, l'iowever, the claim is meritless, as no

.,

..

' .In

amblgulty eXlsts m the Pohey

. . :, .

I

I
I

.!

proVldmg Busmess lome poverage for the 'Penod of

'00' f n!
.
.n.estoration:

"
F'1!st, the P0 I'ley grants coverage )Jor the p,1en
R.estorallon.
:
I
o. Business Income
:

;

:

0

'

suspension ofyour troperarion.s" during rhe ''p~riod I ifresloration ".
,

(Affidavit of Melanie Copley, filed August 20) 2009 "Copley

12.

!
'

,I

4t.

l1
),

!

Exh. A, at H 405.) The

trPeriodofRestoration" means th~perio o/time Thor:

!

~ireC( ~hy.Jcal

a.
Begins with rhe date of
10)S or physical damage i
caused by or resulting from a eovere I C;Jse of Loss at the "scheduled
premises, and
II

b.

I

/

,I

I,

I

Ends on the date when:

,I
JJ

(1)
The property af. the "sc du/ed /premises should be
repalred, rebuilt, or rcp!aced with I easonahle speed and similar
quality;
;
I

,
I

,

I

.

I

"

I

,
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I
I
. ,
I

.

i

:

I

'

!

I

~~

.. ,,

I

I

j

.

j'

I

;

(2) The date when yOW' bUSineSj is r 'Sume ;at a new, permanenl
1ocation.
.
.
iI

:

(Id. at 419.) The Policy then expressly limits the len~ of Ie PerjJd of Restoration to no ro~re

~

than 12 months:

I

I

)

J

(3) We will only pay for loss 0/ Business ncor,u: th)u occurs within 12
consecutive months after the daJe of direct physical loss !or physical damage..
This Additional Coverage is not ~ject to the LX" itSf.lnsurnce. ...

'

;

(Id at 405.), Plaintiff attempts to argue that the defi, ina, of "lleriod of Restoration" llini1S

I

I

!

coverage by, essentially, providing no limit on covel'agc, whic~ results in an ambiguitY in
I
I

coverage by conflicting with the Policy capllimit of 12 mon

This argument is nonsensical I
:
enns fuereby provides the
of
51.

'limii·

plaintiff's argument, at its core, is iliat the mere defInition 0

,ITOU1 resul I,In ..u.w1flllted coverage.:;For

' a de.w,unons
.l:-: •
coverage, Which, Daturaily, m
section,

~

_1'

•

example, the Policy also defines "Money" as f'(a) "Morey" ~t its fape value". (Copley Afr., ~xh.

A, H 416,) However, the Policy goes on to limit cover ge fJr uMohey" to $10,000 in other Jreas
of the Policy (fa. at H000384 and H000402). PtaiJitrs argUlJent, applied in this sceJano,

would mean that the mere definition of "Money" in 4e de
unbounded coverage, irrespective of the express

'tioJ section of the Policy

lilDita~ons [' fthe J01iey.

cr~ated
!

I 'rerms of the Policy. See,; e.g.•

Thus, there is no ambiguity in the Policy> in light j f the

d

Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. y. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. q" 1 1

I

Id~b 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751", 754
df the

(2005) ("In construing an insurance policy, the Couh m it look to the plain meaning
words to determine if there are any ambiguities.

I
I
'
~s trmiJtion is a question of lair.

I

resolving this question of law, the Court must construe
i,olated pbrase,")(empbasis added),

I

I

e

P9~icy "as

a whole, Dot

lortured

reading of a

to be deemed ambiguous, a tenn must be ccreaSjOably su~er

'to

.'

. . ..

,

MOrON FOR. RECONSIDERATION· l8

I.

aD

diffilring iDterpreratns,"

,
HAR"fFORJ)'S OPPOSlrION TO PLAINTIFF'S fOUR

In

~OIiCY
rage, ~iSregardS clear Idaho la~ that
I
;

Moreover, flaia 'ff's

definition. in an attempt to create essentially UnlimitjclJ co

~y

.

i

;

I

'

•••

w

'"

•

• ~.

•

•

,

.

A,1:l'g51rong v. F!mPe!s

Ins. Co.

.

I

'

of Idaho. 143 :Idaho: 135 137, 139 P.3d 737, 739 (2006)

(_phasi. aclded)( "there is no obligation on courts to

~UIl1ance a tortured consauction o~ en

insurance contract's language in order to create an ambig'
.

and thus provide an avenue: for
I

!

coverage where none exists:" Id. (quoting Mutual of Ehum aw Ins, Co. v. Roper!&- 1281daho
232,236,912 P.2d 119, 123 (1996».

,
Notably. plaintiff cites no authority holding ili,~l p icy language regarding "PerioQ of
"

i

Restoration" is ambiguous. Indeed, in cases previousfy di ussed by the parties, th~ c;ourtia in
i

those matters expressly found Period of Restoration colvcra

to be limited to a maximum cjf 12

,:

"

,

2003 WL 22004888, a~ n.l

months. See, e.g., trearnline Ca ita LLC v. Hart ord'Cas:

ru:. Co.

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)("The business income insurance Ullder

e Policy is limited to the lois of

I

busciness income that occurs 'within 12 consecutive

m1nths' after the date of direct physical; loss

'1
) .L...ava
T_,
;
II
I
or damage. '" - same policy
anguage;
TradiD &l.c. v Hanford Fire Ins. Co. 365 F. Supp.
2d 434,

~47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005){"Lava reli~ on ~anguJ,ge i
i'
,

the Policy itself that

provide~. for
'

I

example, that there is DO dollar limit for busi1l6SS intezfupti n coverage, which is limited only by
1

h

a maximum of twelve months plus thirty days,!' - sitPiiar olley language where the Period of
Restoration

,,~s on the date when the property at Je

cribed premises should be

rep~red,

,J
'
1::3~;D:~~. !o:J:~;
'f ;::::~u:: 1:
'
reStorali~n. it
cons~utive

::::;:::,::e

,

I:

t>usin<:ss inc<J"", loss during the 'period of

to exceed twelve (12)

"d~fined as the period of time necess~ to
repair. rebuild or replace the damaged property ~th Jason ble speed and similar quality. ,,)l
months''', where the 'period of restoration' .was
.

I

,

I,
Plaintiff's citation to Farmers Ins. Co. ,¥, Talbot, 33 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043 (11999)
,'
,I'
offers no assista:Dcc; to its position. Talbot invol ed conflicting damage calcUlation
/'

,

t .

i

,.

I,'

:'
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i
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, I

f

2:JO(,

~
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1

. ,_. ......' .......... -" ................ .

~
j

~

.i

J

:~,

'I

I

methodologies in a single Underinsmed Motorist provi~ion. ;!One provision limited coverag~ to

···'the difference of the total amount paid by that

yaur damage, up

'verls

l~ility. i n _ and tho amounl of

to the limils of the coverage,' hterJ. the 'endorsement then

second, different limitation: 'O[tJhe

mcl.deiI

a

<1jffercnc~ bjloen tHe anlunt paid in damages to the ins.Jred
I'

'

'

person by and :fur any pc1'son or organi:zation who may ge leJany liable for the bodily injury, ~d

I , '.

the limit of the UNDERinsured Motorist

Cove~e." Itt at fO'

The Hartford Policy at

i~ in

this matter contai.n.s no such patent ambiguity, an~, thus I TalBot offers no guidance.
As such, plaintiffs Fourth Motion

:

shOulfe detI ed. 'i;l

CONC

SIO

'
;

':

:

abovr PI&!nitr} founh Motion for Recon.sld~1ion
" Iii
.bo>1ld be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMIrrED this ,~ 1(iay Jf A~tu, 2010.
'
.
I
II r,.
Aooordingly, for the reasons stated

HALL, F~:! • OBER.RJiCHT &
/sL '
:~ P.A.
::

;1
ii

By'

KeeI y '. Jj) ell. Of the trm
N k~ls - Of the Finn
Attome11for ~efendant
B~an A.

h
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I
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